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ABSTRACT
Psychopaths are known to wreak havoc in the lives, careers, and relationships of people
with whom they come into contact, triggering impacts that can extend for many years. To
date, few studies have investigated the psychological tactics used by psychopaths to
manipulate and control others in relationships. Previous research in the area of
autobiographical memory has demonstrated that the decisions people make regarding
belief in their memory for life events are influenced by feedback received from others.
Social feedback has been shown to be a powerful influence in persuading others to revise
beliefs about past events, particularly in the context of close relationships. The two
studies described herein applied what is known about social remembering to examine
how individuals evaluate intrapersonal (i.e., cognitive) and interpersonal (i.e., social)
influences when deciding what to believe about their memory following the receipt of
disconfirmatory social feedback, termed memory challenge, within the context of a
dyadic relationship. The social-cognitive (SCO) dissonance model of decision-making
about memory (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) outlines interpersonal and intrapersonal
influences of rememberers decisions to: (a) maintain or reduce belief in memory, and (b)
agree or disagree with the challenger. Two samples of rememberers provided descriptions
of a memory challenge and ratings of characteristics of their relationship, their memory,
the challenge, their personality, and the personality of the challenger. Rememberers’
ratings were used to compute composite scores representing the four main elements of
the SCO model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020): evaluation of memory, evaluation of
feedback, reasons to agree, and reasons to disagree; and to identify statistical predictors
of belief reduction and agreement with the challenger. Of the rememberers recruited from

iv

an undergraduate student psychology pool and Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 259), 60%
reported reducing belief in their memory and 29% reported agreeing with the challenger.
In contrast, of the rememberers who self-identified as victims of suspected psychopaths
(N = 86, Study 2), only 33% reported reducing belief in their memory and 10% reported
agreeing with the challenger. Unexpectedly, psychopathy scores did not differ between
outcome groups within the sample of self-identified victims. However, psychopathy
scores differed between samples, as did the status of the relationship between
rememberer and challenger, suggesting that different elements of the SCO model
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) may influence decisions about memory depending on the
relationship. Finally, regression analyses in both studies revealed overlap in the statistical
predictors of rememberers’ decisions to reduce belief and to agree with the challenger
suggesting that, although conceptually distinct, the interpersonal (social) and
intrapersonal (cognitive) influences overlap in practice. The findings of both studies add
to what is known about the social and cognitive influences of decision making about
memory in response to social feedback. Additionally, these studies mark some of the first
examinations of memory challenges as potential manipulation tactics used to influence
the memories of others.
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CHAPTER I
General Introduction
What is Memory?
Simply defined as the capacity to encode, store, and retrieve information (Squire,
2009), the term memory encompasses the many different structures and processes involved
in retaining information over time. Memory, more broadly, supports all cognitive functions
making it possible to learn new information, to think about the past, and to make decisions
about the future (Exton-McGuinness et al., 2015; Kim, 2012). With such a central role in
functioning, it is crucial that individuals have confidence in their memory and, without
evidence to the contrary they assume that their memory truthfully and accurately represents
the past. However, situations do arise when the accuracy of a memory is called into question.
Something as simple as a conversation with a family member in which accounts of a past
event differ can challenge one’s confidence in their memory. Depending on the specific
memory being challenged, questioning belief in the accuracy of one’s recollection can have
serious implications for the rememberer.
This dissertation examines memory challenges to test a model of belief in memory
but first starts with an overview of the elements of memory. These elements are differentiated
by the type of information involved, the stages of memory storage, and the cognitive
processes involved in information acquisition and retention (Mahr & Csibra, 2018; Zlotnik &
Vansintjan, 2019). Each of these three elements of memory – types, stages, and processes –
are reviewed first to provide context for the present investigation into social challenges to
memory.

1

Memory Stages
According to the multi-store model of memory (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968),
information passes through three possible stages or ‘stores’: sensory memory, short-term
memory, and long-term. Each stage differs in its storage capacity and the duration for which
information can be retained. First, large quantities of information are received by the sensory
system. Sensory information is only available for a fraction of a second before it is lost,
unless it is attended to and transferred to short-term memory for processing (Tripathy &
Ogmen, 2018). With a much smaller storage capacity, short-term memory receives and stores
sensory information for a short period of time while connections are made with existing
memory networks in long-term memory (Cowan, 2008; Schacter & Tulving, 1994). Finally,
long-term memory can retain vast quantities of information accumulated over many years
(Cowan, 2008; Schacter & Tulving, 1994). There is currently no known limit to the amount
of information or the period for which long-term memories can be retained (Wang et al.,
2003). All three stages of memory are foci of a great deal of scientific study, but the focus of
this dissertation is long-term memory.
Types of Long-Term Memory
Different types of information are stored in long-term memory (Conway, 2009;
Tulving, 1972) but the distinction relevant to the present study is between semantic memory
and episodic memory. Semantic memory refers to the explicit memory store of factual
information and general knowledge about the world accumulated through conscious learning
and experience (St-Laurent et al., 2011; Tulving, 1972). As such, semantic memories
typically take longer to form connections and may require repeated rehearsal to move from
short-term to long-term memory. For example, it is semantic memory that allows you to
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identify Madrid as the capitol of Spain. In lay terms, semantic memory is what most of us
think of as ‘knowledge’ whereas our episodic memory is what most of us think of as
‘memory.’
Episodic memory comprises information about personally experienced events or
‘episodes’ (Tulving, 1972, 1985). Episodic memories are thought to be committed to longterm memory more quickly than semantic memory and without much repetition (Conway,
2009; Schacter & Tulving, 1994). One possible explanation for this difference in ease of
processing is that episodic memories contain rich contextual information about the time and
place of the event that reflect more connections in long-term memory than semantic
information (Squire et al., 2015). However, episodic memories are also thought to be more
vulnerable to interference for the same reason. For example, the memory you have of getting
on a plane to Spain would be an example of an episodic memory. If you happen to be a
frequent traveller, it is possible that the episodic memory of getting on that flight to Spain is
actually a memory of another flight out of the same airport at the same time of year.
As a combination of semantic and episodic memory, autobiographical memories are
composed of both episodic memories for life experiences and semantic knowledge about
oneself and one’s life (Tulving, 2002). Autobiographical memories are thus personally
significant and emotionally salient for the rememberer (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000;
Talarico et al., 2009). With respect to the prior example of a memory of a flight to Spain,
semantic memory might guide in conjuring the memory to the extent that you know that
flights to Spain leave the Toronto airport early evening. Memory for a specific flight (or
episode) would thus be constrained by that time and location.
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The characteristics of autobiographical memories and the processes involved in
autobiographical memory encoding and retrieval are critical to the present studies and, as
such, are explored in detail in the following sections.
Autobiographical Memory
Simply put, autobiographical memories are memories for the events of one’s life
(Conway & Rubin, 1993). More than a series of episodes strung together, it is the product of
integration of perceptions and interpretations of past experiences into a coherent life narrative
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). For example, it is the autobiographical memory system
that retains information about your trip to Spain as a college junior as well as the personal
importance of this trip as a milestone in achieving your independence and realizing your
passion for world travel. The life narrative produced by the autobiographical memory system
has important implications for understanding our personal history, identity, and place in the
world (Fivush, 2011).
What makes autobiographical memories unique from other types of long-term
memory is that they contain different types of knowledge at different levels of specificity
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Autobiographical memory is a combination of
episodic memories (i.e., specific sequences of past lived experiences) and
autobiographical knowledge (i.e., details of the past that are known to be true regardless
of whether they can be explicitly recalled; Kihlstrom, 2009; Scoboria et al., 2014). As
such, autobiographical memories almost always involve information about a specific life
period (e.g., college), details associated with the life period (e.g., increasing
independence), a general event (e.g., trip to Spain), and knowledge specific to that event
(e.g., the view from the departure lounge at the airport; Conway, 1996). Combined, these
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different types of information and different levels of specificity provide rich contextual
information that, when transferred to long-term memory, allows for a relatively stable
representation that is more easily recalled than factual information alone (Dudai, 2002,
2004).
Why is Autobiographical Memory Important?
Autobiographical memory involves the interplay between one’s sense of self and
one’s personal knowledge base or ‘record’ of past experiences (Conway & PleydellPearce, 2000). It allows for the development of a sense of self that is continuous in time
by linking specific, personal experiences from the past to the present and the future
(Fivush, 2010, 2011; McLean et al., 2007). As such, it has been theorized to serve at least
three essential functions. These functions relate to the self, to social relationships, and to
the direction of future behaviour (Alea & Bluck, 2003; Bluck et al., 2005; Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Fivush, 2011; Pillemer, 1992, 1998, 2001, 2003; Schacter et al.,
2007).
The self-function of autobiographical memory informs self-definition and selfperception (Bluck & Alea, 2008). Memories from the past inform the development of
cognitive schemas regarding personal values, abilities, and goals which, in turn, inform
thoughts, choices, and behaviour (Bartlett, 1932; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000;
Habermas & Bluck, 2000; Waters et al., 2014). In fact, self-schemas and
autobiographical memories are so closely related that they are often referred to as part of
the larger construct of ‘the self’ (Conway & Tacchi, 1996).
The social functions of autobiographical memory include the development and
maintenance of social bonds through communication and interaction with others (Bartlett,
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1932; Fivush et al., 2018; Mahr & Cisbra, 2018). Social bonds are essential for human
wellbeing and reminiscing about the past is one way people develop and nurture
importance relationships (Rimé et al., 1991). Regardless of whether the autobiographical
memory being recalled was an event shared by all parties, remembering can be thought of
as a social transaction in which parties share information and communicate their needs
(Clark & Stephenson, 1995; Wegner, 1986).
Finally, directive functions of autobiographical memory include motivation for
and guidance of future behaviour as well as informing problem-solving approaches based
on past experiences (Kuwabara & Pillemer, 2010; Pillemer, 2001, 2003; Waters et al.,
2014). Given the important implications of autobiographical memory for human
behaviour and interpersonal relationships, a deeper understanding of the processes
involved in memory, particularly those related to how memory can be influenced, is
warranted.
Understanding Memory Development: Encoding, Storage, and Retrieval
Another way memory is understood is through the cognitive processes involved in
transferring information between stages. First, sensory information is converted into a form
that can be retained temporarily in short-term memory through the process known as
encoding. Encoding effectively translates newly acquired sensory information into
meaningful representations which can then be stored and accessed in the future (Tulving &
Thomson, 1973). Because the process of encoding happens in short-term memory, it is
limited in both quantity and duration. As such, newly encoded memories are considered
unstable and therefore vulnerable to “disruption” through decay or interference until they are
stabilized in long-term memory (Exton-McGuinness et al., 2015, p. 376).
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In order for information to be retained over longer periods, a more elaborate method
of processing is required to transfer the encoded information from short-term memory (STM)
to long-term memory (LTM); a process known as consolidation (Squire et al., 2015).
Memory consolidation involves the development of new neural connections between the
newly encoded information and the existing knowledge base, resulting in an increasingly
complex network of related memories (Squire & Wixted, 2015). The networks that exist in
long-term memory are responsible for the strength and resilience of memories to withstand
interference and decay over time, allowing memories to be recalled after days, weeks, and
even years.
Memory retrieval refers to the processes by which stored information is brought
back into consciousness in order to be used. Retrieval can be elicited spontaneously by a
cue in the environment (e.g., seeing a photograph of Madrid) or through conscious effort
(e.g., recounting details of a trip to a friend; Berntsen, 2009). In order to retrieve
information from long-term memory, the rememberer must access the memory store and
select the appropriate memory. The selected memory is then reactivated by returning it to
short-term working memory where it is reconstructed based on current goals and
influences (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Dudai, 2002). The same basic processes
occur regardless of the type of information involved; however, the context surrounding
memory retrieval has been found to influence what is recalled (Bartlett, 1932; Koriat &
Goldsmith, 1996; Tulving, 1983). The influence of retrieval context and cues will be
discussed in more detail in subsequent sections.
Finally, once it is no longer in use, the retrieved information is returned to longterm memory through a process known as reconsolidation (Exton-McGuinness et al.,
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2015; Hupbach et al., 2009; Nader, 2003; Sara, 2000). Reconsolidated memories are once
again stable but not necessarily the same as the previously retrieved memory. Future
retrievals of memories reflect changes made to the memory trace during past retrievals
once reconsolidation has occurred (Alberini & LeDoux, 2013). Even the stable
representations that form autobiographical memories are subject to updating to allow for
new information and connections to be made based on new experiences or new
interpretations (Exton-McGuinness et al., 2015; Hirst, 2010).
How Memories Can Change
Once thought to be a perfect and unchanging record of the past, human memory is
now understood to be both imperfect and dynamic (Hyman & Loftus, 1998; Loftus,
2005). Decades of research have shown that memories can and do change over time.
Changes to memory are what allow for the incorporation of new information and
updating of existing knowledge structures. In fact, the ability to revise and update
memories is understood to have developed because it allows humans to adapt to new
experiences or changes in the environment (Klein et al., 2002). The latest understanding of
human memory is that it is dynamic, malleable, and open to outside influence (Hardt et al.,
2010; Loftus, 1975; Ost et al., 2002).
Research on human memory has shown that errors can occur at any stage of
information processing and that memories evolve over time due to repeated
reconstructions (Bartlett, 1932; Roediger & DeSoto, 2015). Encoded information that is
not consolidated in long-term memory can be lost over time through decay, commonly
referred to as forgetting (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913). Consolidation of newly encoded
information can also be disrupted if conflicting information is already stored in long-term
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memory; a phenomenon known as interference (Baddeley, 1999). The disruption of
memory consolidation can occur because the new memory may conflict with previously
learned information – termed proactive interference – or because new information may
conflict with an existing memory – termed retroactive interference (Baddeley & Logie,
1999; Underwood, 1957).
Finally, memory changes are also possible during the retrieval process. The many
ways in which memory is subject to change during retrieval is the main focus of this
dissertation and, as such, is reviewed in detail in the following sections.
Autobiographical Memory Retrieval (aka Remembering)
The term ‘remembering’ broadly refers to the retrieval processes by which
information stored in long-term memory is brought back into short-term memory for
current use. The same basic retrieval processes are thought to occur regardless of the type
of information involved. What makes autobiographical remembering unique is that it
involves the simultaneous retrieval of semantic knowledge regarding past events as well
as phenomenological details of lived experiences (i.e., sights, sounds, smells, and
feelings) that give the rememberer a sense of reexperiencing the past (Tulving, 1985;
2002). In fact, the degree of internal information regarding mental imagery, emotional
valence and intensity, and spatial characteristics of the scene included in autobiographical
memories contributes to its “episodicity” (Habermas et al., 2013, p. 1062). Contrasted
with the mostly external information recalled when accessing the knowledge that a past
event occurred, autobiographical remembering describes the process of recalling how a
past event occurred.
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Recently, researchers in the area of autobiographical memory have distinguished
between knowing that an event occurred in the past, termed belief in occurrence, and the
mental representation of how it occurred, termed recollection (Scoboria et al., 2014).
Both are important constructs in the area of autobiographical memory and will be
revisited in later sections.
The Functions of Autobiographical Remembering
Remembering the past satisfies two core human needs: epistemic needs and
relational needs (Echterhoff et al., 2009; Kihlstrom, 2009). Epistemic needs refer to the
need to achieve a valid and reliable understanding of the world and to establish
agreement with important others about what is real (Higgins, 2012). Relational needs
refer to the basic human need to feel connected to others and to elicit social support from
others (Alea & Bluck, 2003; Bluck, 2003; Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012). Both needs explain
why autobiographical remembering occurs. First, the act of remembering is useful in
producing a mutually acceptable shared narrative of past events. Second, remembering in
the presence of others serves to build and maintain important interpersonal relationships
(Bluck & Alea, 2011; Bluck et al., 2005; Waters et al., 2014). Both needs are served
when individuals recall their personal past in the presence of others, the phenomenon
known as social remembering (Clark & Stephenson, 1995).
Social Remembering
As social creatures, many aspects of the human experience are subject to social
influence and memory is no exception. In fact, the act of retrieving information from
memory is an important social behaviour (Bietti & Stone, 2019; Echterhoff & Higgins,
2020; Higgins et al., 2021; Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012; Wang, 2013). Social remembering
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refers to recall that takes place within the context of social interactions between
individuals who have experienced the same, or similar, events (Clark, 1987). When
discussing past personal events, human beings demonstrate a fundamental need to
understand the events and circumstances of their lives (Bartlett, 1932). Yet, much of what
is experienced in life cannot be objectively verified and so corroboration from others who
were present for the event is often the easiest way to confirm an autobiographical
memory (Nash et al., 2017).
Individuals discuss past events with others in an attempt to make sense of the past
and also to establish a consensus, or shared record, of past experiences (Hirst &
Echterhoff, 2012). Social consensus carries particular weight compared to other forms of
knowledge or feedback when verifying memories for past events so long as the consensus
occurs within a group of credible and reliable sources (Vorauer & Miller, 1997; Wade et
al., 2014). Although autobiographical remembering may serve the same functions for all
people, it may not be the case that all people have the same motivations for recalling the
past.
How Social Remembering Influences Memory
As mentioned, autobiographical memory does not simply consist of factual
information stored, unaltered and unedited, to be retrieved on demand (Echterhoff &
Hirst, 2009). Rather it is a system of “transitory, dynamic mental constructions generated
from an underlying knowledge base [… that are] minutely sensitive to cues, and patterns
of activation” (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000, p. 261). Participants involved in
conversational remembering, whether as a speaker (rememberer) or a listener (audience
member), have been shown to influence which events are discussed, which specific
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details about the event are recalled, and how the details are interpreted; all of which
influences how that same event is recalled in subsequent conversations (Bietti & Stone,
2019; Cuc et al., 2006; Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012; Muller & Hirst, 2014).
Pasupathi (2001) has outlined two principles of social remembering that impact
what is recalled about past events in the moment as well as any subsequent recollection
of the same event: co-construction and consistency. The principle of co-construction
emphasizes the joint influence of the speaker and the context, which includes any
audience or listeners, in reconstructing past events through conversation. Speakers and
listeners jointly influence which events are recalled in conversations about the past,
which details are discussed including interpretations made about the events or details, and
what emotions become connected with the events (Brown et al., 2009; Cuc et al., 2006;
Pasupathi, 2001).
Speakers are those who first choose which specific past event to talk about based
on the desired outcome of the conversation. Speakers present information consistent with
their self-concept, attitudes, and goals. For example, relationship-oriented individuals
tend to recall interpersonally oriented stories when free to recall events from their
personal past with minimal influence of the listener (McAdams et al., 1997). In much of
the previous research on social remembering, the speaker was considered to hold the
primary role in the conversation and little attention was given to the influence listeners
may have on reconstructions of past events (Davies & Harré, 1990; Gergen & Gergen,
1988; Hardin & Higgins, 1996).
However, by acknowledging the reciprocal influence of both speaker and listener,
Pasupathi (2001) suggests that both parties influence what is talked about, how the
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information is recalled, and what the ultimate outcome of the conversation is (i.e., what
the contents of the shared memory are following the discussion). Listeners can change the
direction of the conversation based on what direct, explicit feedback they provide to the
speaker, through their nonverbal reactions to what is discussed, and even due the
speaker’s unspoken expectations of the listeners’ reaction based on previous experience
in the relationship (Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012; Hirst et al., 1997).
Consistency refers to the changes in autobiographical knowledge that occur
during recall which influence future recollections such that they are consistent with past
recollections. Here, consistency refers to the influence of conversational reconstruction
on subsequent recall of memories for past events. Consistency in recalled information can
refer to different levels of detail with respect to the social reconstruction of memory. For
example, consistency may refer to the overall narrative or storyline of a remembered
event, the emotional valence of what was experienced, or the fine grain details of what
took place during the event (including, for example, dialogue). Consistency in overall
narratives or general themes is typically seen to a greater extent than is consistency in
specific details (Hyman, 1994). However, variations in specificity provide opportunities
for the listener to offer feedback that may or may not align with the speaker’s account
(Echterhoff & Higgins, 2020; Rossignac-Milon & Higgins, 2018).
The autobiographical memory system operates outside of conscious awareness to
guide behaviour and decision-making so that they align with the goals of the current self
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Therefore, each time an autobiographical memory is
retrieved, it is done so within the context of the rememberer’s current attitudes,
judgments, personal goals, and understanding of the world (Bartlett, 1932; Maughan &
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Rutter, 1997). As previously discussed, upon retrieval existing memories are reactivated, or
destabilized, through a return to short-term memory where they are open to modification
(Exton-McGuinness et al., 2015; Schacter & Dodson, 2001). If memories are subject to
revision based on the rememberer’s current attitudes and feelings and the rememberer’s
attitudes are subject to influence by others’ attitudes and feelings, then memories are subject
to influence byway of the reactions from rememberers’ audience or social feedback.
Social Feedback and Challenges to Memory
In conversations about past events, it may be taken for granted that listeners will
agree with the speakers’ account of their memory for the event. However, research in the
area of social remembering has demonstrated that this is rarely the case. In fact, it is more
common that individuals will have different memories for the same event (Hirst &
Manier, 1996, 2008). Whether intentional or not, listeners provide verbal and nonverbal
feedback to rememberers about the quality and accuracy of their memories for past
events; feedback which has been shown to influence both the current reconstruction of
the remembered event as well as future recollections of the same event (Brown, et al.,
2009; Cuc et al., 2006; Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012; Muller & Hirst, 2014). Feedback from
others about one’s memory for a past event can also have a strong influence on
rememberers’ belief in the occurrence of a past event (Scoboria, Boucher, et al., 2015;
Scoboria et al., 2019). In fact, Scoboria, Boucher and colleagues (2015) reported that
social feedback was the most frequently cited reason for withdrawing belief in memories
with more than 40% of survey respondents citing it as the primary reason.
Social feedback about memory can be either confirmatory or disconfirmatory.
Confirmatory feedback about memory aligns with the rememberers’ recollection of
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events and serves to confirm, or even strengthen, their confidence in their memory of the
past (Barcic, 2015; Hirst et al., 1997). In surveys of social remembering, participants
often report providing feedback about another’s memory in order to help them make
sense of their narrative for the event, to teach them, to inform them, to provide support, to
entertain, and/or to reminisce with them (Fivush, 2012; Webster, 2003). In fact,
confirmatory feedback about memory helps children to develop the skills required to
retrieve memories and communicate about the past (Dyshniku, 2017; Fivush, 2011;
Nelson & Fivush, 2004).
However, social feedback can also undermine rememberers’ belief in their
memory of past events. Disconfirmatory social feedback is any feedback that contradicts
the rememberers’ recollection of the past or suggests an alternative source of the memory
(Scoboria, Boucher et al., 2015). Social challenges to memory are defined as instances in
which listeners provide disconfirmatory (i.e., contradictory) social feedback to
rememberers regarding their memory for a past event. Social challenges can be implicit
(e.g., perceiving disapproval based on an uninterested facial expression of the listener) or
explicit (e.g., being told outright that your memory for an event is wrong).
Different types of feedback from listeners may elicit different reactions from
rememberers depending on a variety of factors including personality traits, past
experience, and relationship dynamics between rememberer and challenger (Muller &
Hirst, 2014). The numerous social and cognitive factors thought to be involved in the
evaluation of feedback about memory are the focus on the remaining sections.
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Cognitive Influences on Memory
According to the reconstructive theory of memory, humans reconstruct memories
for the past based on their current knowledge of themselves and of the world (Bartlett,
1932; Neisser, 1967; Schacter, 1996). The availability of existing cognitive schemas has
been shown to impact understanding of experiences and influence interpretation of
recalled information (Rice & Okun, 1994; Tuckey & Brewer, 2003). Experiences or
information that challenges existing cognitive schemas may be impacted more by
feedback from others than those experiences that are easily understood (Pasupathi, 2001).
In other words, imposing an existing schema on an experience recalled in conversation
may lead to the exclusion of details from original event that do not fit the schema
developed from previously learned information.
One option for memory modification, assimilation, involves the incorporation of new
information into existing structures. The second option, accommodation, occurs when
existing structures are adjusted to better represent the new information. Memories are
therefore reconstructed upon retrieval based on what is deemed plausible at the time
(Pezdek et al., 2006; Scoboria et al., 2004).
The experience of remembering has been described by Scoboria et al. (2014) as
involving a variety of metacognitive appraisals: recollection (i.e., mental simulation
accompanied by feelings of re-experiencing the past), belief in occurrence (i.e., “the truth
value attributed to the occurrence of an event, whether or not the event is recollected”, p.
1243) and belief in accuracy (i.e., the degree to which an event is believed to have
occurred in the way it is recalled, that the details that come to mind correspond to the
details that were present when the event was experienced; Scoboria, Talarico et al.,
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2015). These concepts are separate but related in that a memory with strong
phenomenological qualities (e.g., vividness, sense of reliving, spatial details, etc.) can
exist in the absence of belief that the remembered event occurred (i.e., belief in
occurrence) or in the absence of belief in the accuracy of the recollection (i.e., belief in
accuracy).
On the contrary, the occurrence of a past event can be believed by a rememberer
despite having no recollection of the occurrence; a common appraisal for events from
childhood learned about from family members, that are believed to have genuinely
happened without recollection (termed believed-not-remembered events by Mazzoni et
al., 2010). The difference between belief in accuracy, belief in occurrence, and
recollection, as well as the implications for studying autobiographical memory become
clear when discussing the social factors that impact each construct in the context of social
remembering.
Social Influences on Memory
Several social factors have been identified in existing research on social, or
collaborative, remembering. The following sections include a select few factors that have
been studied in the context of social remembering.
Personality
As a primarily social phenomenon, conversational remembering is heavily
influenced by the individuals that make up the social group engaged in discussion. It
stands to reason that the resulting conversation, in terms of information shared, direction
of reconstructed narrative, and group dynamics would be impacted by the personality
traits of the parties involved.
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Narcissism. Simply defined as the ability to maintain a positive view of the self,
narcissism has been shown to occur in the general population on a continuum from
normal to pathological (Pincus et al., 1999; Pincus et al., 2009). Normal, or adaptive,
narcissism refers to the tendency to be assertive, demonstrate agency, and maintain a
positive self-concept through the use of self-enhancement and self-regulation (Dowgwillo
& Pincus, 2017; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). Pathological, or maladaptive, narcissism is
demonstrated through expressions of grandiosity, entitlement, and an inflated sense of
self achieved and maintained through socially inappropriate behaviour involving
aggression and interpersonal dominance (Dowgwillo & Pincus, 2017; Furnham et al.,
2013; Pincus et al., 2014).
In studying memory challenges, narcissism in the rememberer could reduce the
likelihood that disconfirmatory social feedback would lead to questioning the accuracy of
a memory. Alternatively, narcissistic challengers who impress as more knowledgeable or
confident in their recollection of events may be more effective at challenging a
rememberer and persuading them to alter belief in their memory.
Although not directly focused on social remembering, Jones and colleagues
(2017) recently explored the relationship between narcissism and autobiographical
memory reporting, finding that narcissists are faster at retrieving positive self-focused (“a
time when you felt clever”) than negative self-focused autobiographical memories (“a
time when you felt stupid”) and were faster at retrieving negative group-focused (“a time
when you felt rude”) versus positive group-focused (“a time when you felt cooperative”)
autobiographical memories. Narcissists also rated items related to memory
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phenomenology (i.e., visual detail, sense of reliving, etc.) higher for positive rather than
negative self-focused memories.
Compliance. Compliance refers to the tendency of an individual to obey the
propositions, requests or instructions made by others and is thought to be comprised of
two main characteristics: (1) an eagerness to please others, and (2) an avoidance of
conflict and confrontation (Gudjonsson, 1989, 2003). Compliance does not require
agreement with the position or request, just that the individual performs the behavior
requested of them. Compliant individuals have been shown to be more susceptible to
social influence particularly in situations involving authority figures which explains the
application of compliance research to the study of false confessions (Blair, 2007;
Gudjonsson, 2003, 2006; Gudjonsson & Main, 2008; Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004).
Compliance is of interest in the study of memory challenges because of the
implications the tendency to conflict avoidance and please others could have in
conversations about past events, particularly in which parties disagree regarding the
occurrence and accuracy of their memories. Furthermore, compliance has been shown to
predict vulnerability to coercion by others in interpersonal interactions (Gudjonsson,
2004; Kassin, 2008) which would suggest that compliant rememberers may report
agreement with the individual challenging their memory regardless of their own belief in
their memory.
Interpersonal Style
According to the interpersonal circumplex model of personality (IPC; Sullivan,
1953; Leary, 1957), a person’s approach to interacting with others can be characterized
along two orthogonal dimensions: (1) dominance-submissiveness and (2)
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coldheartedness-agreeableness. These dimensions represent certain dispositions or
tendencies of individuals that reflect their values and beliefs and influence their
behaviour towards others (Wiggins, 1995; Wiggins & Broughton, 1985).
Dominance. Dominance refers to the demonstration of autonomy and control as
well as a value of personal agency in interpersonal interactions (Locke & Adamic, 2012;
Wiggins, 2003). According to IPC theory, dominant individuals believe they are worthy
of respect and value superiority over others (Wiggins, 1995). In studies of conversational
remembering, a dominant narrator has been shown to have more influence over the
collective narrative of a group than an individual with perceived expertise (Brown et al.,
2009; Cuc et al., 2006).
Agreeableness. Individuals closer to the agreeable end of the coldheartnessagreeableness continuum tend to demonstrate warmth towards others, and value building
relationships and community with others (Locke & Adamic, 2012; Wiggins, 2003).
Individuals who are high on agreeableness have been shown to prioritize altruism,
community, and collaboration over competition or personal gratification (Wiggins, 1995).
In the context of social remembering, agreeableness would be expected to predict
motivation to maintain positive interpersonal relationships (Jensen-Campbell et al.,
2003).
Goals
The term collaborative remembering seems to imply that the parties involved are
working towards a common goal when recalling past events (Pasupathi & Wainryb,
2019). Yet, real life remembering often involves multiple differing, even conflicting,
opinions and goals which influence the process and outcome of conversations about
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memory (Cohen, 1998; Cuc et al., 2006; Hyman & Faries, 1992; Gollwitzer & Wicklund,
1985; Marsh & Tversky, 2004). For example, rememberers may recount past traumatic
past experiences with the goal of garnering emotional support from those around them.
However, listeners may respond by minimizing the impact of the recalled event in an
attempt to protect him- or herself from experiencing difficult emotions (Pasupathi, 2001).
When comparing the potential influence of different goals resulting in different
ways of recalling the same event, research suggests the people with the stronger
motivation to achieve their goals may “win” the negotiation and more heavily influence
the content of the resulting narrative (Hinde, 1978). What is not understood is how the
influence of goals is impacted by the personality and interpersonal characteristics (e.g.,
trait dominance, or conflict management styles) of the parties involved. Based on each
individual’s goals, both speakers and listeners may add new information, question
presented information, change focus of speaker’s retrieval, or otherwise alter the
discourse to achieve the desired outcome.
Behaviour
Verbal and nonverbal behaviour of the listener also impacts what the speaker
chooses to discuss and how the conversation unfolds. Speakers are known to deliberately
shorten or omit information based on both verbal (e.g., challenges posed by the listener)
and nonverbal responses (e.g., facial expressions that suggest disapproval) of listeners
(Dickinson & Givon, 1995; Pasupathi et al., 1998). Listeners who appear distracted or
disinterested elicit less information for speakers (Pasupathi, 2001). Even ambivalent
responses (e.g., looks of confusion) influence the level of detail communicated by
speakers (Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012). People often remember more than they recount to
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others regarding the details of past events, particularly when the audience is expected to
disagree with a speaker’s version of events (Pasupathi, 2001). Studies of group social
interactions suggest normative conformity occurs when individuals want to gain
acceptance by fulfilling others’ expectations of them (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).
In another investigation, Cuc and colleagues (2006) found that following group
conversations about past events, unshared memories that were held only by dominant
narrators were then recounted by the group. In this and other similar studies, a dominant
narrator is defined as a group member who contributes the most units of information
regarding the narrative during the conversation (Cuc et al., 2006; Stone & Jay, 2019). In
this study, the output of the group, referred to as the collective memory, seemed to adopt
more information shared only by the dominant narrator as compared to other group
members. In explaining why this effect might have occurred, Brown and colleagues
(2009) suggest that narrators who dominate conversations not only contribute more
information to the conversation, but they also draw more attention to the information they
contribute through the use of verbal and nonverbal behaviours, influencing the resulting
shared narrative (Echterhoff et al., 2009; Stone & Jay, 2019). Therefore, listeners who
behave dominantly in conversations about past events, meaning they provide more
narrative units of feedback about the speaker’s account and/or draw attention to their
feedback, are likely to more heavily influence any subsequent recall the speaker has
regarding the event under discussion.
Considering that memory retrieval influences later recollection and behavioural
responses of listeners have been shown to impact the way that speakers recount events, it
stands to reason that a listener’s behaviour will also affect how information is recalled at
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a later time which would have important implications for investigative interviewing, legal
testimony, and any other setting in which socially influenced remembering occurs.
Expertise
Listeners who demonstrate expertise in the material subject to discussion, either
through previously learned information or through being present at the time the
remembered event took place, may be assumed by speakers to have greater credibility
than non-experts or listeners who were not present. In studies of social contagion (i.e., the
spread of information from one person to another through conversation; Roediger et al.,
2001), the perceived expertise of one party enhanced the spread of information
contributed by the expert to others in the group (Brown et al., 2009; Dodd & Bradshaw,
1980; Stone & Jay, 2019).
Expertise in the context of remembering may also affect the power differential
between speaker and listener giving more weight to the contribution of the listener over
the speaker and leading the speaker to question his or her memory for that event (Koppel
et al., 2014). Furthermore, knowledge of the material discussed may also boost
confidence in the accuracy of an expert’s memory and promote the adoption of a more
dominant role in the conversation imposing schemas that shape the other party’s future
recall of events (Pasupathi, 2001; Roediger & DeSoto, 2015; Stone & Jay, 2019).
Relationship Characteristics
In her discussion of social remembering, Pasupathi (2001) differentiates between
strangers and familiar listeners, explaining that the effect of shared remembering is
stronger for “natural pairs” (e.g., friends, spouses) than for unfamiliar participants in
laboratory studies. Hirst and colleagues have performed numerous experiments
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examining how family members engage in conversations about past events, many of
which support the notion that interpersonal factors such as relationship dynamics have
important implications for both present recall and later recall (Hirst & Manier, 1996;
Hirst et al., 1997).
Other researchers have hypothesized that familiar listeners may differ from
unfamiliar listeners (e.g., experimenters, confederates) in their degree of accountability to
their partners (Hirst et al., 2018). Friends and family are assumed to have greater interest
and investment in particular versions of events and may feel more comfortable discussing
divergent interpretations of events. Intimate relationships can also exert more pressure for
agreement and consistency in that familiar parties are more motivated to protect the
relationship than to “win” the negotiation. For example, Hope and colleagues (2008)
found more group conformity in memory accounts between romantic partners than
between strangers.
Relationship dynamics including trust between individuals and history of past
behaviour can play an important part in rememberers’ decisions regarding whether to
engage in conversational remembering with the listener in the first place, which details to
disclose to the listener (e.g., audience tuning; Echterhoff et al., 2005), and how to
interpret the feedback received from the listener (Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012).
Trust. Defined as the “psychological state comprising the intention to accept
vulnerability based on positive expectations of intentions or behaviour of another”
(Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395), trust is essential to the formation and maintenance of
healthy relationships and the development of positive self-worth (Craddick, 1975).
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Erikson (1963) recognized the development of interpersonal trust as an important first
step in the formation healthy relationships during infancy.
Throughout the lifespan, trust is thought to be required for the success of all
affiliative behaviours including cooperation, planning, and caring (Brenkert, 1998; Dietz
& Den Hartog, 2006). Trust is fundamentally relational (Schoorman et al., 2007) and
evolves over time through interpersonal exchanges in the context of a relationship. When
trust is not developed in childhood or develops from experiences of betrayal later in life
(Rempel et al., 1985), it can lead to distrust or negative expectations of others (Lewicki et
al., 1998) and can cause difficulties in relationships.
Abuse. Similar to the expectation of trust in relationships, behavioural responses
from others are often learned based on past experiences. In relationships involving abuse
and coercion, the goal of the perpetrator is often to obtain compliance from the victim
through the use of physical, verbal, emotional, or psychological tactics (Lehmann et al.,
2012; Pence & Paymar, 1986, 1993; Spear, 2020; Stark, 2007). If past experience
suggests that the listener will not respond positively to the speaker’s account of a past
event, this will likely influence whether the speaker chooses to disclose or to not disclose
their memory for the event, which details the speaker chooses to include in the
description, and whether or not the speaker will alter belief in their memory and whether
they communicate their decision to the listener.
Social roles. Hirst and colleagues (1997) described the influence of social roles in
conversational remembering involving family members and advised that past interactions
(and the outcomes of those interactions) are likely to influence which social roles family
members adopt in future conversations (Brown et al., 2009; Cuc et al., 2006). Past
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experience in relationships not only influences the adoption of social roles but also
influences the expectations individuals have for the behaviour of others in future
interactions.
Individuals in groups have been shown to perform specified roles when
recollecting past experiences (Hirst & Manier, 1996; Hirst et al., 1997; Manier et al.,
1996). Hirst and colleagues (1997) described three common roles adopted in
conversations about past events: (a) the ‘narrator’, defined as the one who speaks the
most and therefore contributes the most detail about the remembered event; (b) the
‘mentor’, defined as one who facilitates remembering by asking questions and providing
cues; and (c) the ‘monitor’ who interjects to prevent inaccuracies, evaluates the narrative
provided, and adds details to supplement the account (Coman et al., 2009; Cuc et al.,
2006; Hirst & Echterhoff, 2008). Narrators, as the main contributors to the conversation,
tend to control the narrative ensuring that their version of events is what emerges as the
shared narrative in the end (Coman et al., 2009; Hirst et al., 1997).
Although social roles are not necessarily static (i.e., who in a group fulfills each
depends on the context), individuals may tend to naturally adopt certain roles in
conversations about memory based on personality traits (e.g., narcissism, extraversion),
interpersonal styles (e.g., dominance, competition), and expertise on the topic (e.g.,
whether or not they were present at the original event; Yashamiro & Hirst, 2020).
Romantic pairs have been shown to coordinate storage and retrieval of shared knowledge
in a kind of transactive memory system (Wegner, 1986) in which one partner is
informally assigned the role of expert for certain types of knowledge or information.
Family members tend to adopt specific roles based on factors like “folk theories” of
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remembering, status in the family, culture, and past experiences with conversational
remembering (Hirst et al., 1997, p. 169).
Age
Age has been shown to influence both the ability to recall past events (e.g.,
infantile amnesia: see Bauer, 2014; and age-related declines: see Zacks & Hasher, 2006)
as well as belief in the occurrence and belief in accuracy of memories for past events
(e.g., non-believed memories; Mazzoni et al., 2010; Scoboria, Memon et al., 2015). For
example, research indicates that adults implicitly instruct and aid others in remembering
by reminding them of forgotten details and negotiating interpretations of past events with
others in conversation (Fivush, 1994; Haden et al., 2001; Pasupathi, 2001; Webster,
1997). Specifically, Nelson and Fivush (2004) reviewed the various ways parents
contribute to their children’s development of autobiographical memory through modeling
processes of remembering and scaffolding their children’s attempts at recalling details
about past events.
Age is also often related to power, authority, and expertise in interpersonal
relationships suggesting that the opinions and recollections of adults may carry extra
weight in conversations about memory simply due to their age and life experience.
Evidence also demonstrates that older adults are less likely to change accounts of past
events to please listeners and as a result may be less susceptible to social influence than
younger adults (Arnett; 2000; Pasupathi, 1999). Therefore, age alone may influence
social remembering and confidence in memory as a consequence of the later development
of the autobiographical memory system; however, it may also function as a proxy
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measure of interpersonal dominance in its representation of power and authority in
relationships.
Gender
In conversations about the past, women tend to reminisce more about people and
relationships than do men (Grysman & Hudson, 2013) and their memories have been
found to be more elaborative and detailed than men’s (Fivush, 1998). These
characteristics could have important but differing implications for same-gender versus
cross-gender negotiations regarding remembered events. Women are also the preferred
recipients of disclosure, particularly emotional disclosure, from both men and women
(Clark, 1994) suggesting that gender may also influence the degree of disclosure in
conversations about memories for past events.
Limitations of Existing Research on Social Remembering
Most of the social remembering studies conducted to date have involved
structured interview protocols employing experimenters and confederates, and
intentionally limited differentials in influence or power between those involved. Or the
studies were conducted with small groups of research participants who were asked to
collaboratively recall previously learned semantic information (Echterhoff & Hirst,
2009). Although these approaches can be useful for examining relationship dynamics
between strangers of approximately equal status, this approach does not lend itself to the
study of naturalistic social remembering within close interpersonal relationships or in
which larger discrepancies in power and authority (e.g., parent-child, employeremployee, abuser-victim, etc.) may exist.
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Furthermore, most of the existing models of remembering describe social
remembering from either cognitive or social lens, but not both (Hoskins, 2018). Recently,
one model was proposed that combines both cognitive and social influences on belief in
memory to describe the processes undertaken when faced with feedback that challenges
one’s memory: The social-cognitive (SCO) dissonance model of challenges to memory
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).
The Social-Cognitive (SCO) Dissonance Model of Challenges to Memory (Scoboria
& Henkel, 2020)
Based on his work in the field of autobiographical memory, Alan Scoboria (2016)
developed a conceptual model of decision making about memory to explain the cognitive
and social processes undertaken when someone receives feedback that makes them
question their memory for a past event. The original model included numerous
interpersonal (i.e., social) and intrapersonal (i.e., cognitive) factors thought to influence
the decision to maintain or reduce belief in the occurrence of a remembered event, as well
as the decision about what to communicate to the memory challenger. In 2020, Scoboria
and Henkel published the social-cognitive (SCO) dissonance model of challenges to
memory and offered a more streamlined graphic depiction of the two main processes
involved in decision-making following a memory challenge (Figure 1).
The model asserts that the introduction of disconfirmatory social feedback about a
memory (e.g., being told that the event you remember did not happen) causes a
rememberer to experience two types of cognitive dissonance: intrapersonal dissonance
and interpersonal dissonance. Based on the principle that dissonance is an inherently
motivating state (Festinger, 1957; Elliot & Devine, 1994), the model proposes that
rememberers are motivated to resolve both types of cognitive dissonance in an attempt to
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escape the associated psychological discomfort created by the discrepancy of the
feedback with their memory (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).
Figure 1
The Social-Cognitive (SCO) Dissonance Model of Challenges to Memory (Scoboria &
Henkel, 2020)
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memory for a past event
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Evaluate costs and benefits
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Decision
m>f
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Output:
Decision
about
belief

In order to resolve the discrepancy between the feedback and their memory,
rememberers must either alter their belief in their memory or discount the feedback
received from the challenger. Similarly, to resolve the discrepancy between themselves
and the person who challenged their memory, the rememberer is expected to report a
decision to the challenger following the challenge. Scoboria (2016) proposed that in order
to make these two decisions, rememberers weigh a variety of social and cognitive factors.
Resolving Intrapersonal Dissonance (Lower Left Corner)
Beginning with the intrapersonal (i.e., cognitive) factors, rememberers weigh the
quality of the feedback they receive against the strength and quality of the memory being
challenged.
30

Evaluating the Feedback. In evaluating the feedback, rememberers are thought
to consider characteristics of the feedback and the challenger including the plausibility of
the feedback, the strength of any evidence presented, the credibility of the challenger and
the information provided, and the importance of the remembered event.
Evaluating the Memory. In examining their own memory, rememberers consider
the strength and quality of their memory (e.g., vividness of recollection), the plausibility
of the event having occurred, and the importance of the memory.
Based on the model predictions, when the feedback is judged superior to the
memory, dissonance is resolved through the reduction or withdrawal of belief in the
memory. On the other hand, if the memory is judged to be superior to the feedback, belief
in the memory is maintained and the dissonance is resolved by discrediting the feedback.
Resolving Interpersonal Dissonance (Upper Right Corner)
The second dissonance-reducing decision aims to resolve the interpersonal
conflict created by the discrepancy between the challenger and rememberer’s version of
events. In deciding what to communicate to the challenger about the memory,
rememberers are thought to weigh the costs and benefits of agreeing and disagreeing with
the challenger.
Reasons to Agree and Reasons to Disagree with the Challenger. In the interest
of maintaining a harmonious relationship, rememberers must evaluate the costs and
benefits of communicating agreement or disagreement to the challenger. Rememberers
are likely to consider a number of factors when weighing the costs and benefits of their
decision including potential consequences to the relationship or to themselves for
disagreeing, the importance of protecting the relationship, the ease with which they can
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disagree with the challenger, and their past experience in conflicts with the challenger.
Personality characteristics of the remember and the challenger are also likely to factor
into the decision. As discussed, compliant individuals prioritize avoiding conflict
(Gudjonsson, 1989) and dominant individuals value autonomy and self-determination
(Wiggins, 1995).
Other factors such as the power dynamic between the parties (due to status,
authority, expertise), the quality of the relationship, the perceived forcefulness of the
feedback (e.g., confidence, persistence), the importance of the relationship (e.g., intimate
partner vs. acquaintance), the anticipated reaction based on past experience, as well as the
rememberer’s tolerance for conflict are considered in the decision to agree or disagree
with the feedback provider. To address the interpersonal dissonance, the rememberer
weights the costs of agreeing or disagreeing with the other person and decides whether to
report their agreement or disagreement to the feedback provider (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).
Considering the nature of the interpersonal facet of the model, the outcome decided by the
rememberer can have vastly different consequences for the relationship with the other person.
Decision Outcomes
The combination of these two decisions: feedback versus memory and agree
versus disagree, produces four possible outcomes of a memory challenge for the
rememberer. The four main outcome decisions are represented in the model graphic in a
two-by-two matrix. For the sake of clarity in the present discussion, the following terms
will be used to denote the four main model outcomes:
Defending and Maintaining Belief in the Memory. Rememberers who report
disagreeing with the feedback they have received and maintaining belief in the
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occurrence of the memory are said to defend and maintain belief in their memory for the
event.
Denying the Feedback and Reducing Belief in the Memory. Rememberers who
report disagreeing with the feedback they have received yet decreasing belief in the
occurrence of the memory are said to deny the challenger’s version of events while
reducing belief in (aka doubting) their memory for the event.
Complying with the Challenger and Maintaining Belief in the Memory.
Rememberers who communicate agreement with the challenger while maintaining belief
in the occurrence of the memory are said to have complied with the challenger and
maintained belief in their memory.
Relinquishing and Reducing Belief in the Memory. Rememberers who report
agreeing with the feedback and decreasing belief in the occurrence of the memory are
said to have relinquished and reduced belief in their memory.
The utility in the SCO model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) comes from its
consideration of the influence of both intrapersonal (e.g., internal, cognitive) and
interpersonal (e.g., external, social) factors on decision making about autobiographical belief,
as well as articulating the various decisions that rememberers may communicate after
receiving feedback about their memory. In short, the model explains how individuals weigh
different intrapersonal and interpersonal factors when determining whether to maintain what
they believe about their memory for a past event. The model also examines how the
rememberer makes the decision to communicate agreement or disagreement with the
feedback provided by the memory challenger.
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Existing Research on Memory Challenges
To date, only a handful of studies have explored decision-making about belief in
memory following the receipt of social feedback. Recently, the social-cognitive (SCO)
model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) inspired investigations into social challenges of
memory in diverse samples. In 2016, Wysman used the original model to examine
experiences of social challenges to memory. The first of three studies surveyed
rememberers from the general population. For the second and third studies, Wysman
(2016) interviewed in victims of intimate partner aggression (IPA) finding that, in
general, victims of IPA came to question belief in their memories for past abuse based on
feedback received from the perpetrator or other important individuals in their lives. In
general, both samples surveyed by Wysman (2016) reported decisions that aligned with
the outcome groups proposed by the social-cognitive model, and discussed the
hypothesized processes of dissonance, questioning belief in memory, and communicating
an outcome decision with the challenger occur in response to social challenges. Two
notable findings of this research that have not yet been accounted for in the model are
that, first, many participants reported changes, (termed vacillations) in belief over time,
and second, different considerations are involved in questioning belief in the accuracy of
a memory compared to belief in occurrence (Wysman, 2016).
In another recent application of the SCO model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020),
Dyshniku (2017) investigated the relationship between personality, motivations for
challenging another’s memory, and experiences of dissonance related to self-discrepant
memories. Common motivations for challenging another’s memory including protecting
one’s self-concept, avoiding negative emotional states (e.g., shame), seeking
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confirmation of remembered information, and providing emotional support. In this
dissertation, personality and gender were found to be related to the motivations behind
social challenges such that women who challenged another person’s memory in order to
protect their self-concept were found to score higher on the arrogant-calculating
dimension of the Interpersonal Adjective Scale (IAS; Wiggins, 1995).
Barcic (2015) reviewed reports of social challenges to memories for past events
provided by rememberers, who participated in the studies conducted by Wysman (2016)
and found that challenges were not always perceived as confrontational. In fact,
rememberers reported believing that challenges were posed in an attempt to correct their
memory in a helpful manner, to help them remember, and to clarify both parties’
memories in order to come to a shared agreement about the past (Barcic, 2015). The
perceived motives align with a number of the social functions of conversational
remembering put forth in the literature (e.g., building and maintaining relationships,
eliciting support from others, sharing knowledge and information; Alea & Bluck, 2003;
Pillemer, 1998, 2003); however, ulterior motives related to the self-functions of social
remembering may also be involved.
Regarding experimental studies involving feedback about memory, Scoboria and
colleagues (2018) created a laboratory procedure in which participants’ memories for
actions performed in the lab were challenged by the experimenter. As predicted by the
SCO model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020), social challenges were associated with reduced
ratings of belief in occurrence and recollection with belief in occurrence ratings seeing a
greater reduction. Additionally, it was discovered that although some participants
demonstrated both defended and reduced belief, certain participants always defended
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their memory and others always reduced belief in their memory (Scoboria et al., 2018).
Additional research employing this procedure is needed to further understand the
difference between characteristic ‘defenders’ and ‘reducers.’
In summary, recent research in the area has looked at the outcomes and variables
related to decision making after receiving disconfirmatory social feedback. Certain
personality characteristics have been investigated in relation to motivations for
challenging another’s memory in order to preserve one’s self-concept. What is missing
from the literature is an exploration of the individual characteristics and interpersonal
dimensions that influence whether or not a person receiving disconfirmatory social
feedback (a) relinquishes or maintains belief in their memory, (b) discloses their decision
to the feedback provider, and (c) experiences negative effects resulting from the
experience of receiving such feedback about their memory.
Updates to the Social-Cognitive (SCO) Dissonance Model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020)
Even prior to the publication of the model in 2020, Scoboria continued to revise
and update the model based on ongoing studies involving social feedback about memory
and related areas.
Additional Outcome Categories
Based on related research in the area of cognitive interviewing and “don’t know”
responding (Scoboria et al., 2008; Scoboria & Fisico, 2013), two other outcome
categories were considered for addition to the model. The proposed additions would
allow for inclusion of rememberers who maintained belief in their memory or who
reduced belief in their memory but who chose not to communicate their decision to the
challenger. For the purpose of the present investigation, these rememberers are referred to
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as “silent maintainers” and “silent reducers” (N. Wager, personal communication,
November 2019). The proposed updates to the SCO model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020)
are presented in Figure 2.
Figure 2
The Social-Cognitive (SCO) Dissonance Model of Challenges to Memory (Scoboria &
Henkel, 2020) with Additional Outcome Categories: Silent Maintainers and Silent
Reducers
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In summary, the goal of this dissertation was to extend existing work by Scoboria,
Henkel, and others regarding how intrapersonal and interpersonal factors influence
conversational remembering and the outcome decisions of rememberers facing a
challenge to their memory.
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CHAPTER II
Memory Challenges in Interpersonal Relationships
As social beings, our individual histories are co-constructed through negotiation with
others and the incorporation of social feedback about our memories (Bietti & Stone, 2019;
Pasupathi, 2001; Sheen et al., 2001; Williamson et al., 2013). Individuals discuss past
events with others in an attempt to make sense of what occurred and also to establish
shared, consensual understandings of the meaning of past experiences (Hirst &
Echterhoff, 2012). In fact, social consensus carries particular weight compared to other
forms of knowledge or feedback in shaping memories for past events (Scoboria, Boucher,
et al., 2015; Vorauer & Miller, 1997; Wade et al., 2014) and influences what is
subsequently remembered at a later time (Brown et al., 2009; Fivush, 1994).
In other words, social remembering influences what people come to know about
the past and what decisions they make about the future. Feedback from others about
specific memories can either reinforce or undermine a rememberer’s belief in the
occurrence of a past event or belief in the accuracy of their memory for the event
(Scoboria, Boucher et al., 2015; Scoboria, Memon, et al., 2015). The social-cognitive
(SCO) dissonance model of memory challenges outlines the social and cognitive
decision-making processes undertaken by a rememberer when feedback is received that
contradicts their memory (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020). This dissertation explores the role
of personality, interpersonal style, and relationship characteristics in decision-making
about belief in memory following the receipt of disconfirmatory social feedback about
autobiographical memories. The first of two does so in a sample of rememberers from the
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general population. The second does so in a sample of rememberers who were challenged
by suspected psychopaths.
Study 1
Purpose
The primary goal of this study was to test the predictions made by the socialcognitive (SCO) dissonance model of memory challenges (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020)
with respect to rememberers’ self-reported evaluation of their memory, their evaluation
of the feedback received, their reasons for agreeing, and their reasons for disagreeing
with the person who challenged their memory to determine if their ratings aligned with
what rememberers said they decided about their memory. A second goal of this study was
to identify which components of the SCO model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) contribute
most to rememberers’ decisions to (a) reduce belief in their memory, and (b)
communicate agreement with the challenger following a memory challenge.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Memory Versus Feedback
According to the SCO model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020), rememberers who
report maintaining belief in their memory following a memory challenge are assumed to
have judged the quality and accuracy of their memory as superior to the feedback
received from the challenger. Therefore, defenders, compliers, and silent maintainers
were expected to provide higher than average ratings of the quality of their memory
(hypothesis 1a) and lower than average ratings regarding the quality of the feedback
received from the challenger (hypothesis 1b). In contrast, deniers, relinquishers, and
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silent reducers were expected to provide lower than average ratings on memory
(hypothesis 1c) and higher than average ratings on feedback (hypothesis 1d).
Hypothesis 2: Agreement Versus Disagreement with the Challenger
According to the SCO model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020), rememberers who
reported agreeing with the challenger are assumed to have judged the costs of
disagreeing, or the benefits of agreeing, as greater than the benefits of disagreeing, or the
costs of agreeing. Therefore, compliers and relinquishers were expected to provide higher
than average ratings on reasons to agree (hypothesis 2a) and lower than average ratings
on reasons to disagree (hypothesis 2b). Conversely, defenders and deniers were expected
to provide lower than average ratings on reasons to agree (hypothesis 2c) and higher than
average ratings on reasons to disagree (hypothesis 2d). Finally, silent maintainers and
silent reducers were expected to evaluate the reasons to agree and reasons to disagree as
approximately equal, thus providing similar relative ratings on these two composite
scores (hypothesis 2e). The first two hypotheses regarding composite score patterns are
summarized in Table 1.
Hypothesis 3: Statistical Predictors of Decisions About Memory
Based on the two types of dissonance (intrapersonal and interpersonal) predicted
by the social-cognitive (SCO) dissonance model of challenges to memory (Scoboria &
Henkel, 2020), it is expected that the cognitive components involved in evaluating belief
in memory (e.g., belief in occurrence, recollection) and evaluating feedback about
memory (e.g., trust in feedback, evaluation of challenger) will predict rememberers’
decisions to reduce belief in their memory following a memory challenge. In contrast,
rememberers’ decisions to agree with the challenger will be predicted by the social
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components involved in evaluating reasons to agree (e.g., importance of the relationship)
and reasons to disagree with the challenger (e.g., rememberer dominance and
forcefulness) following a memory challenge.
Table 1
Summary Table Depicting Study 1 Hypotheses for Composite Scores by Outcome Group
Defenders

Deniers

Compliers

Relinquishers

Silent
maintainers

Silent
reducers

Evaluation
of memory

Above
average1a

Below
average1c

Above
average1a

Below
average1c

Above
average1a

Below
average1c

Evaluation
of feedback

Below
average1b

Above
average1d

Below
average1b

Above
average1d

Below
average1b

Above
average1d

Reasons to
agree

Below
average2c

Below
average2c

Above
average2a

Above
average2a

Similar to
reasons to
disagree2e

Similar to
reasons to
disagree2e

Reasons to
disagree

Above
average2d

Above
average2d

Below
average2b

Below
average2b

Similar to
reasons to
agree2e

Similar to
reasons to
agree2e

Note. “Average” refers to the overall sample mean for the composite score. Superscripts denote the
corresponding hypotheses. Ex: 1a = hypothesis 1a. Italics indicate rememberers who reported reducing
belief in their memory following the challenge.

Method
Participants
Two hundred fifty-nine individuals were included in the final analyses including
156 individuals (60.2%) recruited from a University Participant Pool (a pool of university
students who receive extra credit in enrolled courses for participating in research) and
103 individuals (39.8%) from Mechanical Turk. Participants ranged in age from 17 to 70
years (Mage = 27.20, SD = 10.86). Just over two-thirds (68.3%), of the total sample
identified as female. Participants’ demographic characteristics including age, gender,
education, and ethnic background are presented in Table 2.
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Table 2
Frequency of Demographic Characteristics Reported by Rememberers in Total Sample
Total sample
N = 259

Current age

M

SD

27.20

10.86

Frequency

Percent (%)

Gender
Female

177

68.3

77

29.7

Non-binary

1

0.4

Not reported

4

1.5

164

63.3

Black/African American/-Canadian

16

6.2

Latin/South American

12

4.6

Asian

15

5.8

6

2.3

26

10.0

European

8

3.1

Indian

7

2.7

Not reported

5

1.9

133

51.4

Community college

42

16.2

Bachelor’s degree

67

25.9

Master’s degree

9

3.5

Professional or doctoral degree

4

1.5

Not reported

4

1.5

Male

Ethnicity
White/Caucasian

Biracial
Middle Eastern

Education
High school
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Recruitment Strategy
In order to access a broad sample, participants were recruited through the
University of Windsor undergraduate participant pool and Amazon Mechanical Turk, a
crowdsourcing platform often used for large-scale research surveys.
University Participant Pool
A summary of the study purpose and participant requirements was listed on the
university’s participant pool website and was accessible to students registered with the
pool who responded ‘yes’ to the screening question: “Has someone close to you ever
provided you with feedback that made you question your memory for a specific past
event?” Information about compensation in the form of 1.5 bonus credits to an eligible
undergraduate psychology course in which the student was registered also was included
in the study listing.
Students interested in participating in the study selected the study from the list of
available studies and registered to complete the study online. Once registered, students
received a link to the online survey through the participant pool platform. Upon
completion of the survey, or following withdrawal from the survey, student participants
were redirected to another webpage where they were asked to enter their name and
student identification number to receive course credit.
Mechanical Turk
An advertisement requesting participants to complete an online survey of social
remembering was listed on the Mechanical Turk task forum. Eligibility was limited to
registered users of Mechanical Turk residing in United States or Canada who had not
previously participated in a study from Dr. Scoboria’s lab and who endorsed having
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experienced a social challenge to their memory by someone close to them. Interested
Mechanical Turk workers registered for the task and were provided with a link to
Turkitron. Turkitron is a tool that screens Turk workers for eligibility for studies and
directs Turk workers to survey links to aid in study management. In the current study,
Turkitron was used to prevent Turk workers who had completed similar studies in Dr.
Scoboria’s lab in the past from gaining access to the present study by cross-referencing
their Turk ID with a list of participant IDs from prior lab studies stored in Turkitron.
Eligible workers then were redirected to the survey website for the current study.
Compensation for Turk workers was provided per payment norms on the Mechanical
Turk site. Participants were compensated $3.50 USD for completing the survey.
Measures
The same measures were administered to participants in the present sample as
well as the sample of self-identified victims of suspected psychopaths (Study 2). Any
differences in methods or materials will be described in Study 2.
Evaluation of the Memory
Participants were asked to rate the following items in relation to the event for
which their memory was challenged.
Belief in Occurrence (Scoboria et al., 2020). Created from a combination of
earlier belief in occurrence scales tested by Scoboria, Talarico, et al. (2015) and Ernst and
D’Argembeau (2017), this eight-item scale is designed to measure belief in the
occurrence of remembered events. All items are rated on a 7-point scale and scale
anchors are tailored to each item. For example, the item “How likely is it that you
personally did in fact experience this event?” is rated from 1 (definitely did not happen)
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to 7 (definitely happened). Scale scores are calculated by summing item scores and
dividing by the number of items (i.e., calculating mean scores) with higher scores
indicating higher levels of belief in the occurrence of the remembered event. This scale is
a valid indicator of the unique latent variable termed belief in occurrence with factor
loadings ranging from .74 to .90 (Scoboria et al., 2020) that has been shown to be a
distinct construct, separate from belief in accuracy (Scoboria, Talarico, et al., 2015) and
recollection (Scoboria et al., 2014). In the present study, Cronbach’s alpha for the scale
was .97.
Belief in Accuracy (Scoboria, Talarico, et al., 2015). Three items pertaining to
belief in accuracy were employed to measure belief in the accuracy of the details of the
remembered event. Items are rated on a 7-point scale and scale anchors are tailored to
each item. For example, the item “How confident are you that your memory for this event
is accurate?” is rated from 1 (not at all confident) to 7 (completely confident). Scale
scores are calculated by summing item scores and dividing by the number of items (i.e.,
calculating mean scores) with higher scores indicating higher levels of belief in the
accuracy of the memory. Scoboria, Talarico et al. (2015) found these three items to have
the highest factor loadings on a unique latent variable termed belief in accuracy, with all
three factor loadings above .84. In the present study, Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was
.74.
Recollection. The three items on this scale were developed by Scoboria and
colleagues (2014) to measure the extent to which a participant recollects the event in
question. In 2015, Scoboria, Talarico, and colleagues demonstrated the validity of the
items as indicators of recollection as a latent variable within samples recruited from
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Mechanical Turk with factors loadings above .84. Items are rated on a 7-point scale and
scale anchors are tailored to each item. For example, the item “How strong is your
memory for this event?” is rated from 1 (no memory) to 7 (strong memory). In the present
study, Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was .94.
Recollective Phenomenology, Personal Plausibility, and Importance
(Scoboria et al., 2020). Inspired by items from the Memory Characteristics
Questionnaire (MCQ), participants rated eight characteristics of recollective
phenomenology related to the challenged memory. Previous research has repeatedly
demonstrated the association between these items and recollection of autobiographical
memory (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Johnson et al., 1988; Rubin et al.,
2003; Scoboria, Boucher, et al., 2015).
Three items assessed vividness of mental simulation. Four items assessed spatial
arrangement and an additional four items assessed autonoetic awareness. All items are
rated on a 7-point rating scale and scale anchors are tailored to each item. For example,
the item “When I think about this event, the relative spatial arrangement of objects and
people are…” is rated from 1 (vague) to 7 (clear/distinct). One item assessing personal
plausibility that the memory being questioned could have occurred to them in the past:
“How plausible is it that you personally experienced this event” rated from 1 (not at all
plausible) to 7 (extremely plausible). Additionally, single items assessing the personal
importance of the event and prior discussion or rehearsal of the event were also rated on a
7-point scale with scale anchors tailored to each item. For example, event importance was
rated from 1 (not at all important) to 7 (very important).
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In the present study, Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .35 for vividness to .92 for
spatial arrangement and autonoetic awareness. Removal of one reverse-coded item from
the vividness scale [“My memory for this event does not involve a lot of sensory
information (e.g., sounds, smells, tastes, etc.)”] increased Cronbach’s alpha to .84.
Memory Experiences Questionnaire-Short form (MEQ-SF; Luchetti & Sutin,
2015). A shortened version of the Memory Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ; Sutin &
Robins, 2007), the MEQ-SF has been found to retain the psychometric properties and
construct validity of the original scale with fewer than half the items (Luchetti & Sutin,
2015). The MEQ-SF includes three subscales comprised of three items each: emotional
intensity, sharing, and distancing. Two additional items assess the positive and negative
emotional valence associated with the memory. All items are rated on a 5-point response
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Sample items include: “My
emotions are very intense concerning this event” (emotional intensity), “I frequently
think about or talk about this event with others” (sharing), “I feel like the person in this
memory is a different person than who I am today” (distancing), and “The overall tone of
the memory is positive” (valence). In the present study, Cronbach’s alphas were .89 for
emotions, .83 for sharing, .84 for distancing, and .91for valence.
Centrality of Events Scale, 7 item version (CES; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006).
The CES is a self-report instrument designed to assess participants’ perceptions of the
centrality of the remembered event to their life narrative and identity. Items are rated on a
5-point scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). Sample items include: “This
event has colored the way I think and feel about other experiences.” Total scores are
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obtained by summing the ratings across items with higher scores indicating greater
attributions of importance to the remembered event.
The 7-item short-form of the scale was used in the present study. As with the
original 20-item scale, the shortened scale demonstrates good reliability (α = .88;
Berntsen & Rubin, 2006) and excellent internal consistency (α = .93 to .96; Wysman,
2016) when used in previous studies of this nature. Numerous studies have demonstrated
the validity of the measure in assessing event centrality or importance (Boals, 2014;
Robinaugh & McNally, 2011). Cronbach’s alpha in the present study was .94.
Evaluation of the Feedback
Participants were asked to rate the following items in relation to the individual
who challenged their memory.
Social Challenge Items (Wysman, 2016). Thirteen stand-alone items originally
developed by Wysman (2016) based on Scoboria’s (2016) model were used to examine
other aspects of the memory challenge experienced by the rememberer at the time of the
challenge. The items assess perceived forcefulness of the feedback, importance of
avoiding disagreeing with the challenger, ease of disagreeing with the challenger,
importance of the relationship with the challenger, credibility of the feedback and
challenger, rememberer’s trust in their own memory, perception of being threatened, and
importance of the memory. All items are rated on a 7-point scale and scale anchors are
tailored to each individual item. For example, “How forceful was the challenge the
person made?” is rated from 1 (not at all forceful) to 7 (very forceful). Reliability
coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha) could not be calculated for stand-alone items and the
items have not been used in studies other than by Wysman (2016).
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Modified Interpersonal Relationship Scale (Garthoeffner et al., 1993). The
Modified Interpersonal Relationship Scale is a 49-item self-report measure designed to
assess the quality of past and present relationships. The measure is comprised of six
scales representing domains of relationship satisfaction: trust, self-disclosure,
genuineness, empathy, comfort, and communication. Items are rated on a 5-point scale
from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Sample items include “My partner
would tell a lie if s/he could gain by it” (trust) and “My partner doesn’t really understand
me” (empathy). Positively worded items are reverse-scored such that higher scores
correspond with higher relationship satisfaction (Guerney, 1977).
The psychometric properties of the Interpersonal Relationship Scale and its
various modifications (e.g., romantic partners, roommates, and future relationships) have
been established in numerous studies dating back to the original validation study
(Guerney, 1977; Schlein, 1971; Waldo, 1984). The Modified Interpersonal Relationship
Scale and the two subscales used the in present study were found to be reliable and valid
measures of relationship quality and satisfaction (Cronbach’s alpha of .95; Garthoeffner
et al., 1993). In the present study, Cronbach’s alpha for each of the two subscales used:
Trust and Genuineness, was .92.
Relationship Characteristics. A number of single-item questions were posed to
participants to gather information about the relationship between them and the person
who challenged their memory.
Type of Relationship. Respondents were asked to identify the type of
relationship they have/had with the feedback provider (e.g., romantic partner, friend,
sibling, parent, child, etc.) in an open-text field.
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Time Since End of Relationship. Respondents were asked if the relationship they
chose to discuss for this study was ongoing (yes/no). If the relationship had ended,
respondents were asked to estimate the length of time passed since the end of the
relationship with the feedback provider (numerical value, in months and years).
Duration of Relationship. Respondents were asked to estimate the length of time
they had known the feedback provider at the time when the described interaction took
place (numerical value, in months and years) and then to estimate the length of time they
had known the feedback provider up to now (numerical value, in months and years).
Frequency of Social Feedback about Memory in the Relationship. Respondents
were asked if this type of exchange about memory for past events was a typical feature of
interactions with this individual (yes/no) and to estimate the frequency of this type of
feedback in this particular relationship (“How frequently do you have interactions with
this person about the quality of your memories? e.g., once a week, once a month, etc.) in
an open-text field.
Reasons to (Dis)Agree with the Challenger and Feedback
The following measures were administered twice to each respondent to assess
personality characteristics and interpersonal styles, first for themselves, and second for
the individual who challenged their memory. Some of the measures included below were
developed to be used as self-report measures and were modified slightly (e.g., by
changing ‘you’ to ‘him/her’) to function as other-report measures.
Interpersonal Adjective Scale – Revised (IAS-R; Wiggins et al., 1988). The
Interpersonal Adjective Scale is a 64-item self-report personality measure based on the
circumplex model of personality. The items are comprised of a series of trait adjectives
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with behavioural descriptors. For example, the item “assertive” is further described as:
tends to be aggressive and outspoken with others. Items are rated on an 8-point scale
from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 8 (extremely likely) corresponding to how well the item
describes the respondent.
Item ratings on each of the eight octants are averaged to produce octant scores
corresponding to eight interpersonal dimensions: aloof-introverted, arrogant-calculating,
assured-dominant, cold-hearted, gregarious-extraverted, unassuming-ingenuous,
unassured-submissive, and warm-agreeable. The measure has been demonstrated to have
good psychometric properties across a variety of samples (Wiggins, 1980, 1982, 1995)
and octant scores on the IAS have been shown to correspond with observable
interpersonal behaviour (Gifford, 1991, 1994). In the present study, values for
Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .76 to .90 for the self-report subscales and from .81 to .94
for other-report subscales.
The Dutch Test for Conflict Handling (DUTCH; Euwema & Van de Vliert,
1990). The DUTCH is a 20-item self- and other-report measure designed to evaluate
styles of handling interpersonal conflict. The items represent five interpersonal styles: (a)
collaborating/problem-solving, (b) competing/forcing, (c) accommodating/yielding, (d)
avoiding, and (e) compromising. Items are rated on a 5-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 5
(very much) corresponding to the degree to which the item reflects the respondent’s
typical behavior in a conflict situation. Sample items include “gives in to the wishes of
the other party” (yielding) and “works out a solution that serves own and other's interests
as much as possible” (problem solving). Item scores are summed to produce scale scores
for each of the five conflict handling styles (Van de Vliert, 1997). Validation studies of
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the DUTCH report good psychometric properties performing better than other existing
self-report measures of conflict handling style (de Dreu et al., 2001; Johnson & Hall,
2018). In the present study, Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .78 to .88 for self-report
scales and .82 to .91 for reports regarding the challenger.
Modified Self-Report Psychopathy scale1. The 29-item Self-Report
Psychopathy scale – Short Form (SRP-SF; Paulhus et al., 2016) assesses four domains of
psychopathy: interpersonal traits, affective traits, lifestyle traits, and antisocial traits.
Consistent with previous studies assessing psychopathic traits in third parties (Beaudette,
2012; Humeny, 2017; Humeny et al., 2021; Pagliaro, 2009), the measure was modified to
allow for the assessment of psychopathic traits in another person (i.e., other-report as
opposed to self-report). Psychopathic traits of the challenger were rated by the
rememberer on a 5-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) indicating
the degree to which the rememberer believes each item describes the challenger. Sample
items include: “Has dumped friends that he or she doesn’t need any more,” “Thinks he or
she should take advantage of other people before they do it to him or her,” and “Thinks a
lot of people are ‘suckers’ and can easily be fooled.”
Item scores are summed to produce four facet scores, two factor scores, and a
total score representing the challenger’s overall level of psychopathic traits. Higher
scores indicate higher levels of psychopathic traits. A wealth of studies exist supporting
the reliability and validity of the SRP and similar measures (e.g., Psychopathy Checklist
– Revised or PCL-R) based on the four-facet structure of psychopathy (Gordts et al.,

1

Self-Report Psychopathy (SRP) scores were collected in the present sample as a control variable when
comparing results between samples. Scores on the SRP were low across the present sample and, as such,
are not reported in this study.
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2015; Hare, 2003; Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005; Patrick, 2006; Seara-Cardoso et al.,
2019). Cronbach’s alphas in previous studies, in which respondents evaluated
psychopathic traits in others, ranged from .42 to .85 (Beaudette, 2012; Humeny et al.,
2021). In the present study, Cronbach’s alphas were .80 to .93 for facet scores and .96 for
total scores.
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS; Gudjonsson, 1989, 1997). The
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale is a 20-item self-report measure of compliance.
Rememberers rated each item on a 4-point scale: 1 (false), 2 (mostly false), 3 (mostly
true), and 4 (true) corresponding to the how false or true the item is in describing them.
Sample items include: “I give in easily to people when I am pressured” and “I tend to go
along with what people tell me even when I know they are wrong.” Item ratings are
summed to produce a total score. Higher total scores indicate more compliance.
The psychometric properties of the Gudjonsson Compliance Scale are well
documented (Gudjonsson, 2003) as is the factor structure (McGuffin et al., 2012) and its
utility across a variety of contexts (Gudjonsson et al., 2004). Cronbach’s alpha was .89 in
the present study.
Checklist of Controlling Behaviors (CCB; Lehmann et al., 2012). The
Checklist of Controlling Behaviors is an 84-item self-report instrument designed to assess
the intensity and frequency of violence and coercive control in intimate relationships. The
measure is comprised of ten scales: physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional abuse,
economic abuse, intimidation, threats, minimizing and denying, blaming, isolation, and
male privilege. Rememberers rated the items on a 5-point scale from 1 (never) to 5 (very
frequently) corresponding to the frequency with which that behaviour occurred in their
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relationship with the challenger. Sample items include “Threw something at me”
(physical abuse), and “Criticized my care of the children or home” (emotional abuse).
Item scores are summed to produce scale scores. Scale scores were summed to
produce total scores with higher scores representing more frequent and severe
relationship abuse. The psychometric properties of the scale were examined by Lehmann
et al. (2012) and it was found to demonstrate strong reliability and validity as well as
practical utility. In the present study, Cronbach’s alpha was .99 for total scores.
Procedure
Participants were first presented with a screening question to assess their
suitability for the study. Participants who endorsed the screening question were provided
a website address to access the online survey and, following completion of at least 80%
of the study items, were compensated for their time through either the receipt of course
credit or monetary payment.
Upon arriving at the survey website, participants were presented with the consent
form (Appendices B1 and B2). The potential risks involved in participating, particularly
related to emotional distress associated with reflecting on past relationship experiences
including instances of emotional, sexual, and/or physical abuse, were outlined in the
letter of information. Participants were advised of these risks again in the consent form
and were asked not to participate if they expected to experience discomfort when
reflecting on, or describing, personal experiences with relational aggression.
Additionally, contact information for supportive resources for University of Windsor
students (Appendix B13) and Turk participants (Appendix B14) were made available on
every page of the online survey and again at the conclusion of the survey. To minimize
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bystander risk, participants were reminded not to include identifying information about
themselves, or any other person, in their survey responses. Identifying information found
in participant responses was deleted upon receipt.
Participants were informed that continuing with the study was interpreted as
consent to participate and were encouraged to print the consent form before continuing.
After providing informed consent, participants began the online survey. The first item
asked for a written, first-person, account of an interpersonal exchange in which they
received social feedback about their memory for a specific past event from an individual
with whom they were in a relationship. Examples of what constitutes an interpersonal
relationship such as family members, friends, or romantic/intimate partners, etc. were
provided in the instructions. Participants who had received social feedback about more
than one specific memory were asked to choose one memory that is “most representative
of the type of interaction you have had with this person regarding your memories.”
Participants then were asked to describe their memory for the event in question,
the feedback that the other person provided, including specific statements made and
strategies used by the feedback provider where possible, and the outcome of the
exchange, i.e., any decisions that the rememberer made about belief for their memory.
Next, participants were asked to provide information about the relationship with the
person who provided the feedback, including the type of relationship, time since the end
of the relationship if the relationship has ended, duration of the relationship, and how
frequently discussions regarding the accuracy their specific memories for past events
occurred in the context of the relationship in question.
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Following this, participants completed the measures of personality traits and
interpersonal/conflict management styles of themselves and the feedback providers. They
also were asked to complete measures of relationship quality and current psychological
and social functioning. The order of the measures was randomized to control for order
effects.
Upon completion of the measures, respondents were asked to provide
demographic information, e.g., age, gender, ethnicity, and education, and were redirected
to a separate page to enter their information in order to receive compensation. Students
participating through the Pool had the option to withdraw at any point and still receive
full credit for their participation. Turk participants were required to complete 80% of the
survey responses in order to receive payment. Twenty-one workers (7.5%) were denied
payment because their surveys were incomplete, or their written responses were
obviously copied and pasted from internet sources related to memory. For example, one
response contained an excerpt taken from the Wikipedia page entitled Memory: “Memory
is the faculty of the brain by which data or information is encoded, stored, and retrieved
when needed. It is the retention of information over time for the purpose of influencing
future action” (Memory, 2020, para. 1).
Written descriptions of the original remembered event and the social interaction
referred to as the memory challenge were coded by raters trained in the coding schemes
developed by Wysman (2016) and Scoboria, Boucher, et al. (2015) as well as additional
coding criteria created for this study. The variables of interest for this study included: (a)
whether or not the rememberer expressed having doubt about their memory during the
challenge and (b) whether the rememberer sought additional information or evidence as a
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result of this doubt. Additionally, the descriptions of the memory challenges were coded
for the type of social feedback provided to the rememberer about the event: (a) the
rememberer was told the event did not occur or (b) the rememberer was told the event
happened differently.
Data Cleaning and Sample Preparation
Data Screening
Data were screened upon receipt to assess quality and completeness. Judgment
regarding the retention of participant data was made on a case-by-case basis based on the
completion of measures, time taken to complete the study, relevance of the data provided,
and suitability of the event described in relation to the focus of the study. Figure 3 depicts
the stages of data screening culminating in the final sample analyzed.
Eligibility. In total, 207 responses were collected from participants through the
University of Windsor undergraduate student Participant Pool. An additional 276
responses were collected from participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk (combined
N = 483). One hundred percent of the responses collected from the Participant Pool were
deemed eligible for inclusion in the study based on the screening question included at the
outset of the survey (“Has someone close to you ever provided you with feedback that
made you question your memory for a specific past event?”). Thirty-six responses from
Mechanical Turk were deemed ineligible because participants responded “No” to the
study screening question, leaving 240 eligible responses from Mechanical Turk.
Completion. All eligible responses (combined N = 447) were examined for
completion. Completed surveys were defined as surveys including: (a) a coherent event
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description and (b) answers to more than 20% of the survey items, not including the event
description.
Examples of event descriptions that were deemed incoherent include descriptions
comprised of random characters (e.g., “adfgjhkjewhg”) and definitions of terms copied
from the internet. Based on these criteria, 151 completed surveys were received from
participants through Mechanical Turk and 184 completed surveys were received from
participants through the Participant Pool for a total sample of 335 completed surveys.
Voluntary Withdrawal of Data. Eighteen participants from Mechanical Turk
and 18 from the Participant Pool elected to withdraw their data after completing the
survey. The survey responses of these individuals were removed from the data set leaving
299 surveys for review.
Event Relevance. The event descriptions participants provided at the outset of the
study detailed their experience of a social interaction regarding their memory for a past
event. Event descriptions submitted by each participant were reviewed to determine if
they met the criteria of a memory challenge. Relevant event descriptions were defined as:
(a) those which recounted an interaction with another person regarding the participant’s
memory for a specific past event and (b) those which described an action, expression, or
interpretation of the viewpoint of the other person as contradicting the participant’s
memory making them question their memory for the original event.
Based on these criteria, 121 responses from Mechanical Turk and 164 responses
from the University of Windsor Participant Pool were included in the analyses for a total
sample of 285 relevant event descriptions. An additional nine participants were excluded
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following examination of the description of the challenge because the participants were
challenged because they did not remember an event that the challenger said occurred.
Figure 3
Flowchart Depicting Inclusion and Exclusion of Cases for Final Analyses
Total surveys received
(N = 483)
Screened out (n = 36)
- Answered ‘No’ to screening question
Incomplete (n = 112)
- No or incoherent event description
- Less than 20% survey completion
Completed responses
(N = 335)
Voluntarily withdrew (n = 36)
Included responses
(N = 299)
Irrelevant event or challenge (n = 23)
- Did not describe a specific past event
- Did not describe an interaction that made them
question their memory for the past event
- Described a challenge to a lack of a memory
Less than 50% survey completion (n = 2)
Chose ‘Other: None of the above’ as outcome of challenge (n = 15)
Final sample
(N = 259)

Final Sample. Two additional responses collected through the Participant Pool
were removed from the analyses due to incomplete data. These two cases included
responses to fewer than half of the items in the survey. The final sample of complete
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responses included in the data analyses was comprised of 112 responses from Mechanical
Turk and 162 responses from the Participant Pool for a total sample of 274 cases. Fifteen
participants selected ‘Other: None of the above’ as the decision outcome made about
their memory following the challenge and thus were not included in the final analyses.
Two hundred fifty-nine participants were included in the final analyses.
Missing Data. Following screening for completeness of all measures, data were
analyzed to determine the proportion of missing values. The percentage of missing
responses ranged from 0 .0% to 3.2% for individual items. A test of Little’s (1988)
MCAR was conducted and was not significant. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) suggest that
expectation maximization (EM) is appropriate for use in cases in which less than 5% of
the data are missing and the data are missing at random. Therefore, expectation
maximization was used to estimate missing values at the item level in order to calculate
scale scores based on the items that were completed for each scale.
Outliers. All variables were checked for extreme values and individual cases with
extreme scores (z scores > 3) on one or more variables were identified. Extreme scores
were adjusted to bring the identified values within approximately three standard
deviations of the mean.
Characteristics of the Distribution. Normality was assessed through the
examination of skewness and kurtosis statistics for all variables. None of the dependent
variables exceeded the critical values of ±1 for skewness and ±3 kurtosis. A number of
independent variables were determined to be skewed and/or kurtotic based on critical
values. In large sample sizes, even small standard errors can produce significant values
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for skewness and/or kurtosis despite the appearance of a normal distribution. Therefore,
individual histograms for each variable also were checked for skewness and kurtosis.
Independent Variables. Examination of histograms and distribution statistics
revealed that a number of components were skewed. Once the z scores of each
component were summed to produce the four composite scores, the resulting scores were
no longer significantly skewed or kurtotic.
Analyses
All data analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics Version 26.0.
Confidence intervals for means of standardized (z) scores were calculated using
bootstrapping based on 1,000 samples.
Preliminary Analyses
Description of the Sample. In order to situate the study findings within the
existing literature on social challenges to memory and to identify potential control
variables for inclusion in later regression analyses, descriptive statistics for the present
sample of rememberers were calculated first. Mean values were calculated for the
rememberers’ age at different timepoints as well as for the length of the relationship with
the challenger, in years. Frequencies and proportions were calculated for various
characteristics of the relationship between rememberer and challenger (e.g., relationship
type, current relationship status, frequency of memory challenges in the relationship) and
for the rememberers’ self-reported decision outcome following the memory challenge.
Comparison of Demographics Between Recruitment Sources. Mean values
were calculated for rememberer age at different timepoints and for length of the
relationship with the challenger, in years, and compared between the two recruitment
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sources: university participant pool and Mechanical Turk. Frequencies and proportions
were also compared for various characteristics of the relationship between rememberer
and challenger (e.g., relationship type, current relationship status, frequency of memory
challenges in the relationship) and for the rememberers’ self-reported decision outcome
following the memory challenge to identify any differences between the two sources of
participant recruitment.
Data Reduction
In an attempt to examine the multiple hypotheses generated from the SCO model
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) in one study, a large number of measures representing the
different aspects of the model were included in the study protocol. Data reduction was
subsequently employed to simplify the analyses and minimize the number of statistical
tests performed, thereby minimizing Type 1 error. The author and one advisor
independently categorized the measures into which aspect of the SCO model (Scoboria &
Henkel, 2020) they measured. Agreement was reached between the two raters.
In total, eighteen categories were represented. See Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 for
complete list of items and scales included in each category. For example, items
measuring belief in occurrence, personal plausibility, trust in one’s own memory, and
identifying an alternative source of the memory (reverse scored) were categorized as
representing belief in memory.
It was decided that principal components analysis (PCA) would be used as a data
reduction technique to simplify testing of the hypotheses. PCA is a commonly used data
reduction technique resulting in a component (score) that is a linear combination of the
measured variables (see e.g., Preacher & MacCallum, 2003). This is in contrast to factor
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analysis (FA), which is used to extract latent variables that are thought to give rise to the
measured variables (i.e., the measured variables are a linear combination of factors).
Table 3
Components, Scales, and Items Included in Evaluation of Memory Composite Scores
SCO compositea

Component

Included items/scales

No. items

Evaluation of
memory

Belief in memory

Belief in occurrence

8

1 to 7

Personal plausibility

1

1 to 7

Trust in memory

1

1 to 7

Alternate source

1

1 to 7

Accuracy of memory

Belief in accuracy

3

1 to 7

Recollection

Recollection

3

1 to 7

Vividness

3

1 to 7

Spatial/location

4

1 to 7

Reexperiencing

4

1 to 7

MEQ Sharing

3

1 to 5

Rehearsal

1

1 to 7

Event importance

1

1 to 7

Centrality of Events

7

1 to 5

Memory importance

1

1 to 7

MEQ Distancing

3

1 to 5

MEQ Emotional Intensity

3

1 to 5

MEQ Valence

1

1 to 5

Rehearsal

Importance

Intensity

Range

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).
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Table 4
Components, Scales, and Items Included in Evaluation of Feedback Composite Scores
SCO compositea

Component

Included items/scales

Evaluation of
feedback

Trust in feedback

Credibility of information

1

1 to 7

Trust in others

1

1 to 7

Credibility of challenger

1

1 to 7

Trust in challenger

1

1 to 7

MIRS Trust

18

1 to 5

MIRS Genuineness

4

1 to 5

Evaluation of challenger

No. items

Range

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).

Table 5
Components, Scales, and Items Included in Reasons to Agree Composite Scores
SCO compositea

Component

Included items/scales

No. items

Reasons to agree

Rememberer agreeableness

IAS self-reported
Unassured-Submissive

8

1 to 8

IAS self-reported
Unassuming-Ingenuous

8

1 to 8

IAS self-reported
Warm-Agreeable

8

1 to 8

Compliance (GCS)

20

20 to 80

DUTCH Yield self

4

4 to 20

DUTCH Compromise self

4

4 to 20

DUTCH Avoid self

4

4 to 20

IAS other-reported
Assured-Dominance

8

1 to 8

IAS other-reported
Arrogant-Calculating

8

1 to 8

Rememberer conflict
avoidance

Challenger dominance

64

Range

SCO compositea

Component

Included items/scales

No. items

Range

IAS other-reported
Coldhearted

8

1 to 8

Challenger forcefulness

DUTCH Force other

4

4 to 20

Consequences of
disagreeing

Checklist of Controlling
Behaviors (CCB)

82

82 to 410

Past experience with
challenger

1

1 to 7

Felt threatened by
challenger

1

1 to 7

Forceful challenge

1

1 to 7

Importance of relationship

1

1 to 7

Bothered by disagreement

1

1 to 7

Importance of avoiding
disagreement

1

1 to 7

Difficult to disagree

1

1 to 7

Protection of relationship

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).

Table 6
Components, Scales, and Items Included in Reasons to Disagree Composite Scores
SCO compositea

Component

Included items/scales

No. items

Reasons to disagree

Rememberer dominance

IAS self-reported
Assured-Dominance

8

1 to 8

IAS self-reported
Arrogant-Calculating

8

1 to 8

IAS self-reported
Cold-hearted

8

1 to 8

Rememberer
forcefulness

DUTCH Force self

4

4 to 20

Challenger
agreeableness

IAS other-reported
Unassured-Submissive

8

1 to 8
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Range

SCO compositea

Component

Challenger conflict
avoidance

Included items/scales

No. items

Range

IAS other-reported
Unassuming-Ingenuous

8

1 to 8

IAS other-reported
Warm-Agreeable

8

1 to 8

DUTCH Yield other

4

4 to 20

DUTCH Compromise
other

4

4 to 20

DUTCH Avoid other

4

4 to 20

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).

For each category represented in the SCO model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020), the
first principal component was extracted and saved as the component score, or summary
measure, of the various indicators of each category of the model. Component scores were
then summed to produce the four weighted composite scores rememberers’ (a) evaluation
of their memory, (b) evaluation of the feedback, (c) reasons to agree, and (d) reasons to
disagree (see Figure 4). Higher scores on each composite represent greater belief in
memory, trust in feedback, and more reasons to agree or disagree.
In addition to PCA being the better choice for reducing the complexity of the
data, the underlying PCA model is better suited to these data because the SCO model
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) implies that rememberers weigh multiple different aspects of
their memories when deciding whether maintain or reduce belief in their memory. For
example, based on the SCO model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020), a rememberer’s
evaluation of their memory considers distinct aspects of their memory including belief in
occurrence, recollection, importance, and intensity.
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Weighted Composite Scores. Weighted composite scores were calculated by
summing the component scores representing the aspects of the SCO model (Scoboria &
Henkel, 2020). For reference, weighted composite scores represent the rememberers’
evaluation of each element of the model (memory, feedback, etc.) relative to the rest of
the sample surveyed.
Bivariate correlations between the four weighted composite scores were
produced, as well as correlations between composite scores and rememberer
characteristics, to identify relationships between variables prior to conducting regression
analyses.
Figure 4
Social-Cognitive (SCO) Dissonance Model of Challenges to Memory (Scoboria &
Henkel, 2020) with Additional Outcome Categories
Interpersonal Dissonance
Feedback challenging one’s
memory for a past event

Dissonance
Reasons to disagree (d)
(e.g., personality, approach to
conflict, frequent challenges)

Reasons to agree (a)
(e.g., expected reaction of
challenger, personality,
discomfort with conflict)

Intrapersonal Dissonance
Weigh impact of decision to disagree vs. agree
Evaluation of
feedback (f)
(e.g., credibility
of feedback, trust
in challenger,
level of feedback)

Evaluation of
memory (m)
(e.g., belief in
occurrence,
accuracy,
recollection,
importance)

d>a

m>f

f>m
Weigh feedback against memory

a>d

a=d

Decision

Disagree

Agree

Say nothing

Maintain
belief

Defend

Comply

Silently
maintain
Decision
outcome

Reduce
belief

Deny

Relinquish

Silently
reduce

Main Analyses
Comparison of Composite Scores Between Outcome Decision Groups. Mean
composite scores and 95% confidence intervals were compared between decision
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outcome groups to examine whether or not the patterns of composite scores expected,
based on rememberers’ reported decision outcomes, were observed in the present sample.
Predicting Outcome Decisions Following the Memory Challenge. Two
separate binomial logistic regression analyses were conducted to identify which variables
predict the decision to (a) reduce belief in memory and (b) agree with the challenger,
following a memory challenge. Component scores were included as independent
variables. Additional variables not included in the component scores were added into the
regression model to determine if they contributed to predicting the decision made by
rememberers following the memory challenge. For the purpose of the regression
analyses, silent maintainers and silent reducers were assumed to have not explicitly
defended their memory and thus were considered to have agreed with the challenger.
Relevant demographic variables were entered into Step 1 of the model to act as
control variables. The components created for this study were entered simultaneously into
Step 2. Odds ratios were interpreted to quantify the contribution of each predictor to the
outcome of each path of the model: reduction of belief and agreement with the
challenger.
Results
Preliminary Findings
Description of the Sample
On average, rememberers were approximately 18 years old at the time the original
remembered event occurred and were approximately 23 years old at the time of their
memory was challenged. On average, rememberers reported that approximately ten years
had passed since the event occurred. An average of approximately five years had passed
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since the challenged occurred. Overall, an average of about five years passed between the
original event and the challenge. Average ages of the remember and years passed since
the event and challenge are provided in Table 7.
Table 7
Average Age and Years Passed since Event and Challenge for Total Sample
Total sample
N = 259
Mean

SD

Median

Quartiles

Age at event

17.69

10.42

17.00

10.00, 17.00, 21.00

Age at challenge

22.91

9.09

20.00

17.00, 20.00, 28.00

Years since event

10.09

11.31

5.00

2.00, 5.00, 14.00

4.44

6.83

2.00

1.00, 2.00, 5.00

Years since challenge

One quarter (25%) of rememberers stated that the person who challenged their
memory was their parent. An additional 29% identified their challenger as a friend.
Almost 17% stated that their challenger was their intimate partner. Frequency counts and
percentages of the types of relationships reported by the rememberer are provided in
Table 8.
The majority of rememberers (85%) reported that their relationship with the
person who challenged their memory was current or ongoing. Of those still in a
relationship with the challenger, the average length of the relationship was approximately
18 years. For those who were no longer in a relationship with the memory challenger, the
average number of years passed since the relationship ended was approximately 4 years.
Frequencies, percentages, and mean number of years in (or since) the relationship
is presented in Table 9.
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Table 8
Type of Relationship Between Rememberer and Challenger
Total sample
N = 259
Relation to challenger

Frequency

Percent (%)

Intimate partner

43

16.6

Extended family

18

6.9

Sibling

33

12.7

Parent

65

25.1

Child

3

1.2

Friend

75

29.0

Coworker/classmate

4

1.5

Teacher/boss/authority

8

3.1

Acquaintance

8

3.1

Stranger

2

0.8

Table 9
Relationship Status and Length of Relationship (in Years) in Total Sample
Total sample
N = 259
Frequency

Percent (%)

Yes

219

84.6

No

40

15.4

Mean

SD

Current relationship

If Yes,
Total years in the relationship

18.39

13.2

4.33

4.9

If No,
Number of years since end of relationship
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Approximately half (46%) of rememberers characterized memory challenges as
‘typical’ of their relationship with the challenger. The estimated frequency of how often
memory challenges occurred in the rememberers’ relationship with the challenger is also
outlined in Table 10.
Table 10
Frequency of Memory Challenges in Total Sample
Total sample
N = 259
Frequency

Percent (%)

Yes

120

46.3

No

139

53.7

32

12.4

A couple of times/2 or 3 times ever

4

1.5

Once every few years

9

3.5

Once a year

28

10.8

Twice a year

9

3.5

A few times a year

38

14.7

Once a month

54

20.8

Once a week

30

11.6

Twice a week

7

2.7

Daily

10

3.9

No response

14

5.4

Other: rarely/hardly ever/not often

24

9.3

Typical of relationship

Frequency of challenges in relationship
Only once
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Comparison of Demographics Between Recruitment Sources
A number of differences in demographic characteristics were observed between
participants recruited from the university participant pool and the Mechanical Turk
sample. Demographic characteristics for each recruitment source are presented in Table
A1 of Appendix A (p. 237).
On average, participants recruited from Turk were older (MT = 37.40, SDT =
10.73, 95% CI [35.25, 39.54] than those recruited from the student participant pool (MS =
20.72, SDS = 3.41, 95% CI [20.24, 21.32]. Participants from the student sample were
more likely than those from the Turk sample to be female: 91% vs. 50%, χ2(1, N = 254) =
23.52, p < .001. Additionally, students were more likely to identify as Middle Eastern
(16% vs. 1%), European (5% vs. 0%), or Indian (5% vs. 0%); χ2(8, N = 259) = 35.91, p <
.001. Finally, students were more likely to report high school as their highest level of
education completed: 76% vs. 14%, χ2(5, N = 259) = 101.02, p < .001.
In contrast, Turk participants were more likely than students to identify as
White/Caucasian (72% vs. 58%) or Latin American (9% vs. 2%); χ2(8, N = 259) = 35.91,
p < .001. More participants recruited from Mechanical Turk reported completing postsecondary education including college (29% vs. 8%), Bachelor’s degree (43% vs. 15%)
and master’s degree (8% vs. 1%); χ2(5, N = 259) = 101.02, p < .001.
Intercorrelations Between Composite Scores
Composite scores representing the rememberers’ evaluation of their memory
(memory scores) were negatively correlated with composite scores representing the
rememberers’ evaluation of the feedback (feedback scores) received during the memory
challenge (r = -.130, p = .036). Memory scores were also positively correlated with
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composite scores representing the rememberers’ reasons to agree with the challenger
(agreement scores) following the memory challenge (r = .280, p < .001). The
intercorrelations of composite scores are presented in Table 11.
Table 11
Intercorrelations of Composite Scores
SCO compositea score

1

2

3

4

1. Evaluation of memory

-

2. Evaluation of feedback

-.130*

-

3. Reasons to agree

.280**

-.011

-

-.060

.110

.008

4. Reasons to disagree

-

Note. N = 259. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model (Scoboria &
Henkel, 2020). *p < .05. **p <.01. *** p < .001.

Decisions Made Following the Memory Challenge
Figure 5
Decisions Made by Rememberers Following Memory Challenge
35%
32%

Percent of Total Responses

30%

25%

24%
21%

20%

15%

10%

8%

8%
7%

5%

0%
Defended

Denied

Complied

Relinquished

Silently
Maintained

Decision Made Following Memory Challenge
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Silently Reduced

Denying was the most endorsed outcome decision with approximately one-third
of rememberers disagreeing with the challenger and reducing belief in their memory. The
second and third most-endorsed decision categories were defending and relinquishing.
Compliers, silent maintainers and silent reducers each made up less than ten percent of
the reported outcomes. The percentage of the total sample of rememberers who endorsed
each decision outcome category is depicted in Figure 5.
Correlations Between Composite Scores and Decision Outcomes
Rememberers’ self-reported decisions were differentially correlated with
composite scores representing the four elements of the SCO model (Scoboria & Henkel,
2020): (a) evaluation of memory, (b) evaluation of feedback, (c) reasons to agree with the
challenger, and (d) reasons to disagree with the challenger. The decision to defend the
memory was positively correlated with memory scores (r = .291, p < .001) and negatively
correlated with feedback scores (r = -.155, p = .013). Denying the memory challenge was
positively correlated with feedback scores (r = .172, p = .006). Relinquishing belief in the
memory was negatively correlated with memory scores (r = -.385, p < .001) and
positively correlated with feedback scores (r = .179, p = .004). Finally, the decision to
silently reduce belief was positively correlated with feedback scores (r = .247, p < .001)
and scores on reasons to agree (r = .135, p = .030). The bivariate correlations of
composite scores and decision outcome categories are presented in Table 12.
Correlations Between Composite Scores and Rememberer Characteristics
A number of characteristics of the rememberer and their relationship with the
challenger were correlated with composite scores, presented in Table 13.
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Table 12
Bivariate Correlations Between Composite Scores and Decision Outcomes
Composite score
Decision outcome

Evaluation of
memory

Defended

.291***

Denied

.045

Complied

.049

Relinquished

Reasons to
agree

Reasons to
disagree

-.155*

-.053

.035

.868

.031

.014

.096

-.116

.062

.103

-.067

.135*

.003

.172**
-.057

-.385***

Silently maintained
Silently reduced

Evaluation of
feedback

.179**

.080

-.040

-.091

.247***

Note. N = 259. *p < .05. **p <.01. *** p < .001.

Table 13
Bivariate Correlations Between Composite Scores and Remember/Relationship
Characteristics
Composite score
Evaluation of
memory

Evaluation
of feedback

Reasons
to agree

Gender

.104

.046

.134*

-.207**

Current age

.244***

.051

.190**

-.130*

Age at event

.117

-.018

.181**

.012

Age at challenge

.210**

.013

.161**

-.100

Rememberer characteristic

Ongoing relationship

-.098

.185**

-.229**

Reasons to
disagree

.132*

Years in relationship

.148*

.124

.050

-.100

Years in relationship at challenge

.044

.089

-.012

-.053

Typical exchange

.155*

-.201**

N = 259. *p < .05. **p <.01. *** p < .001.
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.138*

-.124*

The rememberers’ identified gender predicted scores on reasons to agree (r =
.134, p < .05) and reasons to disagree (r = -.207, p < .001) such that women were more
likely to score higher on reasons to agree and lower on reasons to disagree with the
challenger than were male participants. The older the rememberer was at the time of the
study, the higher their memory score (r = .244, p < .001) and reasons to agree score (r =
.190, p < .001.
Age also predicted lower scores on reasons to disagree (r = -.130, p < .001). The
rememberers’ age when the event originally occurred was also positively correlated with
reasons to agree scores (r = .181, p < .001) as was the rememberers’ age at the time of the
challenge (r = .161, p < .001). Rememberers’ age at the time of the challenge was also
positively correlated with memory scores (r = .210, p < .001).
Main Findings
Comparison of Composite Scores by Outcome Decision Group
For ease of reference, hypotheses regarding composite scores across outcome
groups are repeated in Table 1 below. Bolded values indicate findings that were
consistent with the study hypotheses. Asterisks (*) denote statistically significant
differences between the mean composite score of the outcome group and the overall
sample. Mean composite scores for the six outcome decision groups are presented in
Table 14.
Evaluation of Memory. In partial support of hypothesis 1a, compared to the
overall sample of rememberers, the mean composite score for defenders on evaluation of
memory was significantly higher than the mean for the sample overall (Mdef = 1.80).
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Table 1 (Repeated)
Summary Table Depicting Study 1 Hypotheses for Composite Scores by Outcome Group
Defenders

Deniers

Compliers

Relinquishers

Silent
maintainers

Silent
reducers

Evaluation
of memory

*Above
average1a

Below
average1c

Above
average1a

*Below
average1c

Above
average1a

Below
average1c

Evaluation
of feedback

*Below
average1b

*Above
average1d

Below
average1b

*Above
average1d

Below
average1b

*Above
average1d

Reasons to
agree

Below
average2c

Below
average2c

Above
average2a

Above
average2a

Similar to
reasons to
disagree2e

Similar to
reasons to
disagree2e

Reasons to
disagree

Above
average2d

Above
average2d

Below
average2b

Below
average2b

Similar to
reasons to
agree2e

Similar to
reasons to
agree2e

Note. “Average” refers to the overall sample mean for that composite score. Superscripts denote the
corresponding hypotheses. Ex: 1a = hypothesis 1a. Italics indicate rememberers who reported reducing
belief in their memory following the challenge. Bolded font denotes hypotheses that were supported.
Asterisks (*) denotes findings that were statistically significant.

Similarly, as predicted in hypothesis 1a, compliers (Mcom = 0.57) and silent
maintainers (Msm = 0.94) also demonstrated higher mean scores for evaluation of their
memory compared to rememberers as a whole, although the differences were not
statistically significant. In line with hypothesis 1c, relinquishers (Mrel = -2.57) and silent
reducers (Msr = -1.19) provided significantly lower than average ratings of their memory
when compared to the overall sample. Contrary to hypothesis 1c, deniers’ average
memory ratings (Mden = 0.23) did not differ significantly from the average rating of the
overall sample.
Evaluation of Feedback. Consistent with hypothesis 1b, compared to the overall
sample of rememberers, defenders’ mean score on evaluation of the feedback (Mdef = 0.42) was significantly lower than the mean score for the total sample. Similarly, mean
scores on feedback evaluation for compliers (Mcom = -0.29) and silent maintainers (Msm =
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-0.21) were lower than average compared to rememberers as a whole, although the
difference was not statistically significant. As predicted in hypothesis 1d, deniers’ (Mden =
0.38) and relinquishers’ (Mrel = 0.53) mean scores on feedback were significantly higher
than the overall sample mean. However, contrary to hypothesis 1d, the mean score on
feedback provided by silent reducers (Msr = -1.42) was significantly lower than the
overall sample mean.
Reasons to Agree. Contrary to hypotheses 2a and 2c, mean composite scores
representing rememberers reasons to agree did not differ significantly from the overall
sample mean for any of the outcome groups. However, defenders’ (Mdef = -0.34) mean
reasons to agree score was lower than the overall sample, although not significantly, as
predicted in hypothesis 2c. In direct opposition to hypothesis 2c, deniers’ mean score on
reasons to agree (Mden = 0.05) was statistically different from the sample mean.
In contrast to hypothesis 2a, relinquishers’ (Mrel = -0.80) mean score on reasons to
agree was lower than the overall sample mean; however, the difference was not
significant. Compliers scored similarly to the sample mean (Mcom = 0.17) on reasons to
agree opposing hypothesis 2a. Hypothesis 2b predicted that compliers and relinquishers
would score below the sample average on reasons to disagree but this was only the case
for relinquishers (Mrel = -0.37) and the difference was not significant.
Finally, although not statistically significant, silent maintainers and silent reducers
reported higher than average scores on reasons to agree (Msm = 1.23 and Msr = 1.81,
respectively) that in order to support hypothesis 2c, would require similar (above
average) scores on reasons to disagree which was not the case.
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Table 14
Mean Composite Scores by Outcome Decision Group
Total sample
N = 259
Disagreed with the challenger

Agreed with the challenger

Did not communicate decision

Defenders

Deniers

Compliers

Relinquishers

Silent
maintainers

Silent
reducers

n = 62

n = 83

n = 21

n = 55

n = 21

n = 17

Composite
score

Mz (SDz)
[95% CI]

Mz (SDz)
[95% CI]

Mz (SDz)
[95% CI]

Mz (SDz)
[95% CI]

Mz (SDz)
[95% CI]

Mz (SDz)
[95% CI]

Evaluation
of memory

*1.80 (2.85)
[1.09, 2.49]

0.23 (3.31)
[-0.54, 0.88]

0.57 (2.89)
[-0.61, 1.80]

*-2.57 (3.53)
[-3.55, -1.65]

0.94 (2.59)
[-0.25, 1.96]

-1.19 (2.80)
[-2.54, 0.10]

Evaluation
of feedback

*-0.42 (1.50)
[-0.81, -0.07]

*0.38 (1.35)
[0.08, 0.67]

-0.29 (1.51)
[-0.92, 0.33]

*0.53 (1.40)
[0.15, 0.92]

-0.21 (1.12)
[-0.66, 0.28]

*-1.42 (1.91)
[-2.31, -0.56]

Reasons to
agree

-0.34 (3.37)
[-1.21, 0.49]

0.05 (3.55)
[-0.74, 0.85]

0.17 (3.06)
[-0.99, 1.56]

-0.80 (3.36)
[-1.63, 0.07]

1.23 (4.12)
[-0.55, 2.92]

1.81 (4.24)
[-0.02, 3.91]

Reasons to
disagree

0.13 (1.92)
[-0.34, 0.60]

0.09 (2.03)
[-0.33, 0.50]

0.67 (1.73)
[-0.07, 1.39]

-0.37 (2.37)
[-0.99, 0.25]

-0.47 (2.55)
[-1.57, 0.59]

0.02 (1.37)
[-0.61, 0.61]

Note. 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for means calculated using Bootstrapping based on 1000 samples.
Italics indicate rememberers who reported reducing belief in their memory following the challenge.
Bolded values denote findings that are consistent with the study hypotheses. Asterisks (*) denote values
that are statistically significant.

Reasons to Disagree. Similar to scores on reasons to agree, mean scores on
reasons to disagree for each outcome group did not differ significantly from the overall
sample mean. In fact, compliers’ scores on reasons to disagree did not support hypothesis
2b in that the group’s mean score was higher than the sample mean (Mcom = 0.67),
although the difference was not statistically significant. Furthermore, it was expected that
the mean composite scores for reasons to agree and reasons to disagree would be
equivalent within silent maintainers and silent reducers. However, contrary to hypothesis
2e, silent maintainers scored lower than the sample mean (Msm = -0.47) on reasons to
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disagree and silent reducers’ scores were approximately equal to the sample mean (Msr =
0.02). Neither group’s mean score on reasons to disagree was similar (i.e., above average
versus below average) to their mean score on reasons to agree.
Predicting Reduction of Belief Following the Memory Challenge
Results of the hierarchical binary logistic regression indicated that, after
accounting for the association between rememberers’ decision to reduce belief in their
memory and all other variables entered into the model (including the rememberers’ age
and gender), there remained a significant association between reduction of belief and (a)
characterization of memory challenges as typical of the relationship, (b) accuracy scores,
(c) recollection scores, (d) the degree of forcefulness of the challenger’s interpersonal
style, and (e) the degree of dominance of the rememberer’s personality: χ2(24, N = 254) =
87.19, p < .001. The addition of the listed variables contributed to an improvement in the
prediction of the rememberers’ decision to reduce belief from 4% (Nagelkerke R2 = .038
for Block 1) to 39% (Nagelkerke R2 = .393 for Block 2), and correctly classified 75% of
cases.
Based on the model summarized in Table 15 predicting reduction of belief
following the memory challenge, rememberers were twice as likely to reduce belief in
their memory if they characterized memory challenges as typical of their relationship
with the challenger. Additionally, for each standard deviation increase of rememberers’
belief in the accuracy of their memory, the odds that the rememberer would maintain
belief in their memory increased by 2.53 times. Further, for each standard deviation
increase in the strength of the rememberers’ recollection, rememberers were twice as
likely to maintain belief in their memory. On the contrary, for every standard deviation
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increase in the challenger’s forceful interpersonal style, the odds that the rememberer
reduced belief in their memory increased by 1.62 times. Finally, with each standard
deviation increase on rememberer dominance, the odds of maintaining belief in memory
increase by 1.85 times.
Table 15
Hierarchical Binary Logistic Regression Results for Reduction of Belief in Memory
95% CI Exp(B)
Variable

B

S.E.

Wald χ2

p

Exp(B)

LL

UL

Block 0
Constant

0.399

0.128

9.713

.002

1.490

Rememberer gendera

-0.379

0.288

1.730

.188

0.685

0.390

1.204

Rememberer age (current)

-0.029

0.012

5.801

.016

0.971

0.949

0.995

1.458

0.427

11.649

.001

4.296

Rememberer gendera

-0.669

0.389

2.960

.085

0.512

0.239

1.098

Rememberer age (current)

-0.044

0.031

1.984

.159

0.957

0.901

1.017

Age of rememberer at challenge

0.005

0.029

0.031

.859

1.005

0.950

1.063

Length of relationship in years

0.007

0.019

0.135

.713

1.007

0.970

1.046

Years from event to challenge

0.010

0.026

0.148

.700

1.010

0.960

1.062

Typical of relationshipb

0.725

0.339

4.572

.032

2.065

1.062

4.016

-0.035

0.238

0.022

.883

0.966

0.606

1.540

0.195

0.224

0.760

.383

1.216

0.784

1.887

Accuracy (Z)

-0.930

0.259

12.900

.000

0.395

0.238

0.656

Recollection (Z)

-0.711

0.247

8.285

.004

0.491

0.303

0.797

Rehearsal (Z)

-0.103

0.183

0.316

.574

0.902

0.630

1.292

Importance (Z)

-0.031

0.155

0.040

.842

0.970

0.715

1.314

0.239

0.206

1.348

.246

1.270

0.848

1.900

Block 1

Constant
Block 2

Level of doubt in memoryc
Belief in memory (Z)

Intensity (Z)
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95% CI Exp(B)
Variable

B

S.E.

Wald χ2

p

Exp(B)

LL

UL

Trust in feedback (Z)

0.210

0.187

1.266

.260

1.234

0.856

1.779

Evaluation of challenger (Z)

0.180

0.234

0.597

.440

1.198

0.758

1.893

Level of feedbackd

-0.288

0.345

0.697

.404

0.750

0.381

1.475

Rememberer agreeableness (Z)

-0.037

0.229

0.025

.873

0.964

0.615

1.511

Challenger dominance (Z)

0.081

0.300

0.073

.787

1.085

0.603

1.952

Challenger forcefulness (Z)

0.481

0.214

5.055

.025

1.617

1.064

2.459

Expected neg. outcomes (Z)

-0.225

0.242

0.867

.352

0.799

0.497

1.282

Protection of relationship (Z)

0.102

0.184

0.307

.579

1.107

0.772

1.587

Rememberer dominance (Z)

-0.615

0.251

5.994

.014

0.540

0.330

0.884

Rememberer forcefulness (Z)

-0.07

0.217

0.104

.747

0.932

0.609

1.427

-0.086

0.099

0.765

.382

0.917

0.756

1.113

Challenger agreeableness (Z)

0.170

0.275

0.384

.536

1.186

0.692

2.032

Constant

2.111

0.824

6.572

.010

8.260

Conflict avoidance (Z)

Note. Outcome coded (0) maintenance of belief and (1) reduction of belief. Final sample (N = 254)
excluded 5 cases for whom data regarding age or gender was missing. Bolded variables remained
significant at p < .05 in the final step of the model. (Z) denotes variables for which standardized mean
scores were calculated. a gender coded as male (0) and female (1). b typical of relationship coded as no (0)
and yes (1). c level of doubt in memory coded as doubt (0) and doubt plus sought external evidence (1). d
level of feedback represents ‘told happened differently’ (0) and 'told did not occur (1).

Predicting Agreement with Challenger Following Memory Challenge
Results of the hierarchical binary logistic regression indicated that, after
accounting for the association between rememberers’ decision to communicate
agreement or disagreement with all other variables entered into the model, there remained
a significant association between agreement with the challenger and (a) level of doubt in
their memory indicated by the remember, (b) accuracy scores, (c) rehearsal scores, (d)
importance scores, (e) expected negative consequences of disagreeing, and (f) the
rememberers’ desire to protect their relationship with the challenger: χ2(25, N = 254) =
82

77.66, p < .001. The addition of these variables contributed to an improvement in the
prediction of reduced belief of 35% (Nagelkerke R2 = .012 for Block 1, and R2 = .353 for
Block 2), and correctly classified 70% of cases.
Table 16
Hierarchical Binary Logistic Regression Results for Agreement with the Challenger
95% CI Exp(B)
Variable

Wald χ2

B

S.E.

p

Exp(B)

LL

UL

-0.253

0.126

4.010

.045

0.776

Rememberer gendera

-0.411

0.276

2.223

.136

0.663

0.386

1.138

Rememberer age (current)

-0.004

0.012

0.092

.762

0.996

0.974

1.020

0.129

0.409

0.100

.752

1.138

-0.666

0.367

3.285

.070

0.514

0.250

1.056

0.052

0.032

2.715

.099

1.054

0.990

1.122

Age of rememberer at challenge

-0.052

0.030

2.877

.090

0.950

0.895

1.008

Length of relationship in years

-0.014

0.020

0.516

.472

0.985

0.949

1.025

Years from event to challenge

0.037

0.027

1.924

.165

1.038

0.985

1.094

Typical of relationshipb

0.245

0.324

0.574

.449

1.278

0.677

2.411

-0.478

0.237

4.075

.044

0.620

0.389

0.986

0.066

0.209

0.099

.753

1.068

0.709

1.609

Accuracy (Z)

-0.720

0.232

9.632

.002

0.487

0.309

0.767

Recollection (Z)

-0.047

0.210

0.049

.825

0.955

0.633

1.440

Rehearsal (Z)

-0.394

0.174

5.151

.023

0.674

0.479

0.948

Importance (Z)

-0.781

0.176

19.624

.000

0.458

0.324

0.647

Intensity (Z)

-0.026

0.197

0.018

.894

0.974

0.662
2

1.432

0.046

0.187

0.061

.804

1.047

0.726

1.510

Block 0
Constant
Block 1

Constant
Block 2
Rememberer gendera
Rememberer age (current)

Level of doubt in memoryc
Belief in memory (Z)

Trust in feedback (Z)
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95% CI Exp(B)
Variable

Wald χ2

B

S.E.

Evaluation of challenger (Z)

-0.373

0.218

2.928

.087

0.688

0.449

1.056

Level of feedbackd

-0.345

0.335

1.063

.302

0.708

0.368

1.365

Rememberer agreeableness (Z)

-0.304

0.229

1.750

.186

0.738

0.471

1.157

Challenger dominance (Z)

0.379

0.287

1.737

.188

1.460

0.832

2.564

Challenger forcefulness (Z)

-0.102

0.199

0.263

.608

0.903

0.612

1.333

Expected neg. outcomes (Z)

-0.466

0.229

4.129

.042

0.628

0.401

0.984

0.632

0.185

11.687

.001

1.881

1.310

2.703

Rememberer dominance (Z)

-0.234

0.233

1.094

.296

0.784

0.497

1.237

Rememberer forcefulness (Z)

-0.166

0.212

0.614

.433

0.847

0.558

1.284

Conflict avoidance (Z)

0.092

0.094

0.965

.326

1.096

0.913

1.317

Challenger agreeableness (Z)

0.217

0.266

0.666

.415

1.242

0.738

2.092

Constant

0.748

0.814

0.843

.359

2.112

Protection of relationship (Z)

p

Exp(B)

LL

UL

Note. Note. Outcomes coded (0) disagreement with challenger and (1) agreement with challenger. Final
sample (N = 254) excluded 5 cases for whom data regarding age or identified gender was missing. Bolded
variables remained significant at p < .05 in the final step of the model. a gender coded as male (0) and
female (1). b typical of relationship coded as no (0) and yes (1). c level of doubt in memory coded as doubt
(0) and doubt plus sought external evidence (1). d level of feedback represents ‘told happened differently’
(0) and 'told did not occur (1).

Based on the model summarized in Table 16 predicting agreement with the
challenger following the memory challenge, the odds of the rememberer disagreeing with
the challenger increased by a factor of 1.61 if they expressed doubt in their memory and
sought out additional evidence. Furthermore, for each standard deviation increase of
rememberers’ belief in accuracy of the memory, the odds that the rememberer disagreed
with the challenger increased by a factor of 2.05. Similarly, for each standard deviation
increase in rememberers’ scores regarding rehearsal of the memory, rememberers were
1.48 times as likely to disagree with the challenger. On the contrary, for every standard
deviation increase on the rememberers’ desire to protect the relationship with the
84

challenger, the odds that the rememberer agreed with the challenger increased by a factor
of 1.88. Finally, for every standard deviation increase on scores of expected negative
consequences, the odds that the rememberer disagreed with the challenger increased by a
factor of 1.59.
Discussion
The first goal of this study was to build on previous research employing the
social-cognitive (SCO) dissonance model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) of decision-making
about belief in memory. This was accomplished by examining whether the predicted
patterns of composite scores representing evaluation of memory, evaluation of feedback,
reasons to agree, and reasons to disagree, aligned with what rememberers from the
general population reportedly decided about their memory. The second goal of this study
was to identify which intrapersonal (i.e., cognitive) and interpersonal (i.e., social)
component scores contributed most to the statistical prediction of rememberers’ decisions
to (a) reduce belief in their memory and to (b) communicate agreement with the
challenger following the memory challenge.
In the following sections, the findings of the present study are reviewed and
discussed in the context of the existing literature on social remembering. Specifically, key
characteristics of the present sample that impact the generalizability of the results are
summarized first to situate the reader. Second, the patterns of differences in composite
scores across outcome groups are reviewed with a focus on explanations for
discrepancies between predicted and observed differences. The theoretical implications of
the regression results are discussed next. Finally, the strengths and limitations are
reviewed and suggestions for future research are offered.
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Preliminary Findings Regarding Memory Challenges in the General Population
Participants from two subsamples, recruited from the online community and an
undergraduate university student participant pool, were surveyed to examine their
experience of memory challenges from the perspective of the rememberer. The findings
of these surveys confirmed that memory challenges occur in a variety of types of
interpersonal relationships (e.g., friendships, romantic partnerships, and between
strangers). In fact, almost half the present sample characterized memory challenges as
‘typical’ of their relationship with the person who challenged their memory. Given what
is known about the subjective representation of human memory and the many ways in
which memories distort or decay over time (Maughan & Rutter, 1997), it is not surprising
that these types of conversations about memory are relatively common in all types of
relationships.
Similar to past studies of social challenges to memory (Scoboria, Boucher, et al.,
2015; Scoboria & Henkel, 2020; Wysman, 2016), rememberers in the present study
commonly reported questioning (i.e., doubting) belief in their memory as a result of the
challenge. However, in contrast to previous studies of memory challenges (Scoboria &
Henkel, 2020; Wysman, 2016) in which defending (i.e., maintaining belief and
disagreeing with the challenger) was the most common outcome decision reported, a
large portion the present sample (32%) reported disagreeing with the challenger and
nonetheless reducing belief in their memory, to some degree.
The findings of the present study confirm what was previously thought about
social influences on memory: that autobiographical memories are vulnerable to social
influence, particularly during remembering (i.e., retrieval). These data also serve to
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support the distinction between two separate but related metamemory decisions regarding
belief in memory and communication with the challenger. By selecting one of the
outcome categories created by crossing the intra- and interpersonal decision pathways
outlined in social-cognitive (SCO) dissonance model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020), the
rememberers surveyed in this study endorsed the combinations of two decision processes
that are interrelated.
Main Study Findings
Support for the Social-Cognitive (SCO) Dissonance Model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020)
The main empirical support for the outcome categories proposed by the SCO
model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) was observed in the differences in composite scores
between outcome groups for rememberers’ evaluation of their memory and evaluation of
the feedback.
Evaluation of Memory. Consistent with the social-cognitive dissonance model
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) prediction, defenders in the present sample evaluated the
quality of their memory higher, on average, than the overall sample of rememberers.
Given that defenders, by definition, maintained belief in their memory despite receiving
contradictory feedback from the challenger, the higher-than-average evaluation of
memory scores confirm their membership in their reported outcome group and lends
support to the intrapersonal (i.e., cognitive) decision pathway outlined in the model.
Also predicted by the model, the reduction of belief in memory reported by
relinquishers was confirmed by the lower-than-average memory scores compared to the
overall sample mean. Similar to defenders, relinquishers, by definition, reduced belief in
their memory following the challenge and thus should have demonstrated memory scores
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that were, on average, not only lower than their theoretical pre-challenge memory scores
but also lower than the other outcome groups. Without knowing how relinquishers would
have rated the strength and quality of their memory before the challenge occurred, it is
reasonable to suggest that relinquishers may have had less confidence in their memory to
begin with and thus were more easily persuaded by the feedback received from the
challenger.
What was not predicted by the SCO model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) was that
deniers would evaluate their memory approximately equal to the overall sample. As one
of the outcome groups that reportedly reduced belief in their memory following the
challenge, deniers were expected to score below average on memory. However, mean
composite scores were based on a comparison with the overall sample mean of which
deniers contributed one-third of the scores (n = 83). Furthermore, the reduction of
memory scores for deniers was predicted relative to their belief in memory pre-challenge.
Therefore, despite the similarity in memory scores between deniers and the overall
sample mean, it is still possible that deniers experienced a reduction of belief in their
memory as suggested by the outcome decision they reported.
Evaluation of Feedback. The observed patterns of composite scores relating to
evaluation of the feedback also partially supported what was predicted by the SCO model
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020). Defenders in the present sample rated their evaluation of the
feedback lower, on average, than the overall sample. As rememberers who disagreed with
the feedback and maintained belief in their memory, it was expected that defenders would
have thought more poorly of the quality and credibility of the feedback they received,
which turned out to be the case in the present sample of rememberers.
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Consistent with the model and study hypotheses, deniers and relinquishers tended
to evaluate the feedback received higher than the sample mean. However, this was not the
case with silent reducers whose average feedback composite score was far below the
sample mean.
Reasons to Agree and Reasons to Disagree. Although no statistical differences
were observed in the patterns of composite scores representing reasons to agree or
reasons to disagree across outcome groups, some of the composite scores trended in the
predicted direction. Silent reducers, and to some extent silent maintainers, scored above
average on reasons to agree, and defenders scored below average on reasons to agree.
What was not expected was that compliers and relinquishers would score similarly to the
sample mean on reasons to disagree. It was expected that rememberers who reported
agreeing with the challenger would score higher on reasons to agree and lower on reasons
to disagree than the overall sample. Together, these finding suggest that the interpersonal
characteristics examined in the present study (e.g., personality, conflict handling style,
relationship quality) may not fully capture all the aspects of interpersonal relationships
that influence decision making about agreeing or disagreeing with the challenger.
Support for the Validity of Composite Score Calculations
An important and unique aspect of the present study was the method with which
scores were calculated to represent the four elements of decision-making proposed by the
social-cognitive dissonance model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020): evaluation of memory,
evaluation of feedback, reasons to agree, and reasons to disagree. Past studies employing
the social-cognitive dissonance model compared a number of different scores, each
representing a singular aspect of the model (e.g., belief in occurrence), across outcome
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groups. However, examining each aspect of the model in isolation does not serve to test
the conceptual framework in which multiple components of the memory, feedback, and
interpersonal costs and benefits are evaluated and compared simultaneously. Although
the method used in the present study is only one of many possible iterations of
calculations possible, the findings of the present study appear to support the current
method of component and composite score calculation.
First of all, the negative correlation between memory and feedback composite
scores supports the division proposed by the SCO model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) and
the method of combining components into composite scores more efficiently represents
the model. A negative correlation between memory scores and feedback scores was
expected given that the feedback received by rememberers was, by definition,
contradictory to the memory.
Second, although seemingly counterintuitive at first glance, the positive
correlation between reasons to agree scores and memory scores could be explained by
rememberers with greater confidence in their memory feeling less interest in arguing with
the challenger about the veracity of their memory. For rememberers in this sample,
higher levels of belief in memory could make the decision to agree or disagree with the
challenger obsolete in which case the rememberer defaults to the easiest decision – to
agree with the challenger despite strong confidence in their memory.
Further support for the present method of calculating composite scores was
observed in the correlations between composite scores and decision outcomes reported by
rememberers. As defined by the SCO model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020), the decision to
defend (i.e., to disagree and maintain belief) was associated with higher scores on
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memory and lower scores on feedback, whereas denying the challenge (i.e., disagreeing
and reducing belief) was associated with higher scores on feedback. In the case of
deniers, higher relative scores on evaluation of feedback would be expected given that
deniers reported some reduction of belief in their memory as a consequence of receiving
the feedback from the challenger.
Additionally, relinquishing (i.e., agreeing and reducing belief) was associated
with lower scores on memory and higher scores on feedback confirming these
rememberers self-reported decisions to reduce belief in their memory following the
receipt of credible feedback from the challenger. Similarly, silently reducing (i.e.,
reducing belief while not disclosing the decision to the challenger) was associated with
higher scores on feedback and on reasons to agree. Again, the correlations support the
decisions reported by rememberers in this group regarding reduction of belief in memory
and agreeing, or at least not outwardly disagreeing, with the challenger and feedback.
Finally, select characteristics of the rememberer and of the relationship were also
found to correlate with composite scores thus lending additional support to the method of
calculating component and composite scores in this study. Gender was found to predict
both composite scores representing interpersonal decision-making: reasons to agree and
reasons to disagree. Specifically, women were more likely to score higher on reasons to
agree and lower on reasons to disagree with the challenger. These findings are consistent
with decades of research on interpersonal conflict and gender demonstrating that that
women, in general, prefer to avoid conflict and to protect their relationships (Ridgeway,
2011).
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Rememberer age was also positively correlated with memory scores such that
older rememberers tended to rate their evaluation of their memory higher. This finding is
supported by previous research in the field of social remembering conducted by Arnett
(2000) and Pasupathi (1999) who found that older adults were less likely to change their
accounts of the past when faced with contradictory feedback suggesting that rememberers
in the present sample experienced increased confidence in their memory with age.
Other findings from the present study contribute new information regarding social
decision-making about belief in memory. Ongoing relationships and longer relationships
both correlated with higher scores on feedback at the time of the challenge confirming the
assumption that current and longer-term partners are evaluated as more trustworthy
sources of information by rememberers. However, rememberers who characterized
memory challenges as ‘typical’ of the exchanges that occur in their relationships tended
to score lower on evaluation of the feedback suggesting that relationships marked by
frequent challenges to memory may elicit more defending by rememberers over time.
However, rememberers who characterized memory challenges as typical of their
relationship with the challenger also provided lower scores on reasons to disagree.
Perhaps while frequent challenges to memory can lead to distrust of the challenger and
the feedback, repeated challenges to one’s memory also become too laborious to defend
leading rememberers to conclude that the memory is not worth the effort to defend. As
one of only a few studies using the social-cognitive dissonance model (Scoboria &
Henkel, 2020) to examine memory challenges in the context of interpersonal
relationships, the present study is only the beginning of this line of inquiry examining
both cognitive and social influences simultaneously.
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Predicting Decision Outcomes Using the SCO Model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020)
Based on the theoretical division between intrapersonal (cognitive) influences and
interpersonal (social) influences outlined in the SCO model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020), it
was expected that scores on the cognitive components considered in the rememberers’
evaluation of their memory and of the feedback received would predict their decision to
reduce belief in their memory whereas the social component scores that underscore the
reasons to agree and reasons to disagree would predict rememberers’ decision to agree
with the challenger. According to the regression analyses, the social and cognitive
components influenced both decisions made following the memory challenge. For
example, reduction of belief was predicted by scores on belief in accuracy and
recollection, as would be expected given the cognitive nature of these components;
however, the personality of the rememberer (e.g., dominance) and the interpersonal style
of the challenger (e.g., forcefulness) also played a significant role in the rememberers’
decision to reduce belief in their memory following the challenge. Similarly,
rememberers’ decision to agree with the challenger, thought to be mainly a social or
interpersonal decision, was significantly predicted by both social and cognitive
component scores.
Theoretical Implications
The singular consequence of this study’s findings is support for the need for a
combined model that recognizes the influence of both social and cognitive influences in
decision-making about memory. Much of the existing research views memory processes
from either a cognitive or social lens. Traditionally, cognitive scientists have studied
basic memory processes involved in learning and memory using tightly controlled
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laboratory procedures that are designed to limit any interference from outside variables
(Gardner, 1985; Rajaram, 2018). Meanwhile, social scientists have focused on the
interpersonal or group processes that influence the larger social narrative or ‘collective
memory’ for past events (Brown et al., 2012). Recognizing the necessity and importance
of these approaches in understanding individual and social memory processes, the time
has come to explore the interplay between individual and group mechanisms of human
memory which is precisely the aim of the social-cognitive dissonance model (Scoboria &
Henkel, 2020).
The theoretical model developed by Scoboria and Henkel (2020) simplified the
independent roles of social and cognitive influences in decision making about memory in
order to more clearly distinguish between the two decision pathways involved. However,
applying the model to real instances of memory challenges necessitates understanding
that decisions about memory and memorial belief are complex and multifaceted. The
findings of the regression analyses demonstrate this cross-over between decision
pathways supporting what is already known about decision making in interpersonal
relationships: that many different facets of the event and the relationship are considered.
Further support for the SCO model predictions based on cognitive (intrapersonal)
influences including the present method of calculating composite scores for evaluation of
memory and feedback. Most prior research using this model has focused on the cognitive
influences in decision making about memory. The present study operationalized the
elements of the model based on one of many possible iterations of inter- and
intrapersonal variables; other studies may choose to define the model elements differently
thus producing different results.
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Strengths of the Study
The primary contribution of the present study comes from the examination of
patterns of both intrapersonal and interpersonal variables across groups of rememberers.
Patterns of scores on intrapersonal variables across outcome groups observed in past
studies, such as belief in occurrence and recollection, were replicated and new
information regarding patterns of scores on interpersonal variables, such as personality
and conflict handling style, were introduced. This is the first study employing the socialcognitive dissonance model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) to examine the role of personality
and interpersonal characteristics on rememberers’ decision-making following memory
challenges.
In order to strengthen the generalizability of the study results, rememberers were
recruited from two sources, Amazon Mechanical Turk and an undergraduate university
participant pool, allowing for a broader sample of the general population in which to
study memory challenges in interpersonal relationships. The resulting sample spanned a
wider range of ages, education levels, and ethnic backgrounds than would typically be
available in either sample alone.
Finally, the unique statistical approach used to simplify testing of a complex,
multi-faceted model allows for more variables of interest to be examined simultaneously.
The social-cognitive dissonance model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) considers a number of
different variables thought to influence intrapersonal and interpersonal decision making
about memory. The analytic approach used in the present studies was selected because it
allows for further modification regarding the inclusion and weighting of different
variables as the literature expands to explore other possible influences.
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Limitations and Future Directions
The main limitation of the present study stems from the fact that all memories and
challenges described by participants were based on retrospective reporting. Rememberers
were asked to describe the memory and the challenge, and to rate the items used to
generate the composite scores compared across outcome groups, based on how they
“currently” view the memory that was challenged; currently, meaning at the time they
participated in the study. Although their belief in their memory and feelings about the
challenger at the time of their participation in the study was relevant for confirming selfreported outcome group membership as rememberers see themselves today, it does not
necessarily provide the same information regarding their evaluations of their memory and
their response to the challenge at the time the challenge occurred.
Given what is known about changes in autobiographical memory over time and
the influence of current attitudes and beliefs on memories during retrieval, it is expected
that there would be some change in perception of past events when recalled in the present
(Bartlett, 1932; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Maughan & Rutter, 1997). Without
access to rememberers’ pre-challenge ratings of belief in memory, etc., the predictive
accuracy of the model and composite scores cannot be determined. Therefore, future
studies seeking to establish the utility of the social-cognitive dissonance model (Scoboria
& Henkel, 2020) in predicting the outcomes of particular memory challenges should
expect to gather pre- and post-challenge ratings used to calculate component and
composite scores.
Despite attempts to improve the generalizability of the study findings through
recruitment, a number of sample characteristics may actually limit the generalizability of
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findings. For example, more than two-thirds of the total sample identified as female. As
discussed by Fivush (1998), women tend to report more detailed memories for past
events. Although the level of detail in event memories was not specifically examined in
the present study, it stands to reason that more detailed memories would be more resistant
to disconfirmation by others. However, personality studies have also found that women
tend to be more agreeable in interpersonal interactions (Löckenhoff et al., 2014), which
could mean a decision to agree with the challenger, or to not disagree, is more likely if
the rememberer is female.
Similarly, over 60% of rememberers in the present study identified as
White/Caucasian which may limit the generalizability of the study findings to other
ethnic groups if ethnicity or culture is found to influence beliefs about memory. Although
the role of ethnicity on decision-making about memory was outside the scope of the
current study, it presents an interesting opportunity for further study. For example,
rememberers from individualist cultures may be more likely to disagree than those from
collectivist cultures in which cooperation and consensus are valued over ‘winning’ in
interpersonal conflicts (Wagner, 1995) regardless of the strength and quality of their
memory. Using the social-cognitive dissonance model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) to
examine the influence of culture and ethnicity, of both rememberers and challengers, on
decision-making about belief in memory could help to further isolate the role of
individual characteristics on the interpersonal decisions made about memory.
Another limitation of the current study is the lack of demographic information
gathered about the challenger. Information regarding the personality and interpersonal
style of the challenger was collected (from the perspective of the rememberer) as well as
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the relation of the challenger to the rememberer; however, the age, gender, and ethnic
background of the challenger was not collected. Given the reciprocal nature of social
interactions about memory and the importance of the relationship dynamics in decisionmaking, future studies should examine the role of age and gender, of both rememberer
and challenger, in the outcome of memory challenges.
In addition to gathering additional information about individual characteristics of
rememberers and challengers, future research in the area of social remembering and
memory challenges should seek to examine challengers’ motivations for challenging
memories and rememberers’ motivations for maintaining or reducing belief in their
memory and for communicating agreement or disagreement with the challenger. In yet
unpublished studies of memory challenges, Barcic (2015) supported a change in
nomenclature from memory challenge to memory feedback to account for instances in
which rememberers assume a prosocial motive for the feedback about their memory;
similar to Nelson and Fivush’s (2004) description of parents’ ‘memory modeling’ as
aiding in their children’s development of their own autobiographical memory system.
On the other hand, Dyshniku (2017) examined challengers’ motivations for discrediting
another’s memory when the memory was discrepant with their self-concept. The
framework of self-discrepant versus self-protectant memories could also be applied to
rememberers to help clarify the decision process, not just the outcome, of memory
challenges.
Summary and Conclusion
The present study achieved both stated research goals by, first, comparing the
predicted and observed patterns of composite scores across outcome groups of
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rememberers and, second, by identifying the statistical predictors of rememberers’
decisions about their memory following the receipt of disconfirmatory feedback. The
findings of the present study add much needed empirical support for the validity of the
social-cognitive dissonance model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) of decision making about
memory by verifying the importance of both social and cognitive influences in resolving
the dissonance caused by receiving contradictory feedback about one’s memory.
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CHAPTER III
Psychopathy and Memory Manipulation
The first study in this dissertation examined decision-making about memory
following social challenges to memory in a sample of rememberers from the general
population. The second study examined the same in a specialized population who
experienced memory challenges from individuals with personality and behavioural
characteristics characteristic of psychopathy. In the following sections, the existing
knowledge base related to psychopathy and victimization by psychopaths is summarized,
applications of this knowledge to the investigation of social remembering are proposed,
and the findings of this unique investigation into memory challenges perpetrated by
suspected psychopaths are presented.
What is Psychopathy?
Psychopathy is a particular constellation of affective, interpersonal, behavioural,
and lifestyle traits that together represent a distinct personality construct characterized by
callous self-interest, interpersonal manipulation, deceit, impulsivity, and irresponsibility
(Cleckley, 1941/1955; DeLisi, 2009; Hare, 1999, 2003; Hare & Neumann, 2008; Moreira
et al., 2020; Swogger et al., 2007). Although more often associated with criminal
offenders, clinical levels of psychopathic traits have been shown to exist in
approximately 1% to 4% of the general population (Coid et al., 2009; Hare, 1993/1999;
Huss & Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 2000; Miller et al., 2001; Neumann & Hare, 2008;
Thompson et al., 2014); a rate which conservatively equates to 78 million people
worldwide (United States Census Bureau, 2021). Furthermore, psychopathic traits are
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now known to exist on a continuum with subclinical levels likely to occur at even greater
numbers (Lilienfeld et al., 2015; Miller & Lynam, 2003; Unrau & Morry, 2019).
Although psychopathy is often thought of in terms of its characteristic observable
behaviours like impulsive risk-taking, violation of rules, and physical aggression or
intimidation, psychopathy is primarily considered to be a personality disorder due to the
wealth of atypical and problematic personality traits included in the constellation (Coid et
al., 2009; Hare, 2003). What fundamentally separates psychopaths from other individuals
is a callous lack of empathy, also referred to as coldheartedness, that psychopaths
demonstrate across a variety of contexts (Hare, 2003; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996). In
addition, psychopaths commonly demonstrate a need for stimulation that is seen to lead
to impulsive and risky behaviour (i.e., fearlessness; Patrick et al., 2009).
Interpersonally, psychopaths often present as narcissistic, self-centered, glib, and
superficially charming with a grandiose sense of self-worth (Hare, 2003; Lilienfeld &
Andrews, 1996). Combined with a paucity of affective states, psychopaths can also
appear immune to stress or anxiety when compared to non-psychopaths (Lilienfeld et al.,
2012; Patrick & Bernat, 2009) which is thought to be responsible for the ease with which
psychopathic individuals engage in manipulation, exploitation, and pathological lying
(Moreira et al., 2020). Any one of these personality traits alone is a potential cause for
concern with respect to interpersonal relationships but when combined in psychopathic
personalities they present challenges for anyone who interacts with them.
Psychopathy as Social Problem
Psychopaths are known to be disproportionately involved in crime and
victimization and are responsible for substantial tangible (e.g., court system expenditures,
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lost wages, etc.) and intangible (e.g., pain and suffering, decreased quality of life, etc.)
costs to individual victims and society broadly (DeLisi et al., 2017; González Moraga et
al., 2019; Hare, 1999). Although current conceptualizations of psychopathy acknowledge
that different facets – interpersonal, affective, lifestyle, and antisocial – contribute to the
problematic behaviours exhibited by psychopaths, much of the research on psychopathy
focuses largely, if not exclusively, on acts of physical violence or aggression and pays
little attention to the nonphysical tactics (e.g., deceit, manipulation, etc.) employed by
psychopathic individuals to control those with whom they interact (Book, 2004; Hare,
1999).
More recently, researchers have begun to investigate potential differences in
characteristics found in a subtype of successful psychopaths (Hall & Benning, 2006, p.
459). These individuals are thought to demonstrate the same callous, manipulative selfinterest as the prototypical psychopathic offender but with more social poise and without
the characteristic impulsivity and aggression that often leads to physical violence and
incarceration (Benning et al., 2018; Lasko & Chester, 2021; Lilienfeld et al., 2015;
Wallace et al., 2020). With that in mind, the argument can be made that studying the
traits and behaviours of nonclinical (or noncriminal) psychopaths is even more important
and valuable than studying their criminal counterparts alone (Kirkman, 2002) because
individuals with subclinical psychopathic traits likely represent a larger proportion of the
population and are less easily recognizable. One approach to studying noncriminal
psychopaths has been to survey victims, or survivors, who have been on the receiving end
of the deceit, manipulation, and exploitation.
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Studies examining the experiences of victims of psychopaths are relatively recent
and have only just begun to investigate the emotional and psychological tactics employed
by psychopaths to dominate and control others (Carton & Egan, 2017). These studies
focus largely on the negative impacts of physical or sexual violence perpetrated by
psychopaths in intimate relationships and their findings support the notion that abuse
perpetrated by psychopaths has lasting emotional, psychological, and social
consequences for victims (Beaudette, 2012; Deck, 2017; Humeny, 2017; Humeny et al.,
2021; Pagliaro, 2009). Having received little focus outside of the broader context of
physical or sexual abuse, the subtler tactics used by psychopaths have gone largely
unstudied. With only a handful of investigations into the use of tactics such as gaslighting
(making someone question their own perception of reality) and love bombing (the
insincere expression of love through excessive flattery, promises, gestures, and attention;
Deck, 2017; Humeny, 2017; Leedom & Andersen, 2011), not much is known about how
psychopaths employ various psychological manipulation strategies in relationships.
Victimization by Psychopaths
Compared to the abundance of research examining the personality traits and
behaviours of psychopaths themselves (see e.g., Craig et al., 2021; Johanson et al., 2020;
and Wallace et al., 2020 for recent systematic reviews), there has been less scientific
attention paid to victimization by psychopaths. In contrast, popular literature and
entertainment has a much greater focus on the negative impacts of psychopathic
individuals on those around them, particularly for romantic partners. Memoirs, movies,
television series, and podcasts like Dirty John (Goffard, 2017) tell the stories of
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unsuspecting partners who are charmed by psychopathic individuals only to later realize
the harm caused by the lies and manipulation of the psychopath.
The few published studies examining the impact of victimization by suspected
psychopaths in romantic relationships suggests that the physical, sexual, and
psychological abuse that occurs at the hands of psychopathic partners can have serious
and lasting negative effects on their victims (Beaudette, 2012; Pagliaro, 2009). One
potential strategy psychopaths may employ to manipulate and control their victims is the
repeated challenging of memories for past events, which may undermine confidence in
memories and given the importance of autobiographical memory to the sense of self, may
serve to destabilize the victim’s sense of self.
The personality traits and interpersonal behaviours that characterize psychopathic
individuals (e.g., deception, manipulation, emotional disconnection, lack of empathy or
remorse) make psychopaths both more adept at targeting potentially vulnerable
individuals and to act in ways that are more psychologically damaging to victims (Brown,
2008; Wilson et al., 2008). Furthermore, given that psychological tactics like social
isolation, gaslighting, and verbal insults are often invisible, and therefore harder to
recognize as abuse, victims themselves have difficulty recognizing the behaviour as
abusive and also meet significant barriers from others when asking for help (Fanslow &
Robinson, 2010). The unique combination of personality traits and behaviours that
characterize psychopathy could permit psychopathic individuals to abuse others without
engaging in any physical aggression or violence.
Victimization by psychopathic individuals can result in relationship
dissatisfaction, diminished independence, depressive symptoms, somatic complaints,
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psychotic symptoms, paranoia, interpersonal sensitivity, and feelings of hostility resulting
from physical, psychological, and/or emotional abuse (Pagliaro, 2009; Uzieblo et al.,
2011). Themes of betrayal and distrust are commonly reported by self-identified victims
of psychopathic abusers who then struggle to rebuild a sense of self and to develop
satisfactory interpersonal relationships years later (Beaudette, 2012).
Psychopathy has also been implicated in domestic abuse and intimate partner
aggression (IPA) with estimates of psychopathy in domestic abusers ranging from 15 to
20% (Sullivan & Kosson, 2005; Swogger et al., 2007). Considering the relationship
between psychopathy, social dominance, and physical violence, it should not be
surprising to see that psychopaths engage in interpersonal violence within intimate
relationships. Additionally, psychopathy is linked to criminal versatility so there is reason
to believe that psychopaths would engage in multiple types of abuse through a variety of
tactics (Hare, 1991, 2003; Kosson et al., 1990; Shaw & Porter, 2012). The present
investigation marks one of the first attempts to uncover whether memory manipulation is
one such tactic.
Impact of Victimization on Later Functioning
The consequences of victimization by a person with psychopathic characteristics
span all facets of the lives of the victims, their families, and the broader community.
Existing research on the experiences of victims points to an interplay of decline in
victims’ emotional functioning and poor satisfaction with interpersonal relationships
(Whiffen & MacIntosh, 2005). For victims of psychopathic individuals, the psychological
and social consequences are often more severe than for victims of nonpsychopathic
abusers. In fact, the impact of psychopathic behaviour on others’ psychological health
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and wellbeing has been shown to be disproportionate relative to the prevalence of these
individuals in society (Babiak & Hare, 2006; Hare, 1999), suggesting that there is
something qualitatively different about psychopaths that make the impact of interacting
with them more severe and long-lasting than the impacts that result when interacting with
nonpsychopathic abusers.
Gaslighting as Psychological Abuse
The term “gaslighting,” first popularized in the 1960s, has seen a resurgence in recent
years (Abramson, 2014; Fuchsman, 2019). According to recent definitions, gaslighting is “a
form of emotional manipulation that aims to destroy an individual's ability to think
independently resulting in a situation referred to as cognitive dissonance” (Christianson
& Evans-Murray, 2021, p. 640). Gaslighters seek to rewrite history in their own interest
by challenging their target’s memory for the past, or their perception of the present,
thereby undermining their connection with reality. Common justifications gaslighters
employ to explain the difference in perception include characterizing their targets as
being “crazy, oversensitive, or paranoid” (Abramson, 2014). Of the studies conducted to
date, the negative effects of gaslighting on targets are numerous and devastating: selfdoubt, confusion, hypervigilance, depression, anxiety, stress, substance abuse, physical
illness, and suicidal ideation (Christianson & Evans-Murray, 2021; Humeny, 2017; Stark
& Hester, 2019).
Gaslighting has more recently become recognized as a form of emotional and
psychological abuse that can occur within any type of relationship (Stern, 2007/2018).
However, to date, it has been studied most often within intimate relationships or in the
workplace (Christianson & Evans-Murray, 2021; Gass & Nichols, 1988). As with other
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forms of psychological abuse, gaslighting can be difficult to recognize because it is often
subtle, (seemingly) innocuous, and invisible to others (Ahern, 2018). In fact, on the
surface, many instances of gaslighting are difficult to differentiate from “reasonable
disagreement” (Stark, 2019, p. 223). However, as more information comes to light,
gaslighting is increasingly recognized as a method of coercive control employed with the
goal of establishing dominance over others in relationships (Stark, 2019; Stern,
2007/2018).
Gaslighting and Memory Manipulation
As mentioned, gaslighting refers to comments or behaviours aimed to undermine
the position of, and instill self-doubt in, a target (Gass & Nichols, 1988). The utility of
the method relies on the cognitive dissonance created by the receipt of feedback that
conflicts with the recipients’ memory or perception of reality (Christianson & EvansMurray, 2021). Similar to the cognitive dissonance rememberers experience when they
have received feedback that contradicts their memory, targets of gaslighting experience
internal discomfort due to the discord between the gaslighter’s version of events and their
own. Targets, like rememberers, are motivated to resolve these conflicts in one of two
ways: complying with the gaslighter or defending their position (and risking further
conflict). Although not much is known yet about the internal decision processes
undertaken by ‘gaslightees’ when navigating the contradictory feedback received from a
gaslighter, the argument could easily be made that many of the same variables involved
in decision making about memory would also apply to disagreements about the present,
or the more recent past.
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The Role of Psychopathy in Decision Making about Belief in Memory
Memories for life events have important implications for understanding personal
history, developing a sense of life narrative, and establishing and maintaining a sense of
self (Conway, 2005). It is known that social feedback about memories for past events has
the potential to influence how we see the past and make decisions about the future.
Research suggests that conversational remembering occurs in most relationships (Hirst &
Echterhoff, 2012) and existing models of social remembering highlight the importance of
relationship dynamics in negotiations about memories (Pasupathi, 2001; Scoboria &
Henkel, 2020). For example, in the social-cognitive dissonance model (Scoboria &
Henkel, 2020), it is posited that individuals navigate both interpersonal and intrapersonal
dissonance when making decisions about memories that have been contradicted by social
feedback.
Although the model deals primarily with how challenges affect belief in the
occurrence for remembered events, similar variables are likely to influence decisions
regarding belief in the accuracy for remembered events (confidence in the accuracy of the
specific details that are recalled). A potential for manipulation exists when social
feedback about one or more memories for events is undermined through the provision of
feedback that challenges the rememberer’s understanding of what occurred in the past,
leading the rememberer to question their belief in the memory for the event (Wysman,
2016).
In the case of psychopathy, personal goals are invariably linked with self-interest.
Self-interest is a hallmark of psychopathy and can be thought of as a fundamental driver
of psychopathic or antisocial behaviour (Cleckley, 1941/1957; Hare, 1999, 2003).
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Combined with the characteristic lack of empathy, psychopaths are much more interested
in getting ahead rather than getting along (Glenn et al., 2017). This combination of selfinterest and callous disregard for others leads psychopaths to engage in manipulation of
others to get what they want (Hare, 2003; ten Brinke et al., 2017). Considering
psychopaths’ grandiose self-worth described above, what such individuals want is likely
to include victory over others, admiration from others, and/or recognition of perceived
accomplishments and strengths.
The way individuals converse about events from their lives on one occasion
appears to influence how they recall the same events at later times (Fivush, 1994). In
other words, conversational remembering influences what people come to know about the
past and contributes to decisions regarding future behaviour. Feedback from others about
specific memories can reinforce or undercut belief in occurrence and/or belief in the
accuracy of said memories (Scoboria, 2016). The hallmark traits of psychopathy
(pathological lying, interpersonal manipulation, failure to accept responsibility for
actions, and callous lack of empathy) suggest that memory manipulation could be one
manner of coercive control that psychopaths may use to establish dominance over others
in relationships (Cleckley, 1941/1955; DeLisi, 2009; Hare, 1991, 2003). Repeatedly
providing disconfirmatory feedback about another’s memories has the potential to
undermine that individual’s confidence in the memories in manners that challenge their
fundamental understanding of their personal history and identity.
Recent research in the area has supported the outcomes predicted by the model for
individuals who have experienced intimate partner aggression (IPA; Wysman, 2016). Like
perpetrators of IPA, psychopaths use a variety of strategies to manipulate and control others -
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including pathological lying, superficial charm, social influence, or sheer force – in pursuit of
their interests (Cleckley, 1941/1955; DeLisi, 2009; Hare & Neumann, 2008). Although this
type of interpersonal manipulation is a well-known hallmark of psychopathy, the application
of this approach in social interactions concerning feedback about memory has not been
investigated and therefore the implications of these behaviors for those who have
relationships with psychopathic individuals is unknown.
To date, no studies have investigated the manipulation of memorial beliefs as a
possible method of psychological abuse used by psychopaths to dominate and control
others in relationships. However, previous research on conversational remembering
suggests that, in conversations about memories for past events, the characteristics of the
speaker and listener (as well as the social dynamic between them) influences what is
recalled in conversation and how the memory will be subsequently understood (Hirst et
al.,1997).
As demonstrated in Study 1, listeners become challengers, intentionally and
unintentionally, by providing disconfirmatory feedback to speakers regarding the
accuracy of their memories. Depending on the credibility and trust in the feedback
received, rememberers then question, and sometimes alter, belief in their memory for past
events. Confirmation from Study 1 that memory challenges occur across types of
relationships supports the assumption that psychopathic individuals would also engage in
challenges to memory in their relationships. If psychopaths do engage in such challenges,
and do so with frequency, memory manipulation by psychopaths in interpersonal
relationships could have damaging effects on victims with respect to their sense of self
and knowledge of their personal history. Thus, this initial investigation into memory
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challenges by suspected psychopaths was undertaken to contribute to a better
understanding, or at least an increase in awareness, of such challenges and their potential
impact on rememberers.
Study 2
Purpose
The primary goal of this study was to determine whether memory challenges
occur in interpersonal relationships with suspected psychopaths and whether selfidentified victims of suspected psychopaths reported higher rates of compliance with the
challenger and relinquishing belief in the memory compared to rememberers whose
memory was challenged by a nonpsychopathic challenger (in Study 1). The second goal
was to compare composite scores calculated to represent rememberers’ self-reported
evaluation of their memory, their evaluation of the feedback received, their reasons for
agreeing, and their reasons for disagreeing with the person who challenged their memory
to determine if rememberers’ ratings aligned with what they said they decided about their
memory following the challenge. Finally, a third goal was to identify the components of
the SCO model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) that contributed most to rememberers’
decisions to (a) reduce belief in their memory, and (b) communicate agreement with the
challenger following a memory challenge and to identify any differences in predictors of
decisions made by self-identified victims of suspected psychopaths and decisions made
by rememberers in the general population.
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Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Decision Outcomes
Based on what is known about the personality characteristics and interpersonal
style of individuals with psychopathic traits (Hare, 1990, 2003), it was expected that
rememberers whose memories were challenged by suspected psychopaths would report
higher rates of complying with the challenger (hypothesis 1a) and of relinquishing belief
in their memory (hypothesis 1b) compared to rememberers whose memory was
challenged by a nonpsychopathic challenger.
Hypothesis 2: Memory Versus Feedback
Similar to rememberers with nonpsychopathic challengers, rememberers with
psychopathic challengers who judged the quality and accuracy of their memory as
superior to the feedback received from the challenger were expected to report
maintaining belief in their memory. In other words, rememberers who reported
defending, complying, or silently maintaining belief were expected to provide higher than
average ratings of the quality of their memory (hypothesis 2a) and lower than average
ratings regarding the quality of the feedback received from the challenger (hypothesis
2b). In contrast, rememberers who reported denying, relinquishing, or silently reducing
belief were expected to provide lower than average ratings on the quality of their memory
(hypothesis 2c) and higher than average ratings on feedback (hypothesis 2d).
Hypothesis 3: Agreement Versus Disagreement with the Challenger
As with the findings related to nonpsychopathic challengers in Study 1,
rememberers with psychopathic challengers who reported agreeing with the challenger
were expected to have judged the costs of disagreeing, or benefits of agreeing, as greater
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than the benefits of disagreeing, or costs of agreeing. In other words, rememberers who
complied or relinquished belief were expected to provide higher than average ratings on
reasons to agree (hypothesis 3a) and lower than average ratings on reasons to disagree
(hypothesis 3b). Conversely, rememberers who defended or denied were expected to
provide lower than average ratings on reasons to agree (hypothesis 3c) and higher than
average ratings on reasons to disagree (hypothesis 3d). Finally, rememberers who silently
maintained, or silently reduced belief were expected to evaluate the reasons to agree and
reasons to disagree as approximately equal (hypothesis 3e). Hypotheses 2 and 3 regarding
composite score patterns are summarized in Table 17.
Table 17
Summary Table Depicting Study 2 Hypotheses for Composite Scores by Outcome Group
Defenders

Deniers

Compliers

Relinquishers

Silent
maintainers

Silent
reducers

Evaluation
of memory

Above
average2a

Below
average2c

Above
average2a

Below
average2c

Above
average2a

Below
average2c

Evaluation
of feedback

Below
average2b

Above
average2d

Below
average2b

Above
average2d

Below
average2b

Above
average2d

Reasons to
agree

Below
average3c

Below
average3c

Above
average3a

Above
average3a

Similar to
reasons to
disagree3e

Similar to
reasons to
disagree3e

Reasons to
disagree

Above
average3d

Above
average3d

Below
average3b

Below
average3b

Similar to
reasons to
agree3e

Similar to
reasons to
agree3e

Note. “Average” refers to the overall sample mean for the composite score. Superscripts denote the
corresponding hypotheses. Ex: 2a = hypothesis 2a. Italics indicate rememberers who reported reducing
belief in their memory following the challenge.

Hypothesis 4: Impact of Psychopathy Scores
It was expected that the addition of psychopathy scores in calculating
rememberers reasons to agree composite scores would result in an increase score for
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reasons to agree with the challenger for rememberers who reported complying,
relinquishing, silently maintaining or silently reducing belief in their memory (hypothesis
4a). Regarding statistical predictors of decisions to maintain or reduce belief in memory
and decisions to communicate agreement or disagreement with the challenger, it was
expected that higher psychopathy scores would predict a greater likelihood of
rememberers deciding to reduce belief in their memory (hypothesis 4b) as well as a
greater likelihood of reporting agreement with the challenger following the memory
challenge (hypothesis 4c).
Method
Recruitment Strategy
In order to recruit participants having had experience in a relationship with a
suspected psychopath, the study was advertised on five online support forums dedicated
to educating the public about psychopathy and providing informal support for survivors
of relationship abuse: (a) Aftermath: Surviving Psychopathy Foundation (aftermathsurviving-psychopathy.org), (b) Dr. Robert Hare’s website (Hare.org), (c)
LoveFraud.com, (d) LoveLifeOm.com, and (e) psychopathsandlove.com.
Participant recruitment was conducted in two stages, both of which are described
below. Shortly after stage one was initiated, it became apparent that human responders
and computer-automated responders, or “bots,” were accessing the survey and
completing just enough of the survey to qualify for compensation without providing
usable data. In consultation with the research ethics board and other researchers who have
conducted online survey research, changes were made to the recruitment procedure and
to the eligibility criteria for compensation to ensure the data collected were of sufficient
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quality while providing reasonable access for individuals belonging to the sample of
interest who wished to participate in the study.
Stage one. The initial stage of participant recruitment was conducted on the
Aftermath and LoveFraud websites. Visitors to these two websites were invited to
participate in an online study about their experiences in relationships with suspected
psychopaths. A link to the study landing page was provided in the advertisement posted
on the host websites and was accessible to anyone who visited the support forums’
homepage.
Stage two. Following changes to the recruitment procedure outlined below, data
collection was relaunched using a new two-step recruitment procedure comprised of an
initial screening questionnaire open to the public followed by the full survey, accessed by
invitation only, for participants deemed eligible based on their responses to the screening
questionnaire. In stage two, participants were recruited from Aftermath and LoveFraud as
well as from three additional online forums: Hare.org, Love.Life.Om, and Psychopaths
and Love.
Participants
The eighty-six individuals who were included in the final analyses were recruited
from five online forums: 22 (25.6%) from Aftermath, five (5.8%) from Dr. Hare’s
website (Hare.org), 37 (43%) from LoveFraud, three (3.5%) from LoveLifeOm.com, and
19 individuals (22.1%) from Psychopaths&Love. Participants ranged in age from 17 to
71 years (Mage = 52.15, SD = 11.68). Almost eighty-four percent (83.7%) of the total
sample self-identified as female. Participants’ demographic characteristics including age,
gender, ethnicity, and educational achievement are presented in Table 18.
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Table 18
Frequency of Demographic Characteristics Reported by Rememberers in Total Sample
Total sample
N = 86
M

SD

52.15

11.68

Frequency

Percent (%)

Female

72

83.7

Male

11

12.8

Non-binary

0

-

Not reported

3

3.5

65

75.6

Black/African American/-Canadian

2

2.3

Latin/South American

1

1.2

Asian

5

5.8

Biracial

2

2.3

Middle Eastern

0

-

European

7

8.1

Indian

0

-

Not reported

4

4.7

7

8.1

Community college

23

26.7

Bachelor’s degree

29

33.7

Master’s degree

14

16.3

Professional or doctoral degree

10

11.6

3

3.5

Current age

Gender

Ethnicity
White/Caucasian

Education
High school

Not reported
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Measures
Participants in this study were asked to complete the same set of measures as
participants from the general population, as described in Study 1, with small
modifications to the instructions referring to the challenger as “the individual you suspect
is a psychopath.” The measures section of Study 1 on page 44 includes complete
descriptions of the measures used in both studies. Instructions provided to participants in
the present study, including modified wording of items, are outlined in Appendix C.
Embedded Validity Checks
In stage two of recruitment, five validity checks were added at random points
throughout the survey to ensure respondents were attending to the questions. The validity
checks required respondents to correctly answer simple commands (e.g., “Select strongly
agree for this item.”). Correct answers to four of the five checks were required for
participants to received compensation and for the data collected to be analyzed. The letter
of information provided at the outset of the survey was updated to reflect the addition of
validity check questions.
Internal Consistency Reliability Coefficients for the Present Study
Tables 19, 20, 21, and 22 present the Cronbach’s alpha (α) values for standardized
item scores on the scales with more than one item.
Table 19
Reliability Coefficients for Scales Included in Evaluation of Memory Composite Scores
SCO compositea

Component

Scale

Evaluation of
memory

Belief in memory

Belief in occurrence

8

.97

Accuracy of memory

Belief in accuracy

3

.90
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No. items

Cronbach’s α

SCO compositea

Component

Scale

Recollection

Recollection

3

.91

Vividness

3

.72

Spatial/location

4

.90

Reexperiencing

4

.89

Rehearsal

MEQ Sharing

3

.83

Importance

Centrality of Events

7

.90

MEQ Distancing

3

.88

MEQ Emotional
Intensity

3

.91

Intensity

No. items

Cronbach’s α

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).

Table 20
Reliability Coefficients for Scales Included in Evaluation of Feedback Composite Scores
SCO compositea

Component

Scale

Evaluation of
feedback

Evaluation of
challenger

No. items

Cronbach’s α

MIRS Trust

18

.93

MIRS Genuineness

4

.94

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).

Table 21
Reliability Coefficients for Scales Included in Reasons to Agree Composite Scores
SCO compositea

Component

Scale

Reasons to agree

Rememberer
agreeableness

No. items

Cronbach’s α

IAS self-reported
Unassured-Submissive

8

.86

IAS self-reported
Unassuming-Ingenuous

8

.76

IAS self-reported
Warm-Agreeable

8

.90
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SCO compositea

Component

No. items

Cronbach’s α

Compliance (GCS)

20

.93

DUTCH Yield self

4

.79

DUTCH Compromise self

4

.83

DUTCH Avoid self

4

.81

IAS other-reported
Assured-Dominance

8

.89

IAS other-reported
Arrogant-Calculating

8

.88

IAS other-reported
Coldhearted

8

.84

Challenger
forcefulness

DUTCH Force other

4

.75

Consequences of
disagreeing

Checklist of Controlling
Behaviors (CCB)

82

.98

Rememberer
conflict avoidance

Challenger
dominance

Scale

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).

Table 22
Reliability Coefficients for Scales Included in Reasons to Disagree Composite Scores
SCO compositea

Component

Scale

Reasons to disagree

Rememberer
dominance

IAS self-reported
Assured-Dominance

8

.83

IAS self-reported
Arrogant-Calculating

8

.86

IAS self-reported
Cold-hearted

8

.86

Rememberer
forcefulness

DUTCH Force self

4

.81

Challenger
agreeableness

IAS other-reported
Unassured-Submissive

8

.82
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No. items

Cronbach’s α

SCO compositea

Component

Challenger
conflict avoidance

Scale

No. items

Cronbach’s α

IAS other-reported
Unassuming-Ingenuous

8

.73

IAS other-reported
Warm-Agreeable

8

.86

DUTCH Yield other

4

.86

DUTCH Compromise
other

4

.88

DUTCH Avoid other

4

.85

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).

Procedure
The study procedure is largely the same as explained in detail in Study 1 on page
54. Any deviations from the procedure outlined in the previous study are presented
below.
Participants were recruited from one of five online support forums for victims of
psychopaths. With written permission from each support organizations site
administrators, a summary of the study purpose, participant requirements, eligibility
criteria, and compensation offered was listed on the organizations’ homepage (Appendix
C1). As outlined in the section entitled Recruitment, interested participants from stage
one of recruitment were taken directly to the survey homepage by accessing the link in
the study advertisement. In stage two, interested participants were screened for suitability
to complete the study prior to receiving the link to the survey webpage. A link to the
screening questionnaire was included in the advertisement and was accessible to anyone
who visited the organization’s homepage but only participants deemed eligible based on
the screening questionnaire were invited to complete the full survey.
120

Participants recruited in stage one were presented with two screening questions to
assess their suitability for the study: (a) Have you ever been in an interpersonal
relationship with another person you suspect could be a psychopath? and (b) During this
relationship, did the person whom you suspect is a psychopath ever provide you with
feedback that made you question your memory for a specific past event? Eligibility for
the study was determined by the endorsement of both screening questions.
In stage two, the screening questionnaire asked participants to describe, in detail,
a single episode in which the person they suspect to have psychopathic traits gave them
feedback which made them question their memory for a past event. Participants were
asked to save their responses for future reference should they be invited to complete the
remainder of the study. Names and email addresses were requested in order to receive
compensation in the form of a ballot entered in a draw to win one of three $100 USD
electronic gift cards to Amazon.com. Participants were also informed that, if they were
deemed eligible to participate in the full study, their contact information would be used to
send the invitation code required to participate in the remainder of the survey. Each
response to the screening questionnaire was reviewed by the principal investigator and a
research assistant. Responses were assessed for completion and relevance to the study
purpose. Participants whose written descriptions were deemed eligible received an email
containing a single-use webpage link to access the full survey.
Upon arriving at the main survey website, participants were presented with the
letter of information (Appendix C8) advising them of the potential risks involved in
recalling their personal experiences with the person they suspect is a psychopath.
Participants were asked not to continue with the survey if they expected to experience
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discomfort. Additionally, contact information for supportive resources located in North
America (Appendix C20) were made available on every page of the online survey and
again at the conclusion of the survey.
Participants were informed that successful completion of 80% of survey
questions, including both written responses and ratings scales as well as embedded
validity checks, were required to receive compensation and that by initiating the survey
they were agreeing to these stipulations. Twelve eligible participants were not
compensated because their surveys were incomplete. One participant could not be
compensated because they did not provide a valid email address. Finally, one participant
elected not to receive compensation. Additionally, participants were advised not to
include identifying information about themselves or any other person in their survey
responses. Identifying information found in participant responses was deleted upon
receipt.
Upon completion of the survey, participants were asked to provide their name and
email address to receive compensation. In both recruitment stages, participants were
given the choice to receive the $5.00 USD Amazon e-gift card or to donate $5.00 USD to
one of the five online support forums used to recruit for the study. Contact information
provided by participants was kept separate from the dataset and deleted once participants
received compensation.
Data Cleaning and Sample Preparation
Data Screening
Data were screened upon receipt to assess quality and completeness. Judgments
regarding the retention of participant data were made on a case-by-case basis based on
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the completion of measures, time taken to complete the study, relevance of the data
provided, and suitability of the event described in relation to the focus of the study.
Figure 6 depicts the stages of data screening culminating in the final sample analyzed.
Eligibility. In total, 467 surveys were initiated by potential participants recruited
through the five online support forums. Each entry was reviewed by the principal
investigator and a research assistant. Two hundred responses were screened out due to
ineligibility based on the study screening questions (n = 6), failure to respond to any of
the qualitative items (n = 187), suspicion of automated responding (i.e., “bots”; n = 8), or
duplicate respondents identified by identical IP addresses (n = 3).
Completion. Eligible responses (combined N = 267) were examined for
completion. As with Study 1, completed surveys were defined as containing: (a) a
coherent event description, and (b) answers to more than 80% of the survey items, not
including the event description. Based on these criteria, 106 responses were considered
complete.
Voluntary Withdrawal of Data. One participant elected to withdraw their data
after completing the survey. The survey responses of this individual were removed from
the data set upon screening.
Final Sample. Seven additional responses were removed from the analyses due to
incomplete data (less than 20% of the survey). These cases were missing responses to
more than one full scale. Two participants did not provide a response identifying what
they decided about their memory following the challenge and so were removed from the
final sample. Finally, eight participants selected “Other: None of the above” as their
outcome decision and were excluded from the analyses. The final sample of responses
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(N = 86) included in the data analyses was comprised of entries from all five recruitment
sources: Aftermath (n = 22), Hare.org (n = 5), LoveFraud.com (n = 37), Love.Life.Om
(n = 3), and Psychopaths and Love (n = 19).
Figure 6
Flowchart Depicting Inclusion and Exclusion of Cases for Final Analyses
Total surveys initiated
(N = 467)
200 responses screened out due to:
- Ineligibility
- Suspicion of automated responding (“bots”)
- Less than 20% survey completion
- Duplicate responses

Eligible responses
(N = 267)
161 responses deemed incomplete due to:
- Missing event descriptions
- Less than 80% completion

Complete responses
(N = 106)
Voluntarily withdrawn (n = 1)
More than one full scale missing (n = 7)
Did not report outcome decision (n = 2) or chose
‘Other: None of the above’ as outcome of challenge (n = 8)
Final sample
(N = 86)

124

Missing Data
Following screening for completeness of all measures, data were analyzed to
determine the proportion of missing values. The percentage of missing responses ranged
from 0 to 5.1% for individual items. A test of Little’s (1988) MCAR was conducted and
was not significant. As suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), expectation
maximization (EM) was used to estimate missing values at the item level in order to
calculate scale scores based on the items that were completed by participants.
Outliers
All variables were checked for extreme values and individual cases with extreme
scores (z scores > 3) on one or more variables were identified. Extreme scores (n = 4)
were adjusted to bring the identified values within approximately three standard
deviations of the mean.
Characteristics of the Distribution
Normality was assessed through the examination of skewness and kurtosis
statistics for all variables. None of the dependent variables exceeded the critical values of
±1 for skewness and ±3 kurtosis. A number of independent variables were determined to
be skewed and/or kurtotic based on critical values. In large sample sizes, even small
standard errors can produce significant values for skewness and/or kurtosis despite the
appearance of a normal distribution. Therefore, individual histograms for each variable
also were checked for skewness and kurtosis.
Independent Variables. Examination of histograms and distribution statistics
revealed that a number of components were skewed. Once the z scores of each
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component were summed to produce the four composite scores, the resulting composite
scores were no longer significantly skewed or kurtotic.
Analyses
All data analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics Version 26.0.
Confidence intervals around mean scores were calculated using bootstrapping based on
1000 samples. Analyses performed were the same as described in Study 1. See Data
Analysis section of Study 1 on page 61 for complete description of analyses performed.
Only those analyses that differed from the previous study are described in detail below.
Note Regarding Sample Sizes
Due to the small sample size of some of the relinquishers (n = 2) outcome group,
the presentation and discussion of results relating to this group are descriptive in nature.
Confidence intervals were replaced by the two relinquishers’ scores.
Preliminary Analyses
Self-report Psychopathy – Short Form (SRP-SF) scores were included in the
calculation of standardized mean component scores summed to produce the composite
score representing the rememberers’ reasons to agree with the challenger, as shown in
Table 23. Mean composite scores for all four SCO model elements (Scoboria & Henkel,
2020) were calculated for the outcome groups with and without the inclusion of
psychopathy (SRP-SF) scores. Higher composite scores represent more reasons to agree
with the challenger.
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Table 23
Components, Scales, and Items Included in Reasons to Agree Composite Scores
SCO compositea

Component

Included items/scales

No. items

Reasons to agree

Rememberer
agreeableness

IAS self-reported
Unassured-Submissive

8

1 to 8

IAS self-reported
Unassuming-Ingenuous

8

1 to 8

IAS self-reported
Warm-Agreeable

8

1 to 8

Compliance (GCS)

20

20 to 80

DUTCH Yield self

4

4 to 20

DUTCH Compromise self

4

4 to 20

DUTCH Avoid self

4

4 to 20

IAS other-reported
Assured-Dominance

8

1 to 8

IAS other-reported
Arrogant-Calculating

8

1 to 8

IAS other-reported
Coldhearted

8

1 to 8

Self-Report Psychopathy:
Short-Form (SRP-SF)

29

29 to 145

Challenger
forcefulness

DUTCH Force other

4

4 to 20

Consequences of
disagreeing

Checklist of Controlling
Behaviors (CCB)

82

82 to 410

Past experience with
challenger

1

1 to 7

Felt threatened by
challenger

1

1 to 7

Forceful challenge

1

1 to 7

Rememberer conflict
avoidance

Challenger
dominance
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Range

SCO compositea

Component

Included items/scales

No. items

Range

Protection of
relationship

Importance of avoiding
disagreement

1

1 to 7

Importance of relationship

1

1 to 7

Bothered by disagreement

1

1 to 7

Difficult to disagree

1

1 to 7

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020). Italics denote scale added to component and composite scores for present
study.

Main Analyses
Predicting Outcome Decisions Following the Memory Challenge. Again, two
separate binary logistic regression analyses were conducted to identify the variables that
significantly predict rememberers’ decisions to (a) reduce belief in their memory and (b)
agree with the challenger, following a memory challenge. Component scores were
included as independent variables. To maximize available power in a small sample, not
all independent variables were initially included in the regression models. The inclusion
of independent variables in the hierarchical binary logistic regression models was
informed by the results of Study 1. Independent variables that were found to significantly
predict reduction of belief or agreement with the challenger were included in the second
block of the hierarchical regression analyses with demographic variables (current age and
gender of the rememberer) entered into block one.
All independent variables were entered into two additional stepwise binary
logistic regressions predicting reduced belief in memory and agreement with the
challenger to determine which, if any, other variables contributed to the prediction of the
dependent variables in this unique sample of rememberers.
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Post-Hoc Analyses
Descriptive comparisons were conducted between subgroups of the sample of
rememberers based on self-reported demographic and relationship characteristics.
Specifically, standardized mean scores were compared between rememberers who
reported an ongoing relationship with the suspected psychopathic challenger and
rememberers who reported that the relationship had ended prior to their participation in
the study. Independent samples t tests for independence of means and Chi-squared tests
of difference in proportions were conducted to identify differences between subsamples
of rememberers.
Results
Preliminary Findings
Description of the Sample
On average, rememberers were approximately 41 years old at the time the original
remembered event occurred (M = 41.02, SD = 14.30) and were approximately 44 years
old at the time of their memory was challenged (M = 43.97, SD = 11.81). On average,
rememberers reported that approximately ten years had passed since the event occurred
(M = 10.34, SD = 14.69). An average of approximately seven years had passed since the
challenge occurred (M = 7.35, SD = 11.59). Overall, an average of three years passed
between the original event and the challenge (M = 2.95, SD = 6.71). Average ages of the
rememberer and years passed since the event and challenge are provided in Table 24.
Seventy-two participants (83.7%) stated that the person who challenged their
memory was an intimate partner or spouse. Six rememberers (7.0%) identified their
challenger as their parent. Four participants (4.7%) stated that the challenger was a friend.
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Two rememberers (2.3%) identified the challenger as their sibling. One individual (1.2%)
reported having their memory challenged by their boss and another one (1.2%) identified
the challenger as an acquaintance. Frequency counts and percentages of the types of
relationships reported by the rememberer are provided in Table 25.
Table 24
Average Age and Years Passed since Event and Challenge for Total Sample
Total sample
N = 86
Mean

SD

Median

Quartiles (25th, 50th, 75th)

Age at event

41.02

11.68

44.00

32.50, 44.00, 50.50

Age at challenge

43.97

11.81

45.00

35.00, 45.00, 53.00

Years since event

10.34

14.69

6.00

2.00, 6.00, 13.00

2.95

6.71

4.00

2.00, 4.00, 9.00

Years since challenge

Table 25
Types of Relationships Between Rememberer and Challenger
Total sample
N = 86
Relation to challenger

Frequency

Intimate partner

Percent (%)

72

83.7

Sibling

2

2.3

Parent

6

7.0

Friend

4

4.7

Teacher/boss/authority

1

1.2

Acquaintance

1

1.2

The majority of rememberers (83.7%) reported that their relationship with the
person who challenged their memory had ended. Of those still in a relationship with the
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challenger, the average length of the relationship was approximately 22.35 years (SD =
12.81). For those who were no longer in a relationship with the memory challenger, the
average number of years passed since the relationship ended was approximately 5.78
years (SD = 6.94). Frequencies, percentages, and mean number of years in (or since) the
relationship is presented in Table 26.
Table 26
Relationship Status and Length of Relationship (in Years) in Total Sample
Total sample
N = 86
Frequency

Percent (%)

Current relationship
Yes

14

16.3

No

72

83.7

Mean

SD

If Yes,
Total years in the relationship

22.36

12.81

5.78

6.94

If No,
Number of years since end of relationship

Approximately two-thirds (67.4%) of rememberers characterized memory
challenges as ‘typical’ of their relationship with the challenger. The estimated frequency
of how often memory challenges occurred in relationships with the challenger are
presented in Table 27.
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Table 27
Frequency of Memory Challenges in Total Sample
Total sample
N = 86
Frequency

Percent (%)

Yes

58

67.4

No

28

32.6

Only once

2

2.3

A couple of times/2 or 3 times ever

3

3.5

Once every few years

5

5.8

Once a year

0

-

Twice a year

2

2.3

A few times a year

3

3.5

Once a month

19

22.1

Once a week

15

17.4

Twice a week

12

14.0

Daily

21

24.4

4

4.7

Typical of relationship

Frequency of challenges in relationship

No response

Intercorrelations Between Composite Scores
Composite scores representing the rememberers’ evaluation of their memory were
significantly positively correlated with composite scores representing the rememberers’
reasons to agree with the challenger with and without the inclusion of psychopathy scores
(rSRP = .326, p = .002; and r = .373, p < .001, respectively). Mean composite scores
representing the rememberers’ reasons to disagree were negatively correlated with
composite scores representing reasons to agree with the challenger following the memory
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challenge both with (r = -.383, p < .001) and without the inclusion of psychopathy scores
(rSRP = -.460, p < .001). The intercorrelations between composite scores are presented in
Table 28.
Table 28
Intercorrelations of Composite Scores With and Without Psychopathy (SRP-SF) Scores
SCO† composite score

1

2

3

4

1. Evaluation of memory

-

2. Evaluation of feedback

-.123

-

.373***

-.003

-

-.152

.133

-.459***

-

Reasons to agreea incl. SRP-SF

.326**

-.073

.878***

-.383***

Reasons to agreeb incl. SRP-SF

.375***

-.003

1.000**

-.460***

3. Reasons to agree
4. Reasons to disagree

Note. †SCO refers to the social-cognitive dissonance model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020). Reasons to agree
composite scores included psychopathy scores by aadding standardized SRP-SF scores to existing reasons
to agree scores, and badding standardized SRP-SF scores to principal component analyses with singlecomponent forced extraction of all included challenger personality characteristics.
N = 86. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Decisions Made Following the Memory Challenge
Defending the memory was the most endorsed outcome decision with over forty
percent of rememberers reporting disagreement with the challenger and maintenance of
belief in their memory. The second and third most-endorsed decision categories were
denying and silently maintaining. Compliers and silent reducers each comprised about ten
percent of the sample. Only two rememberers reported relinquishing belief in their
memory following the challenge. The percentage of the total sample of rememberers who
endorsed each decision outcome category is depicted in Figure 7. Figure 7 also depicts
the proportion of rememberers in each outcome decision group from Study 1 for
comparison.
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Figure 7
Outcome Decisions Reported by Rememberers in Two Samples

Percent of Total Responses

50%

*

Study 1

40%

Study 2

*
30%

20%

10%

0%

24% 42%

32% 20%

Defended

Denied

8%

8%

Complied

21%

2%

Relinquished

8% 17%

6% 11%

Silently
Maintained

Silently
Reduced

Decision Made Following Memory Challenge
Note. Asterisks (*) denote significant difference in rates of endorsement between samples.

Comparison of Outcome Decisions Rates Between Studies
Contrary to expectations, a far greater proportion of self-identified victims of
psychopaths reported defending their memory (42%, 95% CI [32.6, 52.3]) than
rememberers with nonpsychopathic challengers (24%; 95% CI [18.9, 29.3]). In contrast
to hypothesis 1b, a larger proportion of rememberers with nonpsychopathic challengers
reported relinquishing belief in their memory (21%, 95% CI [16.6, 26.6]) compared to
rememberers whose memory was challenged by suspected psychopathic challengers (2%,
95% CI [0.0, 5.8]). Contrary to hypothesis 1a, the proportion of rememberers who
reported complying with the challenger did not differ between self-identified victims of
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psychopaths (8%, 95% CI [2.3, 14.0]) and rememberers with nonpsychopathic
challengers (8%; 95% CI [5.0, 11.6]).
Correlations Between Composite Scores and Decision Outcomes
Mean scores on evaluation of the feedback were negatively correlated with the
decision to defend their memory (r = -.237, p = .028) and positively correlated with the
decision to deny the feedback but reduce belief in the memory (r = .250, p = .020). Mean
scores on reasons to agree with the challenger were positively correlated with the
decision to silently reduce belief in the memory following the challenge with
psychopathy scores (r = .347, p = .001) and without psychopathy scores (r = .333, p =
.002). Correlations between mean composite scores and rememberers’ self-report
outcome decision are presented in Table 29.
Table 29
Bivariate Correlations Between Composite Scores and Outcome Decisions
Composite score
Self-reported
outcome decision
Defended

Evaluation of
memory

Evaluation
of feedback

Reasons
to agree

Reasons to
disagree

Reasons
to agreea

.056

-.237*

-.159

.007

-.119

-.079

.250*

-.087

.037

-.070

Complied

.004

.208

.090

.075

.028

Relinquished

.065

.139

.103

-.167

.101

-.045

-.102

-.062

.057

-.097

.034

-.073

Denied

Silently maintained
Silently reduced

.333**

-.121

.347**

Note. Reasons to agreea composite scores include standardized psychopathy (SRP-SF) scores added to
existing reasons to agree scores.*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Correlations Between Composite Scores and Rememberer Characteristics
Select demographic and relationship characteristics were found to be correlated
with composite scores representing the rememberers’ evaluation of their memory, the
feedback received, and their reasons to agree or disagree with the challenger. Bivariate
correlations for composite scores with characteristics of the rememberer and their
relationship with the challenger are presented in Table 30.
Table 30
Bivariate Correlations Between Composite Scores and Remember/Relationship
Characteristics
Composite score
Evaluation
of memory

Evaluation
of feedback

Reasons to
disagree

Reasons
to agreea

Gender

.182

-.108

.268*

-.064

.217*

Current age

.130

-.032

.177

-.068

.235*

Age at event

.028

-.158

.060

.007

.012

Age at challenge

.088

-.186

.078

-.002

.126

Ongoing relationship

-.148

-.195

-.048

-.253*

-.065

Years in relationship

.079

-.344**

.049

-.180

.029

Years in rel. at challenge

.088

-.396***

.018

-.160

.014

Typical exchange

.108

-.159

.124

-.037

.139

Rememberer characteristic

Reasons
to agree

Note. N = 86. Reasons to Agreea composite scores include standardized psychopathy (SRP-SF) scores
added to existing reasons to agree scores. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

The self-identified gender of the rememberer was correlated with mean scores on
reasons to agree with the challenger (r = .268, p = .014) such that women tended to rate
themselves higher on reasons to agree. The current age of the remember, their age at the
remembered event, and their age at the time of the challenge were not significantly
correlated with composite scores. Rememberers who reported that their relationship with
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the challenger was ongoing were more likely to provide lower mean ratings on reasons to
disagree (r = -.253, p = .019). The duration of the relationship between the remember and
challenger, in years, was negatively correlated with the rememberers evaluation of the
feedback received (r = -.344, p = .001) such that the longer the rememberer had been in
the relationship at the time of the study, the less weight they gave the challenger’s
feedback. Similarly, the length of the relationship at the time of the challenge was also
negatively correlated with mean scores on feedback evaluation (r = -.396, p < .001).
Main Findings
Comparison of Composite Scores by Outcome Group
For ease of reference, summary Table 17 is repeated below with supported
hypotheses in bold type. Mean composite scores for the six outcome decision groups are
presented in Table 31.
Table 17 (Repeated)
Summary Table Depicting Study 2 Hypotheses for Composite Scores by Outcome Group
Defenders

Deniers

Compliers

Relinquishers

Silent
maintainers

Silent
reducers

Evaluation
of memory

Above
average2a

Below
average2c

Above
average2a

Below
average2c

Above
average2a

Below
average2c

Evaluation
of feedback

*Below
average2b

Above
average2d

*Below
average2b

*Above
average2d

Below
average2b

Above
average2d

Reasons to
agree

Below
average3c

Below
average3c

Above
average3a

*Above
average3a

Similar to
reasons to
disagree3e

*Similar to
reasons to
disagree3e

Reasons to
disagree

Above
average3d

Above
average3d

Below
average3b

*Below
average3b

Similar to
reasons to
agree3e

*Similar to
reasons to
agree3e

Note. “Average” refers to the overall sample mean for the composite score. Superscripts denote the
corresponding hypotheses. Ex: 2a = hypothesis 2a. Italics indicate rememberers who reported reducing
belief in their memory following the challenge. Bolded font denotes hypotheses that were supported.
Asterisks (*) denote mean values that differed significantly from the overall sample mean.
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Table 31
Composite Scores by Outcome Decision Group
Total sample
N = 86
Disagreed with the
challenger

Agreed with the challenger

Did not communicate
decision

Defenders

Deniers

Compliers

Relinquishers

Silent
maintainers

Silent
reducers

n = 36

n = 17

n=7

n=2

n = 15

n=9

Mz (SDz)
[95% CI]

Mz (SDz)
[95% CI]

Mz (SDz)
[95% CI]

Mz
(min., max.)

Mz (SDz)
[95% CI]

Mz (SDz)
[95% CI]

Eval. of
memory

0.34 (4.19)
[-1.09, 1.54]

-0.85 (4.79)
[-3.36, 1.05]

-0.17 (4.37)
[-3.18, 2.74]

1.59
(-0.57, 3.76)

-0.35 (2.49)
[-1.59, 0.86]

0.59 (1.41)
[-0.33, 1.47]

Eval. of
feedback

-0.45 (1.40)
[-0.90, 0.01]

0.43 (1.55)
[-0.26, 1.16]

1.67 (2.00)
[0.22, 2.99]

1.50
(0.25, 2.75)

-0.13 (1.94)
[-1.05, 0.81]

-0.43 (1.34)
[-1.24, 0.50]

Reasons
to agree

-0.54 (2.48)
[-1.38, 0.22]

-0.94 (2.62)
[-2.21, 0.21]

1.19 (2.18)
[-0.29, 2.72]

1.81
(1.44, 2.17)

-0.44 (2.45)
[-1.73, 0.68]

3.35 (2.40)
[1.72, 4.72]

Reasons
to
disagree

0.13 (2.23)
[-0.59, 0.86]

0.22 (2.00)
[-0.69, 1.12]

0.57 (2.20)
[-0.79, 2.03]

-2.26
(-2.57, -1.95)

0.20 (2.03)
[-0.78, 1.26]

-1.20 (1.66)
[-2.18, -0.17]

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive refer to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020). 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for means calculated using Bootstrapping
based on 1000 samples. Italics indicate rememberers who reported reducing belief in their memory
following the challenge. Bolded font denotes hypotheses that were supported. R. = Reasons.

Evaluation of Memory. Contrary to expectations outlined in hypothesis 2a, none
of the outcome groups demonstrated significant differences in mean ratings representing
their evaluation of their memory. Specifically, defenders evaluated their memory
approximately equal to the overall sample mean (Mdef = 0.34, SDdef = 4.19, 95% CI [1.09, 1.54]). Similarly, compliers rated their memory approximately equal to the sample
mean (Mcom = -0.17, SDcom = 4.37, 95% CI [-3.18, 2.74]) as did silent maintainers (Msm =
-0.35, SDsm = 2.49, 95% CI [-1.59, 0.86]).
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In partial support of hypothesis 2c, deniers rated their memory lower than the
sample mean (Mden = -0.85, SDden= 4.79, 95% CI [-3.36, 1.05]); however, the difference
was not significant. Contrary to hypothesis 2c, silent reducers rated their memory
approximately equal to the sample mean (Msr = 0.59, SDsr = 1.41, 95% CI [-0.33, 1.47]).
Finally, of the two rememberers who reported relinquishing belief following the
challenge, one rated their memory higher than the sample mean (Xrel1 = 3.76) and the
other rated their memory lower than the same mean (Xrel2 = -0.57; Mrel = 1.59) thereby
contradicting hypothesis 2c.
Evaluation of Feedback. Partial support was also found for hypotheses 2b and
2d. Compared to the overall sample of rememberers, defenders rated the feedback they
received lower than average (Mdef = -0.45, SDdef = 1.40, 95% CI [-0.90, 0.01]), as
predicted in hypothesis 2b, although the confidence interval of the estimate included zero.
Furthermore, silent maintainers (Msm = -0.13, SDsm = 1.94, 95% CI [-1.05, 0.81]) also
rated the feedback they received lower than the overall sample mean; however, the mean
score for silent maintainers was not significantly different from the overall sample mean.
In contrast to hypothesis 2b, compliers’ mean scores on feedback evaluation were higher
than the sample mean (Mcom = 1.67, SDcom = 2.00, 95% CI [0.22, 2.99]).
As predicted by hypothesis 2d, the mean score on feedback evaluation from
deniers (Mden = 0.43, SDden = 1.55, 95% CI [-0.26, 1.16]) was higher than the overall
sample mean, but not statistically significant. Both relinquishers’ mean scores on
feedback evaluation also were higher than the sample mean (Mrel = 1.50; Xrel1 = 0.25,
Xrel2 = 2.75). In opposition to hypothesis 2d, silent reducers rated the feedback they

139

received lower, on average, than the overall sample (Msr = -0.43, SDsr = 1.34, 95% CI [1.24, 0.50]) although this finding was not statistically significant.
Reasons to Agree. In partial support of hypothesis 3a, both relinquishers rated
their reasons to agree higher than the sample mean (Mrel = 1.81; Xrel1 = 1.44 Xrel2 = 2.17).
Although not statistically significant, the mean reasons to agree score for compliers (Mcom
= 1.19, SDcom = 2.18, 95% CI [-0.29, 2.72]) was also slightly higher than the overall
sample mean.
The remaining outcome groups’ mean composite scores did not differ
significantly from the overall sample mean; however, the confidence interval for
defenders’ (Mdef = -0.54, SDdef = 2.48, 95% CI [-1.38, 0.22]), and deniers’ (Mden = -0.94,
SDden = 2.62, 95% CI [-2.21, 0.21]) mean scores on reasons to agree were more negative
than positive which, if significant, would have been consistent with hypothesis 3c.
Reasons to Disagree. In line with hypothesis 3b, both relinquishers (Mrel = -2.26,
Xrel1 = -2.57, Xrel2 = -1.95) rated their reasons to disagree with the challenger lower than
the overall sample mean. Silent reducers (Msr = -1.20, SDsr = 1.66, 95% CI [-2.18, -0.17])
also rated their reasons to disagree lower than the sample mean. The remaining four
outcome groups did not report mean composite scores that differed significantly from the
overall sample mean. In contrast to hypothesis 3d, defenders (Mdef = 0.13, SDdef = 2.23,
95% CI [-0.59, 0.86]) and deniers (Mden = 0.22, SDden = 2.00, 95% CI [-0.69, 1.12]) rated
their reasons to disagree approximately equal to the overall sample mean, and in contrast
to hypothesis 3b, compliers (Mcom = 0.57, SDcom = 2.20, 95% CI [-0.79, 2.03]) also rated
their reasons to disagree approximately equal to the overall sample mean. Finally, silent
maintainers (Msm = 0.20, SDsm = 2.03, 95% CI [-0.78, 1.26]) demonstrated mean
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composite scores that were approximately equal to the mean composite score for the
overall sample.
Partial support was found for hypothesis 3e in that silent maintainers’ mean score
on reasons to agree (Msm = -0.44, SDsm = 2.45, 95% CI [-1.73, 0.68]) and reasons to
disagree (Msm = 0.20, SDsm = 2.03, 95% CI [-0.78, 1.26]) were both approximately equal
to the sample mean. In contrast, silent reducers’ mean scores on reasons to agree (Msr =
3.35, SDsr = 2.40, 95% CI [1.72, 4.72]) were not approximately equal to their mean
scores on reasons to disagree (Msr = -1.20, SDsr = 1.66, 95% CI [-2.18, -0.17]).
Contrary to hypothesis 4a, mean scores for reasons to agree did not change
significantly for any outcome group following the addition of psychopathy scores using
either method. Relinquishers demonstrated a small increase in reasons to agree scores
with the inclusion of psychopathy scores from (Mrel = 1.81; Xrel1 = 1.44, Xrel2 = 2.17) to
(Mrel = 1.88; Xrel1 = 1.22, Xrel2 = 2.53) using Method A and to (Mrel = 1.85; Xrel1 = 1.46
Xrel2 = 2.23) using Method B, but due to the small sample size (n = 2) of this group, no
conclusions can be drawn from these changes.
Comparison of Composite Scores Following Inclusion of Psychopathy Scores
Mean composite scores for reasons to agree were recalculated with the inclusion
of psychopathy (SRP-SF) scores using two different methods. Method A involved the
addition of standardized scores on psychopathy to the composite scores representing
rememberers’ reasons to agree. Method B included psychopathy scores in the principal
component analysis single component forced extraction procedure for calculating the
component score representing the challengers’ personality which was included in the
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reasons to agree composite score. The resulting composite scores for Reasons to Agreea
and Reasons to Agreeb for each outcome group are presented in Table 32.
Table 32
Composite Scores by Outcome Decision Group Including Psychopathy (SRP-SF) Scores
Total sample
N = 86
Disagreed with the
challenger

Did not communicate
decision

Agreed with the challenger

Defenders

Deniers

Compliers

Relinquishers

Silent
maintainers

Silent
reducers

n = 36

n = 17

n=7

n=2

n = 15

n=9

Mz (SDz)
[95% CI]

Mz (SDz)
[95% CI]

Mz (SDz)
[95% CI]

Mz
(min., max.)

Mz (SDz)
[95% CI]

Mz (SDz)
[95% CI]

Reasons
to agree

-0.54 (2.48)
[-1.38, 0.22]

-0.94 (2.62)
[-2.21, 0.21]

1.19 (2.18)
[-0.29, 2.72]

1.81
(1.44, 2.17)

-0.44 (2.45)
[-1.73, 0.68]

3.35 (2.40)
[1.72, 4.72]

Reasons
to agreea

-0.32 (2.69)
[-1.17, 0.52]

-0.89 (2.99)
[-2.25, 0.46]

0.68 (3.16)
[-1.40, 2.87]

1.88
(1.22, 2.53)

-0.68 (2.73)
[-2.15, 0.53]

3.12 (1.52)
[2.15, 4.03]

Reasons
to agreeb

-0.54 (2.50)
[-1.40, 0.23]

-0.93 (2.64)
[-2.22, 0.24]

1.17 (2.22)
[-0.34, 2.72]

1.85
(1.46, 2.23)

-0.44 (2.47)
[-1.72, 0.67]

3.34 (2.37)
[1.73, 4.70]

Note. 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for proportions calculated using Bootstrapping based on 1000
samples. Italics indicate rememberers who reported reducing belief in their memory following the
challenge. Reasons to agree composite scores include psychopathy scores by aadding standardized SRP-SF
scores to existing reasons to agree composite scores, and badding standardized SRP-SF scores to principal
component analyses with single component forced extraction of all included challenger personality
characteristics.

Predicting Reduction of Belief Following the Memory Challenge
Results of the hierarchical binary logistic regression indicated that, after
accounting for the association between rememberers’ decision to maintain or reduce
belief in their memory with all other variables entered into the model (including the
rememberer’s age and gender), there remained no significant associations between
reduction of belief and any of the independent variables entered into the model: χ2(8, N =
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82) = 8.77, p = .362; demonstrated by an incremental improvement in prediction from 2%
(Nagelkerke R2 = .021 for Block 1) to 15% (Nagelkerke R2 = .145 for Block 2), and no
change in the correct classification of cases (71%) with the addition of independent
variables. This model is summarized in Table 33.
Table 33
Hierarchical Binary Logistic Regression Results for Reduction of Belief in Memory
95% CI Exp(B)
Wald χ2

B

S.E.

-0.882

0.243

13.217

.000

0.414

Rememberer gender

0.058

0.734

0.006

.937

1.060

0.251

4.464

Rememberer age (current)

0.024

0.022

1.126

.289

1.024

0.980

1.070

-2.189

1.355

2.611

.106

0.112

-0.336

0.840

0.160

.689

0.714

0.138

3.706

Rememberer age (current)

0.035

0.026

1.775

.183

1.035

0.984

1.090

Typical of relationship

0.866

0.065

1.778

.182

2.378

0.666

8.493

Accuracy (Z)

-0.344

0.280

1.504

.220

0.709

0.410

1.228

Recollection (Z)

-0.351

0.328

1.147

.284

0.704

0.370

1.339

Challenger forcefulness (Z)

-0.033

0.241

0.019

.891

0.968

0.603

1.552

Rememberer dominance (Z)

-0.083

0.258

0.102

.749

0.921

0.555

1.528

0.014

0.014

0.962

.327

1.014

0.986

1.043

-4.437

1.994

5.178

.023

0.011

Variable

p

Exp(B)

LL

UL

Block 0
Constant
Block 1

Constant
Block 2
Rememberer gender

Psychopathic traits of
challenger
Constant

Note. Final sample (N = 82) excluded 4 cases for whom data regarding rememberer age or gender was
missing. Bolded variables remained significant at p < .05 in the final step of the model.

143

A second binary logistic regression including all independent variables was
performed using a stepwise procedure and indicated that, after accounting for the
association between the rememberers’ decision to maintain or reduce belief in their
memory with all other variables entered into the model (including rememberer’s age and
gender), a significant association remained between the outcome (reduction of belief) and
scores representing the rememberers’ evaluation of trust in the feedback: χ2(1, N = 82) =
6.41, p = .011. The addition of the scores representing trust in the feedback contributed a
marginal improvement in the prediction of reduced belief of 11% (Nagelkerke R2 = .107),
and correctly classified 73% (vs. 71%) of cases. The resulting stepwise model is
summarized in Table 34.
Table 34
Stepwise Binary Logistic Regression Results for Reduction of Belief in Memory
95% CI Exp(B)
Variable

B

S.E.

Wald χ2

p

Exp(B)

LL

UL

1.124

3.339

Step 0
Constant

-0.882

0.243

13.217

.000

0.414

0.661

0.278

5.668

.017

1.937

-0.926

0.256

13.055

.000

0.396

Step 1
Trust in feedback
Constant

Note. Final sample (N = 82) excluded 4 cases for whom data regarding rememberer age or gender was
missing. Bolded variables remained significant at p < .05 in the final step of the model.

Based on this model, with each standard deviation increase above the sample
mean of the rememberers’ trust in the feedback, the odds that the rememberer reduced
belief in their memory increased almost twofold: Exp(B) = 1.937, 95% CI [1.124, 3.339].
Therefore, hypothesis 4b was not supported because scores on psychopathic traits were
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not found to significantly predict reduction of belief in either model.
Predicting Agreement with Challenger Following Memory Challenge
Results of the hierarchical binary logistic regression predicting agreement with
the challenger indicated that, after accounting for the association between rememberers’
decision to agree with the challenger and all other variables entered into the model
(including the rememberer’s age and gender), there remained a significant association
between agreement with the challenger and (a) the rememberers’ current age in years, (b)
rehearsal scores, (c) importance scores, and (d) the rememberers’ desire to protect their
relationship with the challenger: χ2(11, N = 82) = 32.18, p = .001. The addition of these
scores contributed to an improvement in the prediction of agreement with the challenger
from 8% (Nagelkerke R2 = .802 for Block 1) to 44% (Nagelkerke R2 = .442 for Block 2),
and correctly classified 78% (vs. 62%) of cases.
Based on the model summarized in Table 35 predicting agreement with the
challenger following the memory challenge, for each year increase in rememberers’
current age, the odds that the rememberer disagreed with the challenger increased by a
factor of 1.08: Exp(B) = 0.922, 95% CI [0.852, 0.997]. For each standard deviation
increase above the mean on rehearsal of the memory, the odds that the rememberer
disagreed with the challenger increased by a factor of two: Exp(B) = 0.466, 95% CI
[0.223, 0.972]. With respect to rememberers’ ratings of the importance of the memory,
each standard deviation increase above the sample mean was associated with a twofold
increase in odds of agreeing with the challenger: Exp(B) = 2.076, 95% CI [1.021, 4.219].
Finally, for each standard deviation increase above the mean in rememberers’ desire to
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protect the relationship with the challenger, the odds that the rememberer agreed with the
challenger increased by a factor of four: Exp(B) = 3.967, 95% CI [1.789, 8.793].
Table 35
Hierarchical Binary Logistic Regression Results for Agreement with the Challenger
95% CI Exp(B)
Wald χ2

LL

UL

3.740

0.701

19.968

.099

0.966

0.928

1.006

0.006

.939

1.097

1.115

1.087

.297

3.197

0.360

28.407

-0.082

0.040

4.152

.042

0.922

0.852

0.997

Age of rememberer at
challenge

0.018

0.036

0.271

.603

1.019

0.950

1.092

Level of doubt in memory

0.442

0.501

0.778

.378

1.556

0.583

4.154

Accuracy (Z)

0.316

0.344

0.843

.359

1.371

0.699

2.691

Rehearsal (Z)

-0.764

0.375

4.140

.042

0.466

0.223

0.972

0.730

0.362

4.072

.044

2.076

1.021

4.219

-0.003

0.346

0.000

.993

0.997

0.506

1.965

0.003

0.017

0.028

.866

1.003

0.970

1.037

-0.238

0.424

0.314

.575

0.788

0.343

1.811

Protection of relationship (Z)

1.378

0.406

11.509

.001

3.967

1.789

8.793

Constant

0.810

2.648

0.094

.760

2.247

Variable

B

S.E.

p

Exp(B)

-0.498

0.228

4.779

.029

0.608

1.319

0.855

2.383

.123

-0.034

0.021

2.722

0.093

1.217

1.162

Block 0
Constant
Block 1
Rememberer gender
Rememberer age (current)
Constant
Block 2
Rememberer gender
Rememberer age (current)

Importance (Z)
Evaluation of challenger (Z)
Psychopathic traits of
challenger
Expected neg. outcomes (Z)

Note. Final sample (N = 254) excluded 5 cases for whom data regarding rememberer age or gender was
missing. Bolded variables remained significant at p < .05 in the final step of the model.
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A second binary logistic regression including all independent variables was
performed using a stepwise procedure. The resulting model, summarized in Table 36,
demonstrated that after accounting for the association between rememberers’ decision to
agree with the challenger and all other variables in the model (including the
rememberer’s age and gender), a significant association remained between the outcome
(agreement with the challenger) and (a) the current age of the rememberer and (b)
standardized scores representing the rememberers’ desire to protect their relationship
with the challenger: χ2(2, N = 82) = 23.86, p < .001. The addition of age and desire to
protect the relationship contributed to an incremental improvement in the prediction of
agreement with the challenger from 27% (Nagelkerke R2 = .275 for Step 1) to 34%
(Nagelkerke R2 = .344 for Step 2) and correctly classified 76% (vs. 62%) of cases.
Table 36
Stepwise Binary Logistic Regression Results for Agreement with the Challenger
95% CI Exp(B)
Wald χ2

B

S.E.

-0.498

0.228

4.779

.029

0.608

1.231

0.345

12.756

.000

3.423

-0.926

0.256

13.055

.000

0.396

-0.056

0.026

4.760

.029

Protecting relationship

1.422

0.379

14.089

Constant

2.161

1.325

2.660

Variable

p

Exp(B)

LL

UL

1.742

6.725

0.945

0.899

0.994

.000

4.146

1.973

8.712

.103

8.676

Step 0
Constant
Step 1
Protecting relationship
Constant
Step 2
Rememberer age (current)

Note. Final sample (N = 82) excluded 4 cases for whom data regarding rememberer age or gender was
missing. Bolded variables remained significant at p < .05 in the final step of the model.
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Based on the first step in the model, with each standard deviation increase above
the sample mean of the rememberers’ desire to protect the relationship with the
challenger, the odds that the rememberer agreed with the challenger increased by a factor
of three: Exp(B) = 3.423, 95% CI [1.742, 6.725]. In the second step, each standard
deviation increase above the sample mean of the rememberer’s desire to protect their
relationship with the challenger corresponded to a fourfold increase in the odds that the
rememberer would agree with the challenger: Exp(B) = 4.146, 95% CI [1.973, 8.712]. In
contrast, each year of increase in current age of the rememberer corresponded to an
increase in the odds that the rememberer would disagree with the challenger by a factor
of 1.06: Exp(B) = 0.945, 95% CI [0.899, 0.994].
Comparison of Statistical Predictors Between Samples
Table 37
Predictors of Belief Reduction and Agreement with the Challenger in Two Samples
Reduction of belief
Study 1

Study 2

Typical of relationship

Trust in feedback (Z)

Agreement with the challenger
Study 1

Study 2

Level of doubt

Current age of rem.

Accuracy (Z)

Accuracy (Z)

Accuracy (Z)

Recollection (Z)

Rehearsal (Z)

Rehearsal (Z)

Chall. forcefulness (Z)

Importance (Z)

Importance (Z)

Rem. dominance (Z)

Eval. of challenger (Z)

Protect. relationship (Z)

Expect neg. outcomes
(Z)
Protect. relationship
(Z)
Note. Final samples (N1 = 254, N2 = 82) excluded cases for whom data regarding rememberer age or gender
was missing. (Z) denotes scores that were standardized. Variables listed are those that remained significant
at p < .05 in the final step of the regression model. Italics indicate variables that were significant in the
stepwise logistic regression models.
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More significant predictors were identified in Study 1 compared to Study 2 for
both decision models: belief and agreement. Mean component scores representing belief
in accuracy were significant predictors in three of the four models. Mean scores on
rehearsal, importance, and protecting the relationship were significant predictors of
agreement with the challenger for both samples. Statistical predictors of reducing belief
and agreeing with the challenger for each sample are summarized in Table 37.
Post-Hoc Analyses
Given the difference in rates of self-reported decision outcomes between samples,
and the difference in proportion of rememberers in the present sample who stated that
they were still in the relationship with their challenger, further descriptive comparisons
were conducted to identify potential differences between rememberers who remained in
the relationship at the time of the study versus those for whom the relationship with the
challenger had ended. For the purpose of these analyses, the comparison groups are
identified as rememberers in: (a) a current relationship with their challenger (Current) or
(b) a past relationship with their challenger (Past). It is important to note that due to the
small sample size of current rememberers in this sample (n = 14; vs. n = 72), any
differences between the groups are descriptive and should be interpreted with caution.
Variables examined for comparisons included outcome decisions; composite
scores representing evaluation of the memory, evaluation of the feedback, reasons to
agree and reasons to disagree; scores on physical and economic abuse (CCB subscales);
compliance of the rememberer (GCS scores); psychopathic traits of the challenger (SRPSF scores); and years spent in the relationship. The only statistically significant
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differences identified between current and past rememberers were for reasons to disagree
composite scores and years in the relationship with the challenger.
Regarding reasons to disagree with the challenger, those rememberers who
remained in the relationship with the suspected psychopathic challenger at the time of the
study rated their reasons to disagree with the challenger significantly lower than
rememberers whose relationship with the challenger had ended: t(84) = 2.39, p = .019, g
= 0.70. When examined by component scores, agreeableness of the challenger scores
differed most between current and past rememberers: t(84) = 1.83, p = .071, g = .53;
although the difference was not statistically significant.
Regarding the length of the relationship between the rememberer and the
challenger, rememberers who remained in the relationship with the suspected
psychopathic challenger at the time of the study reported longer relationships than those
who were no longer in a relationship with the challenger: t(80) = -2.50, p = .014, g =
0.73. The mean difference was approximately 10 years (Mdiff = -10.71, SDdiff = 4.29, 95%
CI [-19.24, -2.18]).
Discussion
The aim of the present study was first to verify that memory challenges do occur
in interpersonal relationships with suspected psychopaths and to examine the rates of
outcome decisions reported in the present sample of self-identified victims of suspected
psychopaths. The second goal was to compare composite scores representing
rememberers’ evaluation of their memory, the feedback received, reasons to agree, and
reasons to disagree across outcome decision groups to determine if the patterns of scores
observed aligned with the patterns predicted by the social-cognitive (SCO) dissonance
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model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020). The third and final goal was to identify the
components of the SCO model that contributed most to the statistical prediction of
rememberers’ decisions to (a) reduce belief in their memory, and (b) communicate
agreement with the challenger following a memory challenge and to examine any
differences in predictors between samples of rememberers from general population
(Study 1) and the present sample of self-identified victims of suspected psychopaths.
In the following sections, the findings of the present study are reviewed and
situated in the existing literatures on social remembering, intimate partner abuse, and
victimization by suspected psychopaths. First, characteristics of this unique sample of
rememberers are summarized for context. Second, the patterns of composite scores across
outcome groups and regression findings are reviewed. Finally, the theoretical and
practical implications of the findings are discussed with a focus on recommendations for
next steps.
Preliminary Findings Regarding Memory Challenges by Suspected Psychopaths
The participants surveyed in the present study were recruited from five online
forums dedicated to supporting and educating survivors of suspected psychopaths. Based
on the reports from these rememberers, it appears that memory challenges do, in fact,
occur in relationships with psychopathic individuals. What’s more, two-thirds of the
sample characterized memory challenges as ‘typical’ of their relationship with the
suspected psychopath and estimated that such challenges occur ‘frequently’ (i.e., at least
once a month).
Only one other study conducted to date has examined memory challenges in
intimate relationships using the SCO model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020; see Wysman,
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2016); however, recent studies of intimate partner aggression (e.g., Miano et al., 2021;
Stark, 2019; Stern, 2007/2018; Warshaw et al., 2009), as well as a handful of studies of
psychopathic relationships (Deck, 2017; Humeny, 2017), have begun to recognize the use
of gaslighting (i.e., making someone question their own perception of reality) in romantic
relationships. By questioning their partners’ memory for past events, challengers can
undermine the rememberers’ confidence in their memory and even alter which details are
recalled through the provision of feedback (Brown, et al., 2009; Cuc et al., 2006; Hirst &
Echterhoff, 2012; Muller & Hirst, 2014).
It is unsurprising that rememberers in the present sample reported experiencing
memory challenges frequently in their relationships with the suspected psychopaths.
Wysman (2016) found that social challenges to memory occurred often in relationships
involving intimate partner aggression and rates of psychopathy are known to be higher in
domestic abusers than the general population (Dutton & Golant, 1997; Sullivan &
Kosson, 2005; Swogger et al., 2007). In fact, Wysman found that memory challenges
were specifically employed by domestic abusers to disconfirm the victims’ reports of
aggression and other forms of abuse perpetrated by the challenger. Similar to other recent
studies of abuse by psychopathic partners, the partners in Wysman’s (2016) study
challenged the victim’s memory by denying either part of or all of the abuse that
occurred.
These reports are consistent with reports received from self-identified victims of
psychopaths in the present study, the majority of whom described challenges by past
romantic partners who provided feedback that contradicted their memory for abuse
perpetrated by the suspected psychopath. The overwhelming endorsement by
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rememberers in the present study confirmed that, similar to the gaslighting reported in
previous studies of psychopathic partners (Deck, 2017; Humeny, 2017), individuals
suspected to possess psychopathic traits employed memory challenges in a manner that
led rememberers to question the truth and accuracy of their memory for past
confrontations, instances of aggression, and promises made by the psychopath.
Another interesting finding of the studies conducted by Wysman (2016)
introduced the concept of changing levels of belief in memory, coined “vacillation of
belief” (p. 133). Rememberers in abusive relationships reported experiencing changing
levels of belief in their memory over time regardless of what was reported to be their
final decision about their memory: maintaining or reducing belief. Applied to the present
sample, it is likely that many, if not all, rememberers with psychopathic challengers
experienced varying levels of confidence, or doubt, in their memory during and following
the challenge. This may be one explanation for the unexpectedly high proportion of
defenders in the present sample. Other possible explanations for the discordance in
outcome decision rates are outlined in the following sections.
Main Findings
Rates of Outcome Decisions Reported
Based on what is known about the interpersonal features of psychopathy, it was
expected that memory challenges by psychopathic challengers would prompt more
reduction of belief and compliance by rememberers given their characteristic use of
deceit and interpersonal manipulation (Cleckley, 1941/1955), as well as their tendency to
employ both covert and overt aggression to dominate others (Hare, 2001, 2003).
However, despite reports confirming the expected manipulation and aggressive
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behaviour, the opposite finding was observed in the present study. Self-identified victims
reported a significantly higher rate of defending belief in their memory, and
correspondingly, a lower rate of relinquishing belief in their memory. As mentioned,
there are a variety of possible explanations for the low rate of relinquishing belief and
high rate of defending belief in the present sample.
First of all, the majority (84%) of rememberers in the present sample reported on
relationships that had ended since the challenge occurred. In addition to the other known
consequences associated with retrospective reporting (e.g., forgetting, less specific
detail), reporting about a past relationship with the challenger also introduces the
possibility that changes in attitudes towards the relationship, and changes in the
rememberers’ beliefs about the memory that was challenged, could influence
rememberers’ recollection of the challenge and their decision about their memory.
Specifically, in their descriptions of the memory challenge, many rememberers
described having realized (or at least suspected), either before or during the interaction,
that the challenger was attempting to manipulate their memory for their own benefit. For
example, rememberers depicted the challenge as an attempt by the challenger to
minimize or redirect responsibility for past misbehaviours (e.g., lies, infidelities,
aggressive acts). One rememberer recalled the suspected psychopath outright denying a
physical assault he had perpetrated against her earlier the same day. In this example, the
rememberer described realizing that her partner was attempting to avoid responsibility for
his earlier behaviour by refusing to admit the assault happened.
As suggested by Barcic (2015) and Dyshniku (2017), viewing the memory
challenge as stemming from an ulterior motive is likely to influence rememberers’
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perception of the challenge at the time it occurred and during later recall of the
interaction. Given the relatively high proportion of the sample who characterized memory
challenges as ‘typical’ of their interactions with the suspected psychopaths, it is possible
that by the time this particular memory challenge took place, the rememberer had tired of
having their memory challenged and no longer trusted the challenger or their feedback.
Furthermore, if the particular challenge described by rememberers in this study was the
“last straw” event, meaning it prompted the realization that the challenger was engaging
in deceit and manipulation, rememberers would be more likely to defend belief in their
memory once they discounted the credibility of the challenger.
Another explanation for the difference in rates of memory defending includes the
types of memories that were challenged by suspected psychopaths. As mentioned, the
challenges described in the present study often related to prior abuse, conflict, or
disagreement between the rememberer and challenger. As a common characteristic of
psychopathy, the fact that many suspected psychopaths attempted to avoid responsibility
for their actions by denying bad behaviour or blaming the victim is unsurprising (Hare et
al., 1990). However, the nature of emotional experiences like instances of physical abuse
is that it can result in more vivid memories (Buchanan, 2007; Reisberg & Hertel, 2005).
The greater the personal importance placed on an autobiographical event, the more likely
the rememberer is to defend belief in their memory even in the face of contradictory
feedback. Such self-defining memories are known to involve more vivid visual imagery,
intense emotional reexperiencing, and important centrality to self-concept (Blagov &
Singer, 2004). It would be expected, then, that rememberers would be reluctant to
relinquish belief in these memories without substantial evidence of inaccuracies.
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Finally, the type of feedback provided by suspected psychopaths is likely to have
made a difference in the way the feedback was evaluated by rememberers. According to
the descriptions provided by rememberers, the suspected psychopaths were more likely to
challenge the rememberers’ belief in the occurrence of the event by telling them the
remembered event did not occur than they were to target belief in the accuracy of their
memory by arguing that the event happened differently than recalled by the rememberer.
In addition to being a rather bold approach to memory challenging, this type of feedback
from a challenger requires a higher standard of proof than a challenge to the accuracy of
the memory. As is often the case with individuals high on psychopathic traits, their selfconfidence in their ability to convince the rememberer of their version of events may
have backfired and undercut the credibility of the feedback leading more rememberers to
defend rather than relinquish belief in their memory.
Composite Scores Across Outcome Groups
Evaluation of Memory. Contrary to what was predicted, no differences in
evaluation of memory scores were observed between outcome decision groups.
Specifically, rememberers who reportedly maintained belief in their memory (including
defenders, compliers, and silent maintainers) did not evaluate the quality of their memory
higher than the mean of the overall sample. Similarly, rememberers who reportedly
reduced belief following the challenge (deniers, relinquishers, and silent reducers) did not
evaluate their memory lower than the overall sample. In fact, one of the two relinquishers
scored higher than the sample mean on evaluation of memory following the challenge.
There are a few possible explanations for this unexpected outcome. First, the
small sample size of rememberers in each outcome group made it more difficult to detect
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difference between groups, particularly for compliers (n = 7), relinquishers (n = 2), and
silent reducers (n = 9). Second, the lack of obvious differences in memory scores between
outcome groups may indicate that rememberers placed greater emphasis on evaluating
the other elements of the model when deciding what to believe about their memory or
how they would respond to the challenger they suspected had psychopathic traits. The
results of the regression analyses (discussed in more detail in a later section) support the
notion that that rememberers considered the credibility and trustworthiness of the
feedback over and above other variables when deciding to reduce or maintain belief in
their memory.
Evaluation of Feedback. Defenders’ and relinquishers’ mean feedback scores
were consistent with the patterns predicted by the social-cognitive dissonance model
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020). Defenders evaluated the feedback lower than the overall
sample and both relinquishers evaluated the feedback higher than the overall sample.
However, not all outcome groups’ scores followed the predicted patterns. In direct
contradiction to the hypothesis, compliers scored higher than the overall sample on
evaluation of the feedback. Considering the definition of complying includes agreeing
with the challenger while maintaining belief in memory, evaluating the feedback more
positively than the overall sample seems counterintuitive. However, it is possible that
compliers reported agreeing with the challenger at the time of the challenge and
questioning belief due to their positive evaluation of the feedback but have since decided
that they maintained, or reclaimed, belief in their memory.
Reasons to Agree and Reasons to Disagree. There were no real differences in
scores on reasons to agree or reasons to disagree across outcome groups. Both
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relinquishers scored higher than average on reasons to agree and lower than average on
reasons to disagree which aligns with the model predictions; however, conclusions cannot
be drawn on a sample of two rememberers. The lack of consistent differentiation in
scores across outcome groups in both samples of rememberers lends further support for
the notion that there are other variables involved in rememberers’ decisions to agree or
disagree with the challenger that were not accounted for in this study. Even the inclusion
of psychopathy scores did not impact the patterns of scores across outcome groups.
Suggestions for further study will be addressed in subsequent sections; however,
based on the current study’s findings, more exploration of the possible contributors to
decision-making regarding communication with the challenger will be needed. For
example, the Interpersonal Adjective Scale-Revised (IAS-R; Wiggins, 1995) is just one
option for assessing personality and interpersonal behaviour. Other aspects of
interpersonal dynamics including the power differential between challenger and
rememberer, and the rememberers’ expectation of the challengers’ reaction should also
be investigated.
Support for the Validity of Composite Scores
As with rememberers from the general population, the findings of the present
study lend additional support to the method used to calculate SCO model (Scoboria &
Henkel, 2020) composite scores, albeit to a lesser degree. Unlike the previous study,
there was no significant correlation observed between memory and feedback scores;
however, scores on reasons to agree and reasons to disagree were negatively correlated
confirming that these two composite scores represent opposing constructs. Also, like
Study 1, scores on reasons to agree were positively correlated with memory scores which
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may indicate that higher confidence in memory is not necessarily predictive of
disagreeing with the challenger.
Further support for the composite score calculations were also observed in the
correlations with decision outcome group membership. Consistent with the separation
between maintaining and reducing belief in memory, self-identification as a defender was
correlated with lower than average scores on feedback and identification as a denier was
correlated with higher than average scores on feedback. Finally, rememberers who
reported silently reducing belief in their memory tended to score higher on reasons to
agree which confirms the assumption that remaining silent is akin to agreeing with the
challenger.
In the current study, the length of the relationship (in years) at the time the
challenge occurred was negatively correlated with the rememberers’ evaluation of
feedback suggesting that the longer the rememberer was in the relationship with the
challenger, the less they trusted the feedback provided during the challenge. This finding
is supported by past research suggesting that psychopathic individuals are typically not
successful at maintaining longer term relationships, in part because they do not value the
commitment and selflessness required to sustain a relationship, and also because their
impulsive, parasitic behaviours are likely to become tiresome for partners over the longterm (Leedom, 2017).
The present study findings also provide some evidence against the method of
calculating composite scores used to represent reasons to agree and reasons to disagree.
The inclusion of psychopathy scores, using either calculation method, did not change the
outcome rates or the reasons to agree composite scores measurably. Although this may be

159

because the psychopathic traits of the challenger was not as influential in the
rememberers’ decision-making process as expected, it may also mean that a different
statistical approach is needed to calculate composite scores. The current approach was
informed by theory and past empirical studies suggesting that the psychopathic traits of
the challenger, namely their charm and skill at interpersonal manipulation combined with
the threat of impulsive and violent reaction to disagreement, would encourage
rememberers to report agreement with the challenger.
Newly published research by Humeny et al. (2021) demonstrated that
psychopathic traits differentially predicted survivors’ experiences of intimate partner
abuse. Based on this finding, it is possible that psychopathic traits of the challenger
differentially contribute to reasons to agree and reasons to disagree. For example,
individuals high on Factor 1 traits: charming manipulation may be more successful at
manipulating the memories of others than individuals who score higher on Factor 2 traits:
impulsive dominance). More advanced and specialized statistics packages may be
required to investigate the nuances of such complex and multifaceted decisions regarding
belief in memory and agreement with the challenger, particularly in specialized
populations.
Predicting Decision Outcomes Using the SCO Model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020)
Although scores representing the psychopathic traits of the challenger did not
appear to contribute to either decision made by rememberers: reduction of belief or
agreement with the challenger, the significant influence of the rememberers’ evaluation
of trust in the challenger’s feedback in predicting reduction of belief can be examined
with the psychopathic challenger in mind. As previously discussed, the longer the

160

rememberer had known the challenger, the less he or she trusted the challenger’s
feedback. Psychopathic individuals are known to be impulsive risk takers who value
immediate gratification over long-term rewards (Bechara, 2005; Lynam et al., 2011). One
could therefore expect the psychopathic challenger to behave more impulsively within
relationships and not necessarily think through any long-term plans. Although their
approach may be successful in the short-term, the longer the relationship lasts, the more
likely their partners are to identify inconsistencies in their stories and holes in their
arguments. The characteristic deceit, manipulation, and infidelity are just a few reasons
why psychopathic individuals are often less successful in maintaining long-term
relationships (Foulkes et al., 2014). On the other hand, psychopathic individuals are also
known to be charming, self-assured, and skilled at getting what they want (Leedom,
2017). It may take years, even decades, for someone to fully recognize the extent to
which a psychopathic challenger has undermined their confidence in their memory.
Comparison of Predictors Between Samples of Rememberers. Although the
fact that a greater number of statistical predictors were identified in Study 1 is likely the
product of the much larger sample size, other similarities in statistical predictors were
observed across studies. The correspondence between samples in predictors of the
decision to agree with the challenger suggests that certain aspects of decision-making
about memory apply in both samples of rememberers. Specifically, rememberers’ belief
in the accuracy of their memory, the frequency with which they think and talk about the
memory, as well as the importance of the memory to their sense of self were all
influential in their decision to agree or disagree with the challenger. Furthermore, the
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decision to agree with the challenger was impacted by the rememberers’ desire to protect
their relationship with the challenger in both samples.
In examining the difference in predictors of reduction of belief between the two
samples, the lack of memory related variables as predictors for rememberers with
psychopathic challengers stands out. Keeping in mind the limitations associated with the
smaller sample of rememberers, the single predictor identified relates only to trust in the
feedback provided by the challenger and not to the evaluation of the memory itself. In the
absence of other explanations, it would appear that the rememberers’ judgment about the
strength and quality of their own memory is irrelevant to the decision and the only
deciding factor, above others, is the degree to which they can trust the feedback they have
received from the challenger. Future studies should examine the processes by which
rememberers evaluate the trustworthiness of the feedback received from a challenger as
well as the characteristics of the challenger that may impact decision-making about belief
in memory.
Findings of Post-Hoc Analyses
When comparing samples of rememberers across studies, it was apparent that the
two samples of rememberers were noticeably different in at least one characteristic in
addition to the presence of psychopathic traits of the challenger. Rememberers recruited
for Study 2 were far more likely to report that their relationship with the challenger had
ended prior to their participation in the study (84% vs. 15% in Study 1). Combined with
the high scores on psychopathic traits of the challenger, it appeared that there was
something qualitatively different about the relationships and memory challenges
described in Study 2 that may impact the rates of decision outcomes reported by
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rememberers who were no longer in the relationship with the suspected psychopath.
Unfortunately, not many differences could be identified statistically due to the small
sample size of rememberers.
With only 14 rememberers who remained in a current relationship with the
suspected psychopathic challenger, differences in outcome rates were not statistically
significant. However, examination of component and composite scores did suggest that
rememberers who remained in a relationship with the challenger had fewer reasons to
disagree with the challenger compared to rememberers who were no longer in the
relationship with the challenger. Combined with the finding of the regression results
predicting rememberers’ agreement with the psychopathic challenger, it appears as
though rememberers who described a memory challenge perpetrated by a current partner
considered the need to protect that relationship when deciding whether to agree with the
challenger.
Theoretical Implications
In addition to expanding the application of the social-cognitive dissonance model
of memory challenges (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) to a unique population of victims of
suspected psychopaths, the present study provides further support for the model within
different samples of rememberers and different relationships with challengers. The fact
that rememberers in this unique sample endorsed the same outcome decision categories
and described similar experiences of questioning belief in their memory when confronted
with disconfirmatory feedback supports the general applicability of the model to memory
challenges more broadly. Having a conceptual framework with which to examine a
phenomenon as complex and multifaceted as a memory challenge serves to provide both

163

a wide lens perspective on social remembering, as well as more focused investigations of
specific variables involved in decision making about memory.
Differences in sample characteristics such as relationship type and status, as well
as the frequency and severity of abuse within the relationship, suggests that even more
variables are involved in decisions made by rememberers than the many variables
included here. Furthermore, the apparent lack of difference in composite scores
representing reasons to agree and reasons to disagree also suggests that there are other
aspects of the interpersonal decision-making pathway that have not yet been identified
and operationalized. The finding that adding psychopathy scores to the reasons to agree
scores did not change the scores substantially is further evidence that other considerations
may be at play. The methodological decisions made in the present study were guided by
theory and not by prior research or statistics, as little prior research exists. Two different
methods of combining psychopathy were explored but neither produced an appreciable
change in composite scores for reasons to agree again suggesting the larger construct is
not accurately or wholly represented by the current measures. There appears to be a need
for more focused investigations into interpersonal decision making about memory in
order to uncover the remaining variables rememberers consider when navigating
disagreements about past events.
Contribution of Study Findings
The motivation for pursuing research in the area of social challenges to memory
stemmed from a desire to understand how memory challenges can be used to influence or
control the most vulnerable among us. The relative dearth of research studies examining
victimization by psychopathic individuals, compared to the abundant literature on
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psychopathy as a construct and on the psychopaths themselves, underscored the
importance of exposing memory manipulation as a strategy used by psychopathic
individuals to control others and to explore the potential effects of this strategy on the
recipients. By examining the experiences of self-identified victims of psychopaths, it is
hoped that their experiences will be validated and appreciated, and the findings will be
used to identify the warning signs of psychopathic individuals so that fewer individual
rememberers will doubt their perception and memory of the past or to question their
knowledge of their own life story.
Limitations and Future Directions
In addition to the limitations raised in the previous study, a unique limitation of
the present study is the small number of rememberers recruited to participate. A small
overall sample size presented limitations in the representativeness of the sample and thus
the generalizability of the study findings to the larger population of victims of
psychopathic challengers. Furthermore, the need to subdivide an already small sample
leads to further limitations in statistical power with which to conduct between-group
comparisons. Further examination of the impacts of victimization by psychopathic
individuals in interpersonal relationships is needed to identify the many different methods
of manipulation employed by psychopaths, of which memory manipulation is but one.
The rememberers in Study 2 represent survivors of suspected psychopathic
abusers who sought support through one of the online forums used for recruitment and
further, were willing to discuss their experiences of victimization for the purpose of a
research study. Not all survivors of suspected psychopaths are ready or able to seek
support, particularly through an anonymous online forum. Some victims may not
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recognize that what they are experiencing in their relationship is abuse or that the
individual in question is demonstrating psychopathic traits. It is likely that there exist
rememberers who are still in relationships with suspected psychopaths and have not
identified such conversations about their memory as challenges. Others may have
identified their experience as abuse but are not comfortable sharing their experiences at
this time.
Although it cannot be known from the current data how the present sample differs
from the broader population of victims of psychopaths, it is expected that the sample
gathered for this investigation represents a subset of rememberers who (a) have sought
information or support regarding their experience with a suspected psychopath, (b)
recognized the occurrence of conversations about their memory in (past) relationships
with the individual they categorized as psychopathic, and (c) were comfortable discussing
their experience with researchers.
Similar to the few other studies of victimization by suspected psychopaths, the
majority of participants in Study 2 self-identified as women. The high proportion of
women in the sample is likely due, in part, to women’s greater willingness to speak about
their experiences of victimization and not necessarily the result of increased vulnerability
to victimization, although without more investigation into the rates of victimization by
psychopaths in the general population, the relative vulnerability of men and women
cannot be known.
Research has shown that there are generally higher rates of psychopathic traits
found in males compared to females and that within psychopathic offender groups men
tend to score higher on psychopathy assessment tools than women (Jackson et al., 2002;
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Salekin et al., 1997; Wynn et al., 2012). However, there are a number of possible
explanations for this aside from an underlying difference in prevalence rates. One
common explanation is that the development and validation of existing psychopathy
assessment tools was performed exclusively with males, specifically male offenders and
male psychiatric patients (Falkenbach et al., 2017; Wynn et al., 2012). It is therefore
possible that certain psychopathic traits are equally prevalent in women but less readily
identifiable due to differences in clinical presentation between men and women that
biased the development of psychopathy assessment tools.
For example, research in psychopathology generally has shown that women and
girls are more prone to internalizing disorders whereas men and boys are more likely to
exhibit externalizing disorders (Falkenbach et al., 2017; Joiner & Blalock, 1995; Keenan
& Shaw, 1997). A similar pattern exists regarding psychopathic traits with women
scoring substantially lower than men on the lifestyle and antisocial behaviour traits
characteristic of psychopathy (Wynn et al., 2012). Furthermore, internal traits of
psychopathy like personality and affect are more difficult to observe and so may also be
underrated in clinical assessments of psychopathy. All that is to say that women may be
more likely than men to identify themselves as victims of psychopaths in romantic
relationships because male psychopaths demonstrate more outwardly observable
characteristics of the disorder (Forouzan & Cooke, 2008).
Specific to the present sample of rememberers, more information about the nature
of the relationship and the life circumstances of the rememberer at the time of the
challenge may have helped to situate the findings. For example, in comparing
rememberers who remained in the relationship with those who did not, it could have been
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useful to know if there were children in the home and whether the rememberer was
financially independent at the time the challenge occurred. Given what is known the
reasons many partners give for remaining in abusive relationships despite wanting to
leave, this information may have provided context for rememberers decisions to maintain
or reduce belief and to agree or disagree with the challenger.
Summary and Conclusion
The present study achieved the stated research goals, first, by confirming that
memory challenges occur in relationships with suspected psychopaths. Second, patterns
of composite scores were examined across outcome groups and across samples of
rememberers to identify and explain any differences observed. Finally, in comparing the
variables that most influence rememberers’ decisions to reduce belief and agree with the
challenger, the relative unimportance of memory variables to rememberers’ decision to
reduce belief suggest that much more exploration is needed into the experience of
memory challenges perpetrated by psychopaths in interpersonal relationships.
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CHAPTER IV
General Discussion
The overarching purpose of this research was to investigate how rememberers’
decisions about their memory differ depending on the many factors involved in decisionmaking about memory following the receipt of disconfirmatory social feedback or
memory challenge. Past research has examined the influence of cognitive factors such as
rememberers’ current goals and attitudes (Bartlett, 1932; Dudai, 2002, 2004; Neisser,
1967), existing cognitive schemas (Rice & Okun, 1994; Tuckey & Brewer, 2003),
vividness of mental imagery (e.g., Scoboria, Talarico, et al., 2015), and beliefs about the
self, others, and the world (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) on what is recalled about
the past. Separately, researchers have examined the role social factors such as speakers’
and listeners’ personality traits (e.g., Jones et al., 2017), interpersonal styles (Brown et
al., 2009), nonverbal feedback (Dickinson & Givón, 1997; Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012;
Pasupathi et al., 1998), social roles (Hirst et al., 1997), and relationship dynamics (Hope
et al., 2008; Muller & Hirst, 2014) play in collective memory retrieval and
reconstruction. When it comes to the intersection of social and cognitive influences on
memory the literature is much more sparse.
The studies described herein were undertaken to confirm the occurrence of
memory challenges across types of interpersonal relationships and to verify the outcome
decisions predicted by the social-cognitive (SCO) dissonance model of memory
challenges (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) by quantifying a specific set of social and
cognitive factors that, individually, are known to influence beliefs about memory. Study
participants were asked about the social features of their relationship with the individual
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who challenged their memory (e.g., trust, credibility, importance, and history) and the
cognitive features of their memory (e.g., belief, recollection, importance, and intensity).
The circumplex model of personality (Leary, 1957; Wiggins, 1995) and interpersonal
styles of handling conflict (Thomas & Kilmann, 1960; Euwema & Van de Vliert, 1990)
were selected in recognition of the role of personality traits and individual motivations in
negotiating disagreements about memory (Dyshniku, 2017; Gudjonsson, 1989, 2006;
Pasupathi, 2001; Porter et al., 2000). Specifically, psychopathy was measured to test the
hypothesis that psychopathic individuals employ memory challenges as a form of
psychological manipulation to control others in relationships.
Summary and Comparison of Preliminary Findings
In the first of the two studies, rememberers from the general population described
their experiences receiving feedback about their memory from someone with whom they
had an existing, and often ongoing, relationship. The results of this investigation
confirmed that disagreements about memory for past events occur across many types of
relationships (e.g., parent-child, siblings, friends, romantic partners) and concern
different types of past events (e.g., events from childhood, recent experiences, family
trips). In general, the events described by rememberers from this sample were not
traumatic or conflictual in nature, and neither were the conversations (i.e., challenges)
between rememberers and challengers.
Rememberers in this study tended to describe their challengers as correcting their
memory for the event or as having a different perspective on the event. Either way, most
rememberers did not report feeling particularly threatened during the challenge. In fact,
many rememberers rated themselves as the more dominant and forceful party in the
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relationship. As such, more than half (56%) of rememberers in this sample reported
disagreeing with the challenger. However, across outcome groups, only 40% of
rememberers reported maintaining belief in their memory following the challenge
suggesting that, due in part to the challenge, many rememberers experienced some
decrease in their memorial belief despite initially disagreeing with the feedback. Taken
together, rememberers in this sample seemed to question belief in their memory
following the receipt of disconfirmatory feedback from someone known to them, and yet,
still felt comfortable disagreeing with that individual.
In the second study, a special sample of rememberers were recruited to describe
their experiences receiving feedback about their memory from challengers they suspected
demonstrate psychopathic traits. The majority (84%) of rememberers in this sample
recounted challenges that occurred in the context of past romantic partnerships. The types
of event memories and challenges described by this group of rememberers was notably
different from those described in the previous study. The memories described by selfidentified victims were highly traumatic and emotionally intense in nature, as were the
conversations about their memory that later occurred between rememberers and
challengers. Contrary to expectations, more rememberers in this sample (62%) reported
disagreeing with the challenger than did rememberers with nonpsychopathic challengers.
Further, two-thirds (67%) of rememberers in this sample reported maintaining belief in
their memory following the challenge.
The present investigation included a pair of complementary studies conducted
with two distinct samples of rememberers in order to provide context for a comparison of
the findings between samples. The occurrence of these types of conversations about
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memory was confirmed in both samples adding support to the idea that memory
challenges occur in a variety of types of relationships and concerning memories for a
variety of types of past events. The novel contribution of these studies to the existing
knowledge base regarding decision-making about memory begins with the evidence that
self-identified victims of suspected psychopaths identified memory challenges as typical
of their relationship at a much higher rate than rememberers in the general population:
67% vs 46%. Furthermore, the proportion of victims who said such challenges occurred
frequently in their relationships (defined as more than once a month) was almost twice
the proportion observed in the general population: 76% vs. 38%. What this tells us is that,
although memory challenges do occur in relationships with nonpsychopathic partners,
they may occur at an even higher rate in romantic relationships in which one partner
demonstrates psychopathic traits.
Perhaps even more interesting is the difference in proportion of specific outcome
decisions endorsed in the two samples. Victims of suspected psychopaths reported a
higher rate of defending belief in their memory than rememberers in the general
population: 42% vs. 24%, and a much lower rate of relinquishing belief: 2% vs 21%. This
finding contradicted the hypothesis that victims would be more likely to relinquish belief
in their memory due to the coercive and controlling nature of their relationship with the
psychopathic challenger. In fact, it is also worth noting that the rate of silently
maintaining belief was twice as high in the victim sample than the general population:
17% vs. 8%, adding to the number of self-identified victims who maintained belief in
Study 2.
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However, it needs to be underscored that the difference in outcome rates between
samples and the difference in expected versus observed rates of maintaining belief in
Study 2 are likely influenced by the types of challenges reported by this specific
subsample of victims. Based on the written descriptions of the events and challenges
provided by the majority of rememberers in the victim sample, it appears that the
challenges in Study 2 were especially salient and emotionally charged for the
rememberer, perhaps because they were (a) the most recent challenges to occur, or (b)
they represent the moment in which the remember realized the challenger was engaging
in manipulation by disputing their memory, or a combination of both. According to
Blagov and Singer (2004), self-defining memories are vivid memories for highly
significant personal events that evoke strong emotions when recalled. Further, selfdefining memories revolve around important life concerns or conflicts and even went as
far as to identify “moments of insight and disillusionment” as examples of such
circumstances (p. 484). For rememberers recruited in Study 2, it seems fair to
characterize such a realization that a romantic partner is attempting to deceive or
manipulate them as a moment of insight and disillusionment or self-defining memory. If
true, these more salient memory challenges are likely to result in defense of the memory
if the rememberer has identified the manipulation and has decided not to let it continue.
Furthermore, the nature of emotional experiences, such as instances of physical
abuse, is that it can result in more vivid memories (Buchanan, 2007; Reisberg & Hertel,
2005). The greater the personal importance placed on an autobiographical event, the more
likely the rememberer is to defend belief in their memory even in the face of
contradictory feedback. Such self-defining memories are known to involve more vivid
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visual imagery, intense emotional reexperiencing, and important centrality to self-concept
(Blagov & Singer, 2004). It would be expected, then, that rememberers would be
reluctant to relinquish belief in these memories without substantial evidence of
inaccuracies.
Summary and Comparison of Main Findings
Composite Scores
Although only a few between-group differences were observed in mean
composite scores in either sample, the patterns that did emerge were mostly consistent
with outcomes predicted by the social-cognitive dissonance model (Scoboria & Henkel,
2020) at least with respect to the cognitive elements: evaluation of memory and
evaluation of feedback. In both samples, defenders’ mean scores on feedback were below
the overall sample mean which is consistent with the pattern predicted by the socialcognitive dissonance model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) in which defenders are expected
to evaluate the feedback received as inferior to their memory. In Study 1, but not in Study
2, defenders also scored higher on memory compared to the sample mean. The lack of a
difference in memory scores between defenders and the overall sample in Study 2 may
indicate rememberers in this group giving greater relative importance to evaluation of the
feedback compared to rememberers in the general population.
The differential association between the length of the relationship between
rememberer and challenger, and the rememberers’ ratings of trust in the feedback seems
interesting in itself. For rememberers with nonpsychopathic challengers, the duration of
the relationship had no impact on their trust in the feedback yet for rememberers with
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psychopathic challengers, longer relationships were associated with less trust in the
challengers’ feedback.
In both samples, there were no real differences observed across outcome groups
on scores representing reasons to agree and reasons to disagree. As previously discussed,
this suggests that other aspects of the interpersonal and relationship dynamics between
rememberer and challenger exist and were not captured sufficiently by the measures used
in the present studies. Alternatively, it could be that a different statistical approach to
generating composite scores may produce different findings using the same measures.
Suggestions for alternative lines of inquiry regarding composite scores will be the focus
of a later section.
Predicting Outcome Decisions
A greater number of statistical predictors were identified in Study 1, likely due to
its much larger sample size; however, there were some similarities in statistical predictors
observed across studies. The correspondence in predictors for agreement with the
challenger suggests that certain aspects of decision-making about memory apply in both
samples of rememberers. Specifically, in both samples, rememberers’ belief in the
accuracy of their memory, the frequency with which they think and talk about the
memory, and the importance of the memory to their sense of self were all influential in
their decision to agree or disagree with the challenger. Furthermore, the decision to agree
with the challenger was impacted by rememberers’ desire to protect their relationship
with the challenger for both samples.
An examination of the predictors for reduction of belief between the two samples
revealed a somewhat surprising lack of memory related variables as predictors for
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rememberers with psychopathic challengers. Keeping in mind the limitations associated
with the smaller sample of rememberers, the single predictor identified relates only to
trust in the feedback provided by the challenger and not to the evaluation of the memory
itself. In the absence of other explanations, it would appear that the rememberers’
judgment about the strength and quality of their own memory is irrelevant to the decision
and that the only deciding factor is the degree to which they can trust the feedback they
have received from the challenger which, in itself, could be an artifact of long-lasting
psychological and emotional abuse. Future studies should examine the processes by
which rememberers evaluate the trustworthiness of the feedback received from a
challenger as well as other characteristics of the challenger that may impact decisionmaking about belief in memory.
Comparison of Samples
In designing this pair of studies, efforts were made to maximize the likelihood
that the samples would be comparable, at least in terms of demographic characteristics
and study procedure. Both samples were recruited online and, in addition the convenience
sample of undergraduate students, participants in Study 1 were recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk in order to broaden the age range and social backgrounds with the
expectation that an older, more socially diverse sample would be collected in Study 2 as
was the case in the existing studies of victimization by psychopaths (Deck, 2017;
Humeny, 2017; Humeny et al., 2021; Kirkman, 2005; Pagliaro, 2009). Despite these
efforts, self-identified victims were still significantly older, on average, than rememberers
from the general population (Mage_general population = 27.20 years vs. Mage_self-identified victims =
52.15 years).
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It is possible that the difference in average age contributed to the difference in
proportions of outcome decisions observed between the two studies. On average,
rememberers in Study 2 were older at the time of the event and at the time of the
challenge, than were rememberers in Study 1 which could have contributed to their
decision to defend rather than relinquish belief their memory. In previous studies of
nonbelieved memories or memories which are no longer believed to have occurred
(NBMs; Mazzoni et al., 2010; Otgaar et al., 2014), younger age at event has been cited as
an important reason for withdrawing belief in a memory following a social challenge
(Scoboria, Boucher, et al., 2015). In fact, in a recent study examining nonbelieved
memories in over 900 participants across five separate studies, the original events were
more frequently dated in early to mid-childhood (Scoboria et al., 2019). Furthermore, age
at event was positively correlated with ratings on many of the same memory
characteristics measured in the present studies: belief, reexperiencing, and importance,
even after controlling for current age.
According to the proposed “anti-reminiscence bump” for autobiographical
memories (Scoboria et al., 2019, p. 124), events that occur earlier in the lifespan may be
subject to more scrutiny regarding their plausibility and lower ratings of confidence
thereby leading to a higher likelihood of belief withdrawal (Brédart & Bouffier, 2016;
Mazzoni et al., 2010; Scoboria, Memon et al., 2015; Scoboria & Talarico, 2013). For
example, rememberers who were very young at the time of the original event may
dismiss their memory in favour of feedback from an older, trusted authority such as a
parent or older sibling.
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Rememberers who self-identified as victims of suspected psychopaths were also
more likely to be female, White, and more highly educated than rememberers from Study
1. Therefore, it is important to recognize that rememberers from Study 2 represent a
unique subgroup of victims of suspected psychopaths that does not necessarily reflect the
characteristics of all victims of psychopathic individuals. The rememberers in Study 2
represent survivors of suspected psychopathic abusers who sought support through one of
the online forums used for recruitment and further, were willing to discuss their
experiences of victimization for the purpose of a research study. Not all survivors of
suspected psychopaths are ready or able to seek support, particularly through an
anonymous online forum. Some victims may not recognize that what they are
experiencing in their relationship is abuse or that the individual in question is
demonstrating psychopathic traits. It is likely that there exist rememberers who are still in
relationships with suspected psychopaths and have not identified such conversations
about their memory as challenges. Others may have identified their experience as abuse
but are not comfortable sharing their experiences at this time.
Moreover, far more victims than rememberers from the general population
identified the challenger as a (former) romantic partner: 85% vs. 17%. Although this
difference in relationship types was anticipated based on past victimization studies of
psychopathic abusers (Deck, 2017; Humeny, 2017; Pagliaro, 2009), it was expected that
rememberers whose challenger was an intimate partner would be more likely to
relinquish belief in their memory to protect an important relationship and, in the case of
the victim sample, protect themselves from further abuse. What was not considered was
that a majority of victims (84%) would be reporting on a past relationship whereas only a
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minority of rememberers from the general population reported on a past relationship
(15%). Whether the rememberers’ relationship with the challenger is present or past
likely has implications for their selection and interpretation of the challenge described for
the study.
Findings of Post-Hoc Analyses
When comparing samples of rememberers across studies, it was apparent that the
two samples of rememberers were noticeably different in at least one characteristic in
addition to the presence of psychopathic traits of the challenger. Rememberers recruited
for Study 2 were far more likely to report that their relationship with the challenger had
ended prior to their participation in the study (84% vs. 15% in Study 1). Combined with
the high scores on psychopathic traits of the challenger, it appeared that there was
something qualitatively different about the relationships and memory challenges
described in Study 2 that may impact the rates of decision outcomes reported by
rememberers who were no longer in the relationship with the suspected psychopath.
Unfortunately, not many differences could be identified statistically due to the small
sample size of rememberers.
With only 14 rememberers who remained in their relationship with the suspected
psychopathic challenger, differences in outcome rates were not statistically significant.
However, examination of component and composite scores did suggest that rememberers
who remained in the relationship with the challenger had fewer reasons to disagree with
the challenger compared to rememberers who were no longer in the relationship with the
challenger. Combined with the finding of the regression results predicting rememberers’
agreement with the psychopathic challenger, it appears as though rememberers who
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described a memory challenge perpetrated by a current partner considered the need to
protect that relationship more when deciding whether to agree with the challenger. This
finding can be explained by Rusbult’s (1980, 1983) Investment Model which states that
the more an individual feels invested in a given relationship, the more likely they are to
remain in the relationship and to focus their attention on the positive, as opposed to
negative, aspects of the other person (Rusbult et al., 2011). The finding is also consistent
with the theory of cognitive dissonance, which posits that when an individual’s beliefs
and behaviours are not aligned, the individual will feel psychological discomfort and will
seek to resolve it by changing either the belief or the behaviour (Festinger, 1957).
Implications for the Study of Social Remembering
In addition to expanding the knowledge base surrounding decision-making about
memory in the face of social feedback, the present studies normalize the occurrence of
memory challenges within relationships and further the notion that social reconstruction
of the past is an important part of individual identity and interpersonal relationships
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). At the same time, this research also draws attention
to the potential for memory challenges to be misused in (romantic) relationships as a
form of psychological abuse.
The main impetus for conducting this research was to confirm the occurrence of
memory challenges in relationships with suspected psychopaths and validate the
experiences of the survivors who have endured this type of manipulation and raise
awareness of this particular tactics so that others who may face such challenges in the
future will be better able to recognize the warning signs. An unexpected yet encouraging
finding of this research – that self-identified victims of suspected psychopaths are not
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necessarily more likely to comply or relinquish belief in their memory in response to a
memory challenge perpetrated by a psychopathic partner – suggests that even when
manipulated by psychopathic challengers, the autobiographical memory systems of
victims may not be permanently altered; there is the potential for recovery from this form
of psychological abuse such that survivors come to reclaim their memories following the
end of an abusive relationship.
Implications for the Social-Cognitive Dissonance Model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020)
One unique aspect of this study was that the conceptual framework proposed by
the social-cognitive (SCO) dissonance model was used to examine the influence of a
variety of intra- and interpersonal factors on decision-making about belief in memory.
Previous studies employing this model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020; Wysman, 2016)
focused exclusively on the characteristics of the memory and the feedback without
examining other possible influences on rememberers’ evaluation of the costs and benefits
of agreeing or disagreeing with the challenger. Contrary to the study hypotheses, the
composite scores representing reasons to agree and disagree which included measures of
personality and interpersonal style, did not differ substantially between outcome groups.
In fact, even when examined using logistic regression analyses, many of the variables
identified as predictors of the decision to agree with the challenger represented cognitive,
as opposed to social, elements of the model. Scores on belief in accuracy, rehearsal, and
importance of the memory predicted agreement for rememberers in both samples but
relationship characteristics like expecting negative outcomes from disagreeing and a
desire to protect the relationship with the challenger were predictive in Study 1.
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The two studies described here provide empirical support for the relevance of the
social-cognitive (SCO) dissonance model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) across types of
dyadic relationships and event memories. The findings of both studies demonstrate that
rather than being discreet, the social and cognitive factors that influence decisions about
memory overlap or are intertwined. The utility of the SCO model comes from its ability
to distill the many moving parts into two streamlined decision processes. However, the
findings of this research confirm that, in practice, decision making about memory for past
events is a complex and multifaceted endeavour.
Clinical Application of Findings
The primary motivation for carrying out the second study was to confirm the
occurrence of memory challenges in relationships between psychopaths and their victims
in order to validate the experiences of victims and to raise awareness of the potential
negative impacts that repeated memory challenges can have on victims. The few studies
of victimization by psychopaths conducted to date have outlined a broad range of abusive
behaviours perpetrated by psychopaths related to physical aggression, sexual abuse, and
financial crimes (Robertson et al., 2020; Swogger et al., 2012; Wheeler et al., 2009); all
of which are more easily documented than verbal abuse or psychological manipulation.
Victims of psychopaths who experience the invisible abuses of psychological
manipulation are often left questioning their connection with reality and feeling
distrustful of others which then prevents them from seeking the social or professional
support needed to recover from the abuse (Humeny, 2017; Williams & Mickelson, 2004).
Requests for referrals to mental health professionals specializing in the treatment of
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victims of psychopaths have been received by at least one of the support forums used for
recruitment in this study (D. Kosson, personal communication, 2014).
By raising awareness of the potential misuse of memory challenges as a form of
psychological manipulation in relationships, those who have been victimized in this way
may feel less isolation as a result of having the awareness and the shared vocabulary to
communicate their experience with others, particularly those working as mental health
professionals. Extending this awareness to individuals and organizations working with
survivors of intimate partner abuse (e.g., police, courts, service providers), can also serve
to mitigate the negative impacts of memory manipulation caused by victims’ questioning
their perception of reality.
Strengths of the Studies
Previous studies of social remembering have examined cognitive influences on
decision making about memory. For example, memory characteristics including belief in
occurrence, belief in accuracy and recollection have been measured in studies of
nonbelieved memories (Mazzoni et al., 2010; Scoboria, Memon, et al., 2015; Scoboria et
al., 2018; Scoboria & Pascal, 2016; Wysman, 2016). The present pair of studies are the
first to employ the social-cognitive dissonance model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) in
examining the role of interpersonal factors, such as personality traits of the rememberer
and challenger, on decision-making following a memory challenge.
The social-cognitive (SCO) dissonance model of decision-making (Scoboria &
Henkel, 2020) and the unique contributions of a number of social influences outlined in
the model were empirically tested using validated measures of personality, interpersonal
style, and broader relationship characteristics such as abusive behaviours and relationship
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satisfaction. The coverage of interpersonal influences was comprehensive and allowed
for the integration of multiple fields of study that have not previously be studied together
including autobiographical memory, personality, conflict handling style, and relationship
quality.
In order to confidently compare findings between the two studies, efforts were
made to ensure consistency in the recruitment and administration methods. Both samples
were recruited online and completed the study online using the same survey platform.
The only difference in recruitment procedure occurred in stage two of Study 2 in which
an additional screening step was added in order to avoid computerized responding from
“bots.” Survey instructions for both studies were identical for all measures with the
exception of replacing “the person who made you question belief in your memory” with
“the person you suspect is a psychopath” for Study 2.
The wording of the main survey prompt in both studies was chosen to be unbiased
and to encourage rememberers to describe an instance in which they received feedback
about their memory for a past event without implying a positive or negative experience.
This differed from previous studies that employed the term “social challenge” when
referring to conversations about past events in which one party received disconfirmatory
feedback about their memory. The fact that, despite the use of neutral phrases to cue
participants to describe their experience, self-identified victims consistently described
negative interactions about their memory lends further support to the hypothesis that
memory challenges occur in relationships with suspected psychopaths and that these
conversations about memory are experienced as challenges to memory by their victims.
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Although the hypothesis that suspected psychopaths employ disconfirmatory
feedback about memory as a method of coercive control in relationships was not
specifically tested in this study, the accounts of memory challenges provided by
rememberers suggests that this is the case. In future studies, researchers should more
closely examine rememberers’ experiences of receiving disconfirmatory feedback about
their memory from psychopathic individuals to identify possible motives for engaging in
this particular form of psychological abuse.
Limitations and Future Directions
Research Focus and Design
A number of improvements could be made to the procedure employed in the
present studies to streamline the focus of the investigation and to reduce the length of
time participants spend completing the survey: over an hour, on average. First of all, the
study instructions could be refined to cue participants to describe particular types of
events, types of feedback, or types of relationships. In addition to controlling for types of
relationships (e.g., partners, parents, friends, and other family members), controlling for
age and authority may help to isolate the various social influences contributing to the
interpersonal dissonance. Furthermore, including a manipulation check by instructing
participants to describe, in randomized order, a time when they experienced: (a) a
challenge to their memory, (b) help with recalling a past event, and (c) a mutual
disagreement about a shared past event may clarify the role of terminology in eliciting
different types of conversations about memory. The use of varied cues when asking about
events and outcome decisions reported by rememberers would strengthen the validity of
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the study findings by allowing for comparison of composite scores and decision
outcomes across memory types.
As is the case with many studies employing convenience samples recruited
through universities or online platforms, there is no guarantee that the sample collected
will be representative of the larger population which may limit the generalizability of the
study findings. Both present samples were largely comprised of educated, White women.
A larger, more diverse sample of rememberers would allow for comparisons across
demographic groups to test aspects of the social-cognitive dissonance model (Scoboria &
Henkel, 2020) not available in the present studies. For example, a larger, more culturally
diverse sample of rememberers (and challengers) may allow for cross cultural
comparisons of experiences and decisions regarding belief in memory following a
memory challenge.
Like many investigations into events from the past (Banaji & Hardin, 1994; Bell
& Bell 2018; Schwarz, 2007), the present study relied on retrospective self-reporting by
study participants with no objective way to measure the veracity of either the rememberer
or challenger’s account. Therefore, the findings presented here are based solely on what
was deemed noteworthy by study participants at the time they provided their written
accounts of the challenge. Further, both studies relied on self-reports of subjective
interpretations of, and feelings about, past events experienced by study participants
including their experience of the memory challenge itself. Research has repeatedly
demonstrated that humans are not always reliable historians (Barclay, 1988) and, on
average, they sometimes struggle with tasks requiring mental time-travel or perspective
taking regarding past emotions (Ansuini et al., 2016; Hirst et al., 2009; Levine, 1997;
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Levine et al., 2009; Robinson & Clore, 2002a, 2002b; Wilson et al., 2003). However,
retrospective self-reports provide first-person accounts of past events that would
otherwise not be available for study. In combination with experimentally controlled
laboratory investigations, studies based on participant self-reports allow for more indepth understanding of experiences related to memory challenges and the decisions made
about belief in memory as a result of such challenges.
Autobiographical events are recalled in light of the rememberer’s current life
perspective and thus may be viewed differently by the rememberer due to changes in
their attitude and personality that have occurred over time (Levine et al., 2009; Moffitt &
Singer, 1994; Ross, 1989; Wilson et al., 2003). Future studies of memory challenges may
consider asking rememberers to describe how their perspective on the event and the
challenge may have changed over time, particularly in situations where the relationship
between the rememberer and challenger has ended. As suggested by the present findings,
the status of the relationship between rememberer and challenger may have substantial
influence over what is recalled about the event and the challenge. A longitudinal,
repeated measures design may allow researchers to examine changes in the level of
cognitive dissonance at different time points. Wysman (2016) described rememberers’
‘vacillation of belief’ in their memory over time, particularly in victims of intimate
partner aggression. Confirmation of this finding would likely require multiple data
collection points using a longitudinal design.
Finally, in order to simplify the regression analyses conducted to predict
agreement with the challenger, silent maintainers and silent reducers were combined with
compliers and relinquishers to create one group of rememberers who did not disagree
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with the challenger. The rationale for doing so was that, like those who agreed with the
challenger, rememberers who remained silent did not outwardly dispute the views of the
challenger regarding their memory. However, in examining the characteristics of silent
maintainers across both samples, it appears as though this subset of rememberers
represent a unique group with their own patterns of composite scores depending on other
variables. Specifically, although not significant, silent maintainers in Study 1 seemed to
report above average scores representing reasons to agree with the challenger and below
average scores representing reasons to disagree, more like compliers. In Study 2, silent
maintainers reported lower than average scores on reasons to agree, more like defenders
and deniers, although the differences in mean scores were not statistically significant.
Because this is the first time the “remained silent” option was included when studying the
social-cognitive dissonance model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020), it will be important to
replicate the findings and to validate the assumption that remaining silent is more akin to
agreeing with rather than disagreeing with the challenger.
Extending the Social-Cognitive Dissonance Model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020)
One avenue for further exploration that was not considered in the current iteration
of the social-cognitive dissonance model (Scoboria & Henkel, 2020) is the role of
emotions, or affect, in decision-making about memory. Emotion is known to play an
important role in both interpersonal relationships and memory; therefore, affect or
emotion likely has strong influence over decision-making in situations involving
interpersonal conflict (Aaker et al., 2008; van der Kolk, 1994). The emotional intensity of
the memory was measured and included in evaluation of memory composite scores;

188

however, the rememberers’ emotional connection to the challenger may also contribute to
the weigh given to costs and benefits of agreement.
Future Directions
The occurrence of conversations about memory was confirmed in both samples
helping to validate the hypothesis that memory challenges occur in a variety of types of
relationships and concerning a variety of types of past events. What it does not tell us is
why suspected psychopaths may engage in memory challenges more frequently than their
nonpsychopathic counterparts. Dyshniku (2017) began to delve into possible motivations
for challenging another person’s memory in her examination of self-identified memory
challengers. The findings of her study suggest that there are self-protective, or selfpreservation, motives at play when challengers provide feedback about someone else’s
memory that contradicts their own self-concept or threatens their self-esteem. Building on
Dyshniku’s (2017) study, other aspects of social remembering that have not yet been
explored include the rememberers’ beliefs about themselves, their history, and the
attachment style of rememberer which may serve as a proxy measure for their
expectations of others in relationships (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Bowlby, 1980). There
has been some exploration into the role of early remembering on attachment within
families (e.g., Laible, 2011; Newcombe & Reese, 2004; Zaman & Fivush, 2011) but less
so on the role of attachment on decision-making about memory.
Another extension of this particular avenue may be to survey parents or mental
health professionals who provide feedback on the memories of children and clients in
order to aid in autobiographical memory development or to encourage cognitive
reframing in the process of psychotherapy. These types of “prosocial challenges” may
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provide valuable insight into beliefs people hold about the accuracy and reliability of
others’ memories for past events. The relationship between general beliefs about human
memory and specific beliefs about one’s own memory are an interesting topic for further
study.
Finally, the vast majority of memory challenges described in the existing studies
of conversational remembering have taken place face-to-face. A new avenue of
investigation could look at challenges over different media platforms: telephone, text, or
video chat. A recent study by Cadavid and Luna (2021) found that individuals who
participated in online conversations with others after witnessing a ‘crime’ incorporated
misinformation presented by co-witnesses, confirming the existence of the co-witness
suggestibility effect in virtual conversations as well as in-person conversations. Given the
explosion of personal technology such as cell phones, laptops, and home security
systems, access to information, and the potential for misinformation, appears to be
increasing as is the need for understanding the connection between media and memory
(Hoskins, 2018).
Another recent study by Cabalo and colleagues (2020) demonstrated the
persistence of false memories implanted with the use of doctored video clips. As
discussed by Meskys et al. (2020), the latest developments in artificial intelligence have
been employed for prosocial (e.g., entertainment, knowledge dissemination, and free
speech) and antisocial goals (e.g., revenge porn, political control, and fraud) with serious
implications for ethics, business, and the law. Together, the latest findings in memory and
technology research introduce a whole new avenue of study concerning the use and
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misuse of digital media (e.g., face swapping apps, ‘deep fakes’ and Photoshop) to
manipulate others’ memories for the past.
Conclusion
The overarching goal of this dissertation was to extend the existing work by
Scoboria, Henkel, and others in the field of autobiographical memory, by examining the
role of intrapersonal and interpersonal variables on the decisions made by rememberers
when faced with a memory challenge. In the first of two studies, rememberers from the
general population described their experiences navigating disconfirmatory social
feedback from someone they knew. In the second study, self-identified victims of
suspected psychopaths reported on challenges to their memory perpetrated by (mostly)
romantic partners. Combined, the data confirm the occurrence of memory challenges
across relationship types and provide new information regarding the social and cognitive
influences on decisions made about memory. Future studies should aim to replicate the
findings of the present studies and to examine the influence of additional social, cognitive
and emotion variables on decision-making about memory.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: Additional Results for Study 1
Appendix A1
Demographic Characteristics by Recruitment Source
Table A1
Demographic Characteristics of Total Sample, Student Sample, and Mechanical Turk
Sample
Total sample

Student sample

Turk sample

N = 259

n = 156

n = 103

M (SD)
[95% CI]

M (SD)
[95% CI]

M (SD)
[95% CI]

27.20 (10.86)
[25.87, 28.72]

20.72 (3.41)
[20.24, 21.32]

37.40 (10.73)
[35.25, 39.54]

Freq. (%)
[95% CI]

Freq. (%)
[95% CI]

Freq. (%)
[95% CI]

*Male

77 (29.7)
[23.9, 35.5]

30 (19.2)
[12.8, 25.6]

47 (45.6)
[35.9, 55.3]

*Female

177 (68.3)
[62.5, 74.1]

126 (90.8)
[74.4, 87.2]

51 (49.5)
[39.8, 59.2]

Other/non-binary

1 (0.4)
[0.0, 1.2]

-

1 (1.0)
[0.0, 2.9]

*Not reported

4 (1.5)
[0.4, 3.5]

-

4 (3.9)
[1.0, 7.8]

164 (63.3)
[57.5, 69.5]

90 (57.7)
[50.0, 66.0]

74 (71.8)
[63.1, 80.6]

Black/African

16 (6.2)
[3.5, 9.3]

10 (6.4)
[3.2, 10.3]

6 (5.8)
[1.9, 10.7]

*Latin/South
American

12 (4.6)
[2.3, 7.3]

3 (1.9)
[0.0, 4.5]

9 (8.7)
[3.9, 14.6]

Demographic variable
*Current age

Gender

Ethnicity
*White/Caucasian
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Total sample

Student sample

Turk sample

N = 259

n = 156

n = 103

Freq. (%)
[95% CI]

Freq. (%)
[95% CI]

Freq. (%)
[95% CI]

Asian

15 (5.8)
[3.1, 8.9]

8 (5.1)
[1.9, 9.0]

7 (6.8)
[1.9, 11.7]

Biracial/mixed race

6 (2.3)
[0.8, 4.6]

4 (2.6)
[0.6, 5.1]

2 (1.9)
[0.0, 4.9]

*Arab/Middle
Eastern

26 (10.0)
[6.2, 13.9]

25 (16.0)
[10.3, 22.4]

1 (1.0)
[0.0, 2.9]

*European

8 (3.1)
[1.2, 5.4]

8 (5.1)
[1.9, 8.3]

-

*Indian

7 (2.7)
[0.8, 5.0]

7 (4.5)
[1.3, 8.3]

-

Not reported

5 (1.9)
[0.4, 3.9]

1 (0.6)
[0.0, 1.9]

4 (3.9)
[1.0, 7.8]

*High school/
equivalent (GED)

133 (51.4)
[45.2, 57.5]

119 (76.3)
[69.9, 82.7]

14 (13.6)
[7.8, 20.4]

*Community college

42 (16.2)
[11.6, 20.8]

12 (7.7)
[3.8, 12.2]

30 (29.1)
[21.4, 37.9]

*Bachelor’s degree

67 (25.9)
[20.8, 31.3]

23 (14.7)
[9.6, 20.5]

44 (42.7)
[33.0, 53.4]

*Master’s degree

9 (3.5)
[1.2, 6.2]

1 (0.6)
[0.0, 1.9]

8 (7.8)
[2.9, 13.6]

Doctorate/
professional degree

4 (1.5)
[0.4, 3.1]

1 (0.6)
[0.0, 1.9]

3 (2.9)
[0.0, 6.8]

*Not reported

4 (1.5)
[0.4, 3.5]

-

4 (3.9)
[1.0, 7.8]

Demographic variable

Education level

Note. 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for mean values and proportions calculated using Bootstrapping
based on 1000 samples. Asterisks (*) denote variables for which means or proportions differ substantially
between Student and Mechanical Turk samples (i.e., 95% CIs do not overlap).
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Appendix A2
Characteristics of the Memory Challenge
Table A2
Average Age at Event and Challenge by Recruitment Source
Total sample

Student sample

Turk sample

N = 259

n = 156

n = 103

M (SD)
[95% CI]

M (SD)
[95% CI]

M (SD)
[95% CI]

*Age at event

17.69 (10.43)
[16.40, 19.03]

14.91 (5.71)
[14.02, 15.87]

21.91 (13.99)
[19.34, 24.56]

*Age at challenge

22.91 (9.91)
[21.76, 24.14]

17.83 (3.89)
[17.19, 18.42]

30.61 (11.22)
[28.55, 32.72]

*Years since event

9.80 (11.28)
[8.55, 11.29]

5.81 (5.94)
[4.87, 6.77]

16.10 (14.44)
[13.38, 18.94]

*Years since challenge

4.52 (6.92)
[3.72, 5.35]

2.89 (3.62)
[2.36, 3.47]

7.09 (9.61)
[5.30, 9.08]

*Years between event and challenge

5.21 (7.98)
[4.26, 6.21]

2.92 (4.52)
[2.28, 3.69]

8.69 (10.47)
[6.73, 10.80]

Variable

Note. 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for average ages calculated using Bootstrapping based on 1000
samples.
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Appendix A3
Table A3
Frequency of Relationship Type between Rememberer and Challenger by Recruitment
Source
Total sample

Student sample

Turk sample

N = 259

n = 156

n = 103

Freq. (%)
[95% CI]

Freq. (%)
[95% CI]

Freq. (%)
[95% CI]

*Intimate partner

43 (16.6)
[12.4, 20.8]

17 (10.9)
[6.4, 16.0]

26 (25.2)
[17.5, 34.0]

Extended family

18 (6.9)
[3.9, 10.0]

11 (7.1)
[3.2, 11.5]

7 (6.8)
[1.9, 12.6]

Sibling

33 (12.7)
[8.9, 17.0]

19 (12.2)
[7.7, 17.9]

14 (13.6)
[7.8, 20.4]

Parent

65 (25.1)
[19.7, 30.5]

34 (21.8)
[15.4, 28.2]

31 (30.1)
[21.4, 38.8]

*Child

3 (1.2)
[0.0, 2.7]

-

3 (2.9)
[0.0, 6.8]

*Friend

75 (29.0)
[23.6, 34.7]

60 (38.5)
[31.4, 46.2]

15 (14.6)
[7.8, 21.4]

*Coworker/
classmate

4 (1.5)
[0.4, 3.1]

-

4 (3.9)
[1.0, 7.8]

Teacher/boss/
authority

8 (3.1)
[1.2, 5.8]

5 (3.2)
[0.6, 6.4]

3 (2.9)
[0.0, 6.8]

*Acquaintance

8 (3.1)
[1.2, 5.4]

8 (5.1)
[1.9, 9.0]

-

Stranger

2 (0.8)
[0.0, 1.9]

2 (1.3)
[0.0, 3.2]

-

Relation to
challenger

Note. 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for mean values and proportions calculated using Bootstrapping
based on 1000 samples.

240

Appendix A4
Table A4
Duration of Relationship Between Rememberer and Challenger by Recruitment Source
Total sample

Student sample

Turk sample

N = 259

n = 156

n = 103

Freq. (%)
[95% CI]

Freq. (%)
[95% CI]

Freq. (%)
[95% CI]

Yes

219 (84.6)
[80.3, 88.8]

127 (81.4)
[75.0, 87.2]

92 (89.3)
[83.5, 95.1]

No

40 (15.4)
[11.2, 19.7]

29 (18.6)
[12.8, 25.0]

11 (10.7)
[4.9, 16.5]

M (SD)
[95% CI]

M (SD)
[95% CI]

M (SD)
[95% CI]

16.43 (13.16)
[14.69, 18.06]

11.41 (8.51)
[10.14, 12.73]

24.04 (15.21)
[21.72, 26.89]

4.33 (4.96)
[2.90, 6.07]

3.72 (4.12)
[2.38, 5.48]

5.91 (6.67)
[2.55, 9.91]

11.93 (10.82)
[10.66, 13.22]

8.82 (7.56)
[7.68, 9.93]

16.63 (13.11)
[14.18, 18.97]

Relationship variable
Current relationship

If Yes,
*Total years in relationship

If No,
Years since end of relationship

*Years in relationship at challenge

Note. 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for mean values and proportions calculated using Bootstrapping
based on 1000 samples.
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APPENDIX B: Component Loadings and Variance Explained in Study 1
Appendix B1
Total Variance Explained by First Components
Table B1
Proportion of Total Variance Explained by First Component
SCO compositea

Component

Evaluation of memory

Belief

60.44

Accuracy

64.65

Recollection

47.29

Rehearsal

56.84

Importance

49.00

Intensity

56.21

Trust in feedback

60.85

Evaluation of challenger

49.49

Rememberer agreeableness

52.07

Rememberer conflict avoidance

67.85

Challenger dominance

72.56

Consequences of disagreeing

53.25

Protection of relationship

61.03

Rememberer dominance

64.60

Challenger agreeableness

62.64

Challenger conflict avoidance

68.05

Evaluation of feedback

Reasons to agree

Reasons to disagree

Total variance explained (%)

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).
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Appendix B2
Component Loadings for Evaluation of Memory
Table B2
Component Coefficients, Scales and Items Included in Evaluation of Memory Composite
SCO compositea

Component

Included items/scales

Items

Evaluation of
memory

Belief

Belief in occurrence

1. Personally experienced

.865

2. True occurrence

.925

3. Strong belief occurred

.944

4. Feel it occurred

.857

5. Feel it happened

.935

6. Believe it happened

.931

7. Believe it occurred

.939

8. Believe it occurred to me

.881

Personal plausibility

Plausible to experience

-.010

Trust in memory

Trust in own memory then

.109

Alternate source

Wonder if another source

-.093

Belief in accuracy

1. Confidence in accuracy

.912

2. Proportion accurate

.598

3. Doubt in accuracy

.866

1. Remember experiencing

.779

2. Strength of memory

.804

3. Remember rather than
know

.782

1. Visual details

.042

2. Sensory details

.022

3. Lack of sensory
information

-.197

1. Visualize setting

.779

Accuracy

Recollection

Recollection

Vividness

Spatial/location
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Loading

SCO compositea

Component

Included items/scales

.751

3. See setting/location

.777

4. Spatial arrangement

.759

1. Time travel

.774

2. In moment

.773

3. Re-living

.769

4. Re-experiencing

.759

1. Talked about event

.869

2. Think about event often

.835

3. Rarely tell others

.772

Thought or talked about
before

.702

Discussed with others

.550

Event importance

Event is important to me

.654

Centrality of Events

1. Part of my identity

.833

2. Reference point for self

.863

3. Central to life story

.884

4. Coloured the way I think

.830

5. Permanently changed my
life

.860

6. Effects on the future

.798

7. Turning point in life

.855

Memory importance

Importance of memory then

.519

MEQ Distancing

1. Different person then

-.276

2. Not me anymore

-.261

3. Same person today

.144

1. Emotions are intense

.851

2. Evokes powerful
emotions

.862

MEQ Sharing

Rehearsal

Importance

Intensity

Loading

2. Think about location

Reexperiencing

Rehearsal

Items

MEQ Emotional
Intensity
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SCO compositea

Component

Included items/scales

MEQ Valence

Items

Loading

3. Does not evoke strong
emotions

.792

1. Overall tone positive

-.574

2. Overall tone negative

-.621

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).
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Appendix B3
Component Loadings for Evaluation of Feedback
Table B3
Component Coefficients, Scales and Items Included in Evaluation of Feedback Composite
SCO compositea

Component

Included items/scales

Items

Evaluation of
feedback

Trust in
feedback

Credibility of
information

Credibility of information
provided

.780

Trust in others

Trust in others then

.780

Credibility of
challenger

Credibility of challenger
then

.410

Trust in challenger

Trust in challenger then

.604

MIRS Trust

Average score on Trust
scale

.877

MIRS Genuineness

Average score on
Genuineness scale

.823

Evaluation of
challenger

Loading

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).
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Appendix B4
Component Loadings for Reasons to Agree
Table B4
Component Coefficients, Scales and Items Included in Reasons to Agree Composite
SCO compositea

Component

Included items/scales

Items

Reasons to agree

Rememberer
agreeableness

IAS self-reported
UnassuredSubmissive

Average score on
Unassured-Submissive
scale

.807

IAS self-reported
UnassumingIngenuous

Average score on
Unassuming-Ingenuous
scale

.803

IAS self-reported
Warm-Agreeable

Average score on WarmAgreeable scale

.590

Compliance (GCS)

Total score on GCS

.663

DUTCH Yield self

Average score on Yielding
scale for rememberer

.902

DUTCH
Compromise self

Average score on
Compromising scale for
rememberer

.884

DUTCH Avoid self

Average score on Avoiding
scale for rememberer

.664

IAS other-reported
Assured-Dominance

Average score on AssuredDominance scale

.738

IAS other-reported
Arrogant-Calculating

Average score on ArrogantCalculating scale

.934

IAS other-reported
Coldhearted

Average score on
Coldhearted scale

.872

Checklist of
Controlling
Behaviors (CCB)

Total CCB score

.655

Past experience with
challenger

Past experience with
challenger influenced
response

.749

Rememberer
conflict
avoidance

Challenger
dominance

Consequences
of disagreeing
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Loading

SCO compositea

Component

Protection of
relationship

Included items/scales

Items

Loading

Felt threatened by
challenger

Felt like challenger was
threatening me

.841

Forceful challenge

Forcefulness of challenge

.658

Importance of
relationship

Importance of relationship
at time of challenge

.505

Bothered by
disagreement

Felt bothered that memory
disagreed with challenger

.571

Importance of
avoiding
disagreement

Important to avoid
disagreeing with the
challenger

.873

Difficult to disagree

Easy to disagree with
challenger

-.366

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).
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Appendix B5
Component Loadings for Reasons to Disagree
Table B5
Component Coefficients, Scales and Items Included in Reasons to Disagree Composite
SCO compositea

Component

Included items/scales

Items

Reasons to
disagree

Rememberer
dominance

IAS self-reported
Assured-Dominance

Average score on
Assured-Dominance
scale

.744

IAS self-reported
Arrogant-Calculating

Average score on
Arrogant-Calculating
scale

.878

IAS self-reported
Cold-hearted

Average score on
Coldhearted scale

.783

IAS other-reported
UnassuredSubmissive

Average score on
Unassured-Submissive
scale

.685

IAS other-reported
UnassumingIngenuous

Average score on
Unassuming-Ingenuous
scale

.903

IAS other-reported
Warm-Agreeable

Average score on
Warm-Agreeable scale

.771

DUTCH Yield other

Average score on
Yielding scale for
challenger

.817

DUTCH
Compromise other

Average score on
Compromising scale for
challenger

.783

DUTCH Avoid other

Average score on
Avoiding scale for
challenger

.442

Challenger
agreeableness

Challenger
conflict
avoidance

Loading

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).
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APPENDIX C - Component Loadings for Composite Scores in Study 2
Appendix C1
Total Variance Explained by First Components
Table C1
Proportion of Total Variance Explained by First Component
SCO compositea

Component

Evaluation of memory

Belief

69.11

Accuracy

83.78

Recollection

47.49

Rehearsal

60.25

Importance

42.13

Intensity

52.10

Trust in feedback

57.27

Evaluation of challenger

67.20

Rememberer agreeableness

49.39

Rememberer conflict avoidance

55.02

Challenger dominance

75.68

Consequences of disagreeing

53.25

Protection of relationship

48.49

Rememberer dominance

64.80

Challenger agreeableness

58.57

Challenger conflict avoidance

66.14

Evaluation of feedback

Reasons to agree

Reasons to disagree

Total variance explained (%)

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).
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Appendix C2
Component Loadings for Evaluation of Memory
Table C2
Component Coefficients, Scales and Items Included in Evaluation of Memory Composite
SCO compositea

Component

Included items/scales

Items

Evaluation of
memory

Belief

Belief in occurrence

1. Personally experienced

.837

2. True occurrence

.967

3. Strong belief occurred

.947

4. Feel it occurred

.900

5. Feel it happened

.931

6. Believe it happened

.975

7. Believe it occurred

.963

8. Believe it occurred to me

.728

Personal plausibility

Plausible to experience

.954

Trust in memory

Trust in own memory then

.131

Alternate source

Wonder if another source

.241

Belief in accuracy

1. Confidence in accuracy

.917

2. Proportion accurate

.885

3. Doubt in accuracy

.944

1. Remember experiencing

.900

2. Strength of memory

.865

3. Remember rather than
know

.763

1. Visual details

.667

2. Sensory details

.752

3. Lack of sensory
information

-.155

1. Visualize setting

.901

Accuracy

Recollection

Recollection

Vividness

Spatial/location
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Loading

SCO compositea

Component

Included items/scales

.757

3. See setting/location

.783

4. Spatial arrangement

.780

1. Time travel

.351

2. In moment

.529

3. Re-living

.465

4. Re-experiencing

.498

1. Talked about event

.901

2. Think about event often

.876

3. Rarely tell others

.689

Thought or talked about
before

.749

Discussed with others

.631

Event importance

Event is important to me

.546

Centrality of Events

1. Part of my identity

.753

2. Reference point for self

.694

3. Central to life story

.812

4. Coloured the way I think

.790

5. Permanently changed
my life

.853

6. Effects on the future

.727

7. Turning point in life

.743

MEQ Sharing

Rehearsal

Importance

Memory importance
MEQ Distancing

Intensity

Loading

2. Think about location

Reexperiencing

Rehearsal

Items

MEQ Emotional
Intensity
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Importance of memory then

.450

1. Different person then

-.459

2. Not me anymore

-.371

3. Same person today

-.261

1. Emotions are intense

.923

2. Evokes powerful
emotions

.929

SCO compositea

Component

Included items/scales

MEQ Valence

Items

Loading

3. Does not evoke strong
emotions

.855

1. Overall tone positive

.246

2. Overall tone negative

.314

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).
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Appendix C3
Component Loadings for Evaluation of Feedback
Table C3
Component Coefficients, Scales and Items Included in Evaluation of Feedback Composite
SCO compositea

Component

Included items/scales

Items

Evaluation of
feedback

Trust in
feedback

Credibility of
information

Credibility of information
provided

.757

Trust in others

Trust in others then

.757

Credibility of
challenger

Credibility of challenger
then

.754

Trust in challenger

Trust in challenger then

.814

MIRS Trust

Average score on Trust
scale

.869

MIRS Genuineness

Average score on
Genuineness scale

.838

Evaluation of
challenger

Loading

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).
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Appendix C4
Component Loadings for Reasons to Agree
Table C4
Component Coefficients, Scales and Items Included in Reasons to Agree Composite
SCO compositea

Component

Included items/scales

Items

Reasons to agree

Rememberer
agreeableness

IAS self-reported
UnassuredSubmissive

Average score on
Unassured-Submissive
scale

.664

IAS self-reported
UnassumingIngenuous

Average score on
Unassuming-Ingenuous
scale

.907

IAS self-reported
Warm-Agreeable

Average score on WarmAgreeable scale

.838

Compliance (GCS)

Total score on GCS

.102

DUTCH Yield self

Average score on Yielding
scale for rememberer

.821

DUTCH
Compromise self

Average score on
Compromising scale for
rememberer

.664

DUTCH Avoid self

Average score on Avoiding
scale for rememberer

.732

IAS other-reported
Assured-Dominance

Average score on AssuredDominance scale

.846

IAS other-reported
Arrogant-Calculating

Average score on ArrogantCalculating scale

.914

IAS other-reported
Coldhearted

Average score on
Coldhearted scale

.848

Checklist of
Controlling
Behaviors (CCB)

Total CCB score

.655

Past experience with
challenger

Past experience with
challenger influenced
response

.749

Rememberer
conflict
avoidance

Challenger
dominance

Consequences
of disagreeing

255

Loading

SCO compositea

Component

Protection of
relationship

Included items/scales

Items

Loading

Felt threatened by
challenger

Felt like challenger was
threatening me

.841

Forceful challenge

Forcefulness of challenge

.658

Importance of
relationship

Importance of relationship
at time of challenge

.715

Bothered by
disagreement

Felt bothered that memory
disagreed with challenger

.370

Importance of
avoiding
disagreement

Important to avoid
disagreeing with the
challenger

.849

Difficult to disagree

Easy to disagree with
challenger

-.754

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).
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Appendix C5
Component Loadings for Reasons to Disagree
Table C5
Component Coefficients, Scales and Items Included in Reasons to Disagree Composite
SCO compositea

Component

Included items/scales

Items

Reasons to
disagree

Rememberer
dominance

IAS self-reported
Assured-Dominance

Average score on
Assured-Dominance
scale

.580

IAS self-reported
Arrogant-Calculating

Average score on
Arrogant-Calculating
scale

.913

IAS self-reported
Cold-hearted

Average score on
Coldhearted scale

.880

IAS other-reported
UnassuredSubmissive

Average score on
Unassured-Submissive
scale

.789

IAS other-reported
UnassumingIngenuous

Average score on
Unassuming-Ingenuous
scale

.842

IAS other-reported
Warm-Agreeable

Average score on
Warm-Agreeable scale

.652

DUTCH Yield other

Average score on
Yielding scale for
challenger

.870

DUTCH
Compromise other

Average score on
Compromising scale for
challenger

.854

DUTCH Avoid other

Average score on
Avoiding scale for
challenger

.705

Challenger
agreeableness

Challenger
conflict
avoidance

Loading

Note. a SCO = social-cognitive in reference to the social-cognitive dissonance model of memory challenges
(Scoboria & Henkel, 2020).
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APPENDIX D: Materials Used in Study 1
Appendix D1: Letter of Information (Study 1 - Participant Pool)

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH
Title of Study: Remembering past events in interpersonal relationships
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Kendra Nespoli, MA, and Dr. Alan Scoboria
from the Psychology Department at the University of Windsor. This project is being conducted as part of Ms.
Nespoli’s doctoral dissertation.
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel to contact Kendra Nespoli at
nespoli@uwindsor.ca or Dr. Alan Scoboria at scoboria@uwindsor.ca.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study aims to explore people’s experiences with disagreements about remembering past events in
interpersonal relationships.

PROCEDURES
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to identify a time where you experienced a social
challenge to a memory for a past event and answer questions about the social challenge. You will describe
your memory and your experience of the memory being challenged and answer additional questions about
the memory. You will then answer questionnaires about personality, interpersonal style, relationship quality,
and current functioning. The study will take approximately 2 hours to complete and will be completed online.
Please complete the study on your own, and in a private location where you cannot be observed, and at a
time that you can devote your full attention without interruption.

POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
Because this study involves describing experiences in which there was disagreement about remembered
events, it is possible that you may choose to reflect on memories for relationship experiences (including past
experiences of emotional, physical, and/or sexual abuse) which may be upsetting to recall. You will be asked
to complete measures about such types of past experiences during the study. Please do not participate in this
study if you are uncomfortable thinking about or describing personal experiences with relationship aggression
that you may have experienced.
Contact information for supportive resources are provided at the end of the survey and on the withdrawal page
should you wish to seek support. You may access them at this link: SURVEY LINK HERE. You may also
contact the University of Windsor’s Student Counselling Centre at 519-253-3000 ext.4616.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY
There are no known benefits of participation; however, potential benefits include gaining useful knowledge
about yourself and your interpersonal style by reflecting on past social interactions which may have impacted
your belief in memory for specific past events. The results of this research will contribute to understanding of
the relationships between social disagreements about remembered events and other aspects of psychological
functioning.

COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION
Participants will receive 2 bonus point for 120 minutes of participation towards the psychology participant pool,
if registered in the pool and enrolled in one or more eligible courses.
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CONFIDENTIALITY
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain
confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission. You will provide your name and email address at
the end of the study so that we can provide you with bonus points in the participant pool system. No further
identifying information will be collected about you, and your identity cannot be linked to the responses that you
provide. Your name and student ID number will be kept by the researchers for one year as per Participant
Pool procedure.
As researchers, we are not in control of how information is transmitted over the internet, so to ensure
confidentiality, please do not include any personally identifying information about yourself or anybody else
when you describe your experiences during the study.
Anonymized survey responses will be retained indefinitely and will be stored on an external hard drive in a
locked filing cabinet as well as on the secure storage devices of the investigators. The data is collected
anonymously (is not linked to your identity, which is used only to provide credit in the participant pool). Only
anonymized data will be shared with other researchers. In any resulting publications or presentations,
participants will be referred to in the aggregate (as groups) so as to protect individual identity. If any of the
written description that you provide is described in a presentation or publication, the details will be altered or
the event paraphrased, and any potentially identifying information will be removed.

PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
You can withdraw your participation from this study at any time (prior to exiting the survey) by clicking on the
“Next” button until you come to the end of the survey. At the end of the survey, you will be asked if you would
like to withdraw your data. If you would like to withdraw your data, select ‘Yes” and the researchers will
manually remove any information recorded. You will still receive full points for participating. Once you submit
the completed survey and close the browser, you will no longer be able to withdraw your data. The investigator
may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant doing so.

FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE PARTICIPANTS
A summary of the research findings will be available to you upon completion of the project.
Web address: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/research-result-summaries/
Date when results are available: on or before June 30, 2019

SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA
These data may be used in subsequent studies, in publications and in presentations.

RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, contact: Research Ethics Coordinator,
University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4; Telephone: 519-253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail:

ethics@uwindsor.ca
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR
These are the terms under which I will conduct research.
/s/ Kendra Nespoli

June 15, 2018

/s/ Alan Scoboria

June 15, 2018

SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT/LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
I understand the information provided for the study “Remembering past events in interpersonal relationships”
as described herein. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this
study. I have been given a copy of this form.
By commencing the study, it indicates your consent to participate.
Please print or save a copy of this information letter for your records.
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Appendix D2: Letter of Information (Study 1 - Mechanical Turk)

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH
Title of Study: Remembering past events in interpersonal relationships
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Kendra Nespoli, MA, and Dr. Alan Scoboria
from the Psychology Department at the University of Windsor. This project is being conducted as part of Ms.
Nespoli’s doctoral dissertation.
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel to contact Kendra Nespoli at
nespoli@uwindsor.ca or Dr. Alan Scoboria at scoboria@uwindsor.ca.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study aims to explore people’s experiences with disagreements about remembering past events in
interpersonal relationships.

PROCEDURES
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to identify a time where you experienced a social
challenge to a memory for a past event and answer questions about the social challenge. You will describe
your memory and your experience of the memory being challenged and answer additional questions about
the memory. You will then answer questionnaires about personality, interpersonal style, relationship quality,
and current functioning. The study will take approximately 2 hours to complete and will be completed online.
Please complete the study on your own, and in a private location where you cannot be observed, and at a
time that you can devote your full attention without interruption.

POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
Because this study involves describing experiences in which there was disagreement about remembered
events, it is possible that you may choose to reflect on memories for relationship experiences (including past
experiences of emotional, physical, and/or sexual abuse) which may be upsetting to recall. You will be asked
to complete measures about such types of past experiences during the study. Please do not participate in this
study if you are uncomfortable thinking about or describing personal experiences with relationship aggression
that you may have experienced.
If you find that you are not comfortable continuing the study, you may terminate your participation in the study.
Contact information for supportive resources are provided at the end of the survey and on the withdrawal page
should you wish to seek support. You may also access them at this link: SURVEY LINK HERE.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY
There are no known benefits of participation; however, potential benefits include gaining useful knowledge
about yourself and your interpersonal style by reflecting on past social interactions which may have impacted
your belief in memory for specific past events. Results of this research will contribute to improving the
understanding of the relationship between social challenges to memory and remembering.

COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION
Participants recruited through Mechanical Turk will receive $3.50 (USD) for their participation.

CONFIDENTIALITY
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain
confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission. You will participate using your Mechanical Turk
ID so that we can provide you with the compensation after the study is completed. No further identifying
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information will be collected about you, and your MTurk ID will be detached from the data at the earliest
possible point (i.e., as soon as compensation is provided).
As researchers, we are not in control of how information is transmitted over the internet, so to ensure
confidentiality of your identity, please do not include any other personally identifying information about yourself
or anybody else when you describe your experiences during the study.
Data will be retained indefinitely and will be stored on an external hard drive in a locked filing cabinet as well
as on the secure storage devices of the investigators. Your identity will only be accessible to the researchers.
The data is collected anonymously (is not linked to your identity, which is used only to provide credit through
MTurk). Only anonymized data will be shared with other researchers. In any resulting publications or
presentations, participants will be referred to in the aggregate (as groups) so as to protect individual identity.
If any of the written description that you provide is described in a presentation or publication, the details will
be altered or the event paraphrased, and any potentially identifying information will be removed.

PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
You can withdraw your participation from this study at any time (prior to exiting the survey) by clicking on the
“Next” button until you come to the end of the survey. At the end of the survey, you will be asked if you would
like to withdraw your data. If you would like to withdraw your data, select ‘Yes” and the researchers will
manually remove any information recorded. Please note: Only completed surveys (>80%) will receive
compensation. If you choose to withdraw you must also return to Turk and withdraw yourself from the HIT.
The investigator may also withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant doing so. This
will not affect your compensation. Once you submit the completed survey and close the browser, you will no
longer be able to withdraw your data.

FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE PARTICIPANTS
A summary of the research findings will be available to you upon completion of the project.
Web address: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/research-result-summaries/
Date when results are available: on or before June 30, 2019

SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA
These data may be used in subsequent studies, in publications and in presentations.

RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, contact: Research Ethics Coordinator,
University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4; Telephone: 519-253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail:

ethics@uwindsor.ca
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR
These are the terms under which I will conduct research.
/s/ Kendra Nespoli

June 15, 2018

/s/ Alan Scoboria

June 15, 2018

SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT/LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
I understand the information provided for the study “Remembering past events in interpersonal relationships”
as described herein. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this
study. I have been given a copy of this form.
By commencing the study, it indicates your consent to participate.
Please print or save a copy of this information letter for your records.
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Appendix D3
Detailed Study Protocol – Study 1
Part I: Screening
Has someone close to you ever provided you with feedback that made you question your
memory for a specific past event? (Yes/No).
- If Yes, the participant is eligible to participate in the study and will continue with
the protocol.
- If No, the following message will be presented: “Thank you for your interest in
participating but you are not eligible to complete the study at this time.”
Part II: Description of Experience Receiving Social Feedback About a Memory
Instructions:
Please describe, in as much detail as possible, an interpersonal interaction during which
another person who is known to you gave you feedback that made you question your
memory for a specific past event. For example, this could include a time where someone
told you that something did not actually happen to you, that you are misremembering
something, or when the person behaved in a way that made you feel as if they did not
believe your memory for a past event. If you can think of multiple instances in which this
occurred, choose the most representative example to focus on for this study.
Please describe your memory for the original event (i.e., for the event itself).
[Open response field]
Approximately how old were you (in years) when the original event took place?
Please describe how the other person challenged your memory for the event. For
example, what did the person say and/or do that made you question your memory?
[Open response field]
Approximately how old were you (in years) when this challenge took place?
What happened after your memory was challenged?
[Open response field]
What did you decide about your memory?
[Open response field]
Do you think the challenge affected your confidence in your memory? Elaborate if
possible.
[Open response field]
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Why do you think the other person challenged your memory for the event?
[Open response field]
Here is a list of potential outcomes of a challenge to a memory for a past event. Please
check the one that applies, or check “other” if none apply:
a) I defended my memory and told the other person that they were incorrect and
maintained my belief that the event occurred as I remembered it.
b) I defended my memory and told the other person that they were incorrect but felt
as if my belief that the event occurred as I remembered it was lower than it was
before the challenge.
c) I complied with the other person by saying that they were correct but maintained
my belief that the event occurred as I remembered it.
d) I complied with the other person by saying that they were correct and felt as if my
belief that the event occurred as I remembered it was lower than it was before the
challenge.
e) I did not say anything to the other person as to whether they were correct or
incorrect but maintained my belief that the event occurred as I remembered it.
f) I did not say anything to the other person as to whether they were correct or
incorrect, and felt as if my belief that the event occurred as I remembered it was
lower than it was before the challenge.
e) Other: None of these really capture what took place.
Please elaborate on the outcome that you just endorsed in the question above. We would
like more information about what took place that lead to this outcome, particularly if you
selected “Other”.
[Open response field]
Please describe the nature of your relationship with this person (e.g., friend, parent,
sibling, significant other, acquaintance, etc.).
Do you consider this an ongoing relationship at the present time? (Yes/No).
- If Yes, approximately how long (in years) have you been in this relationship?
(numerical value).
- If No, approximately how long (in years) has it been since the end of this
relationship? (numerical value).
Approximately how long (in years) had you known this person at the time the interaction
about this memory took place? (numerical value).
Was/is this type of exchange about a memory a type of interaction that you typically have
with this person? (Yes/No).
How frequently do/did you have interactions with this person about the quality of your
memory for past events? (E.g., once a week, once a month, etc.)
[Open response field]
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Part III: Memory Characteristics
Please answer the following questions regarding how you currently view the memory that
you described at the beginning of the survey (the memory that was challenged by another
person).
Belief in Occurrence (Scoboria et al., 2019)
1. How likely is it that you personally did in fact experience this event?
(1 = definitely did not happen; 7 = definitely happened)
2. It is true that this event occurred to me.
(1 = not at all true; 7 = extremely true)
3. How strong is your belief that this event actually occurred?
(1 = no belief; 3 = weak belief; 5 = moderate belief; 7 = strong belief)
4. While remembering this event, I feel that it actually occurred.
(1 = not at all; 7 = very strongly)
5. I feel that this event really happened to me.
(1 = no feeling; 7 = strong feeling)
6. Whether or not I can visualize this event clearly, I believe the event actually
happened to me.
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
7. I believe this event really occurred.
(1 = definitely did not occur; 7 = definitely occurred)
8. I believe that this event actually occurred to me, even if the details that I remember
are not completely accurate.
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
Belief in Accuracy (Scoboria, Talarico, et al., 2015)
1. How confident are you that your memory for this event is accurate?
(1 = not at all confident; 7 = completely confident)
2. What proportion of your memory for this event is accurate?
(1 = not at all accurate; 7 = 100% accurate)
3. Do you have any doubt about the accuracy of your memory for this event?
(1 = a great deal of doubt; 7 = no doubt whatsoever)
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Recollection (Scoboria et al., 2014)
1. Do you actually remember experiencing the event?
(1 = no memory at all; 7 = clear and complete memory)
2. How strong is your memory for this event?
(1 = no memory; 3 = weak memory; 5 = moderate memory; 7 = strong memory)
3. As you think about this event, can you actually remember it rather than just knowing
that it occurred?
(1 = not at all; 3 = vaguely; 5 = distinctly; 7 = more than any event)
Recollective Phenomenology, Personal Plausibility and Importance (Scoboria et al.,
2019).
1. How plausible is it that you personally could have experienced this event?
(1 = not at all plausible, 7 = extremely plausible)
2. When I think about this event it involves visual details.
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
3. My representation of this event contains sensory details (I can see, hear or perceive
what happened)
(1 = not a lot; 7 = a lot)
4. My memory for this event does not involve a lot of sensory information (sounds,
smells, tastes, etc.) (Reverse scored)
(1 = not a lot; 7 = a lot)
5. As I think about the event, I can visualize the setting where it occurred.
(1 = vague; 7 = clear/distinct)
6. When I think about this event, the location where the event takes place is.
(1 = vague; 7 = clear/distinct)
7. As I think about this event, I can see the location/setting where it took place.
(1 = not at all; 7 = extremely clear)
8. When I think about this event, the relative spatial arrangement of objects and people
are.
(1 = vague; 7 = clear/distinct)
9. As I think about the event, I feel that I travel back to the time when it happened, that I
am a subject in it, rather than an outside observer tied to the present.
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
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10. While thinking about this event, I feel that I travel back in time and that I am right at
the moment when this event happened.
(1 = not at all; 7 = absolutely)
11. As I think about the event, I feel as though I am re-living the event.
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
12. While thinking about this event, I feel that I am re-experiencing the situation, as if I
was there.
(1 = not at all; 7 = very strongly)
13. This event is important to me (in relation to my goals, my values, and so on).
(1 = not at all important; 7 = very important)
14. I have thought or talked about this event before.
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
Memory Experiences Questionnaire-Short Form (MEQ-SF; Luchetti & Sutin, 2015)
EMOTIONAL INTENSITY
1. My emotions are very intense concerning this event.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
2. The memory of this event evokes powerful emotions.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
3. This memory does not evoke strong emotions in me. (reverse scored)
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
SHARING
4. Since it happened, I have talked about this event many times.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
5.

I frequently think about or talk about this event with others.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)

6. I rarely tell others about this memory. (reverse scored)
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
DISTANCING
7. I feel like the person in this memory is a different person than who I am today.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
8. When I recall this memory, I think, “that’s not me anymore.”
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(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
9. I feel like I am the same person in the memory as I am today. (reverse scored)
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
VALENCE
10. The overall tone of the memory is positive.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
11. The overall tone of the memory is negative.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
Centrality of Event Scale (CES, 7-item; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006)
1. I feel that this event has become part of my identity.
(1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree)
2. This event has become a reference point for the way I understand myself and the
world. (1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree)
3. I feel that this event has become a central part of my life story.
(1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree)
4. This event has colored the way I think and feel about other experiences.
(1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree)
5. This event permanently changed my life.
(1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree)
6. I often think about the effects this event will have on my future.
(1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree)
7. This event was a turning point in my life.
(1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree)
Social Challenge Items (Wysman, 2016)
*bolded items created for the present study
Please think back to the time when you experienced the memory challenge you discussed
above and consider these questions.
1. At the time of the memory challenge, how much did it bother you that your memory
disagreed with what the other person said or did?
267

(1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
2. Currently, how much does it bother you that your memory disagreed with what the
other person said or did?
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
3. At the time, how easy was it for you to disagree with the person who challenged your
memory?
(1 = very hard; 7 = very easy)
4. How much did your past experiences with the person who challenged your memory
influence your behaviour (i.e., what you said or did) in reaction to the challenge?
(1 = past experiences did not influence me at all; 7 = past experiences influenced me)
5. How forceful was the challenge the person made?
(1 = not at all forceful, 7 = very forceful)
6. At the time of the challenge, how important was it for you to avoid disagreeing with
the other person?
(1 = not at all important; 7 = very important)
7. At the time of the challenge, how important was your relationship with the person
who challenged your memory?
(1 = not at all important; 7 = very important)
8. How important is your relationship with the person(s) who challenged your
memory now?
(1 = not at all important; 7 = very important)
9. How credible was the information that the person provided when challenging your
memory?
(1 = not at all credible; 7 = highly credible)
10. At the time of the challenge, how credible was the person who challenged your
memory?
(1 = not at all credible; 7 = highly credible)
11. At the time of the challenge, how much did you trust him/her?
(1 = I did not trust them at all; 7 = I trusted them completely)
12. How much do you trust him/her now?
(1 = I do not trust him/her/them at all; 7 = I trust him/her/them completely)
13. At the time of the challenge, how much did you generally trust other people?
(1 = I did not trust others at all; 7 = I trusted others completely)
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14. How much do you generally trust other people now?
(1 = I do not trust others at all; 7 = I trust others completely)
15. At the time of the challenge, how much did you generally trust your own memory for
past events?
(1 = I mistrusted my memory completely; 7 = I trusted my memory completely)
16. How much do you currently trust your own memory in general?
(1 = I mistrust my memory completely; 7 = I trust my memory completely)
17. At the time of the challenge, to what extent did you wonder if your memory might
have come from some source other than personal experience? Some examples of
other sources include having been told about it by someone else, from your
imagination, a dream, or from a TV show.
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
18. After the challenge occurred, how much did you seek out information from anyone
else (other than the person who challenged your memory)?
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much)
19. After the challenge occurred, how much did you discuss the event with others (not
including the person who challenged your memory)?
(1 = lack of discussion with others, 7 = long and/or emotionally intense discussion
with others)
20. At the time of the challenge, to what extent did you feel like the person who
challenged your memory was attempting to threaten you?
(1 = I was not threatened; 4 = I felt that threat was implied; 7 = there was an explicit
threat)
21. How important was this memory to you before it was challenged?
(1 = not at all important; 7 = very important)
Part IV: Other Measures (IAS, DUTCH, MSRP, GCS, CCB, MIRS)
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Appendix D4
Interpersonal Adjective Scale – Self
(IAS-R; Wiggins et al., 1988)
Please rate how accurately each word describes you, using the following scale.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

extremely

very

quite

slightly

slightly

quite

very

extremely

inaccurate

inaccurate

inaccurate

inaccurate

accurate

accurate

accurate

accurate

For example, consider the word “Introverted”. How accurately does that word describe
you as a person? If you think this is a quite accurate description of you, you would select
the number “6” in the space next to the word “Introverted”. If you think this word is
slightly inaccurate as a description of you, you would select the number “4”. If it is very
inaccurate you would select “2”, and so on…
It is very important that you do not skip any. If you are uncertain about the meaning of a
word, please consult the definitions provided in the brackets.

Introverted (feels more comfortable by oneself; is less interested
in other people)
Assertive (tends to be aggressive and outspoken with others)
Timid (tends to be fearful or uncomfortable around others)
This measure is protected by copyright. Samples items are presented in accordance with
PAR Inc. license agreement.
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Appendix D5
Interpersonal Adjective Scale – Other
(IAS-R; Wiggins et al., 1988)
Please rate how accurately each word describes the person who challenged your memory,
using the following scale.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

extremely

very

quite

slightly

slightly

quite

very

extremely

inaccurate

inaccurate

inaccurate

inaccurate

accurate

accurate

accurate

accurate

For example, consider the word “Introverted”. How accurately does that word describe
you as a person? If you think this is a quite accurate description of you, you would select
the number “6” in the space next to the word “Introverted”. If you think this word is
slightly inaccurate as a description of you, you would select the number “4”. If it is very
inaccurate you would select “2”, and so on…
It is very important that you do not skip any. If you are uncertain about the meaning of a
word, please consult the definitions provided in the brackets.

Introverted (feels more comfortable by oneself; is less interested
in other people)
Assertive (tends to be aggressive and outspoken with others)
Timid (tends to be fearful or uncomfortable around others)
This measure is protected by copyright. Samples items are presented in accordance with
PAR Inc. license agreement.
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Appendix D6
Dutch Test of Conflict Handling (DUTCH) – Self
(Euwema & Van de Vliert, 1990)
Please rate the degree to which you agree with the following statements about yourself.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Yielding
gives in to the wishes of the other party.
concurs with the other party.
tries to accommodate the other party.
adapts to the other parties' goals and interests.
Compromising
tries to realize a middle-of-the-road solution.
emphasizes that we have to find a compromise solution.
insists we both give in a little.
strives whenever possible towards a fifty-fifty compromise.
Forcing
pushes own point of view.
searches for gains.
fights for a good outcome self.
does everything to win.
Problem solving
examines issues until finding a solution that really satisfies
both parties.
stands for own and other's goals and interests.
examines ideas from both sides to find a mutually optimal
solution.
works out a solution that serves own and other's interests as
much as possible.
Avoiding
avoids a confrontation about our differences.
avoids differences of opinion as much as possible.
tries to make differences look less severe.
tries to avoid a confrontation with the other.
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5
Strongly
Agree

Appendix D7
Dutch Test of Conflict Handling (DUTCH) – Other
(Euwema & Van de Vliert, 1990)
Please rate the degree to which you agree with the following statements about the person
who challenged your memory.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Yielding
gives in to the wishes of the other party.
concurs with the other party.
tries to accommodate the other party.
adapts to the other parties' goals and interests.
Compromising
tries to realize a middle-of-the-road solution.
emphasizes that we have to find a compromise solution.
insists we both give in a little.
strives whenever possible towards a fifty-fifty compromise.
Forcing
pushes own point of view.
searches for gains.
fights for a good outcome self.
does everything to win.
Problem solving
examines issues until finding a solution that really satisfies
both parties.
stands for own and other's goals and interests.
examines ideas from both sides to find a mutually optimal
solution.
works out a solution that serves own and other's interests as
much as possible.
Avoiding
avoids a confrontation about our differences.
avoids differences of opinion as much as possible.
tries to make differences look less severe.
tries to avoid a confrontation with the other.
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5
Strongly
Agree

Appendix D8
Modified Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Short Form (MSRP)
(SRP-SF; Paulhus et al., 2016)
Please rate the degree to which the following statements describe the person who
challenged your memory.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

The person who challenged my memory…
1.
2.
3.

Rarely follows the rules.
Has often done something dangerous just for the thrill of it.
Never feels guilty over hurting others.

This measure is protected by copyright. Samples items are presented in accordance with
Multi Health Systems license agreement.
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Appendix D9
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS)
(Gudjonsson, 1989)
How false or true is each statement in describing you?
Note: You may skip any questions you do not wish to answer.
1
False

2
Mostly
False

3
Mostly
True

4
True

1. I give in easily to people when I am pressured.
2. I find it very difficult to tell people when I disagree with them.
3. People in authority make me feel uncomfortable and uneasy.
4. I tend to give in to people who insist they are right.
5. I tend to become easily alarmed and frightened when I am in the company of
people in authority.
6. I try very hard not to offend people in authority.
7. I would describe myself as a very obedient person.
8. I tend to go along with what people tell me even when I know they are wrong.
9. I believe in avoiding rather than facing demanding and frightening situations.
10. I try to please others.
11. Disagreeing with people often takes more time than it is worth.
12. I generally believe in doing as I am told.
13. When I am uncertain about things, I tend to accept what people tell me.
14. I generally try to avoid confrontation.
15. As a child I always did what my parents told me.
16. I try hard to do what is expected of me.
17. I am not too concerned about what people think of me.
18. I strongly resist being pressured to do things I don’t want to do.
19. I would never go along with what people tell me in order to please them.
20. When I was a child, I sometimes took the blame for things I had not done.
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Appendix D10
Checklist of Controlling Behaviors (CCB)
(Lehmann et al., 2012)
Below is a list of behaviours people may experience in relationships. For each of the
statements below, please select the response that best describes your relationship with the
person who challenged your memory (i.e., the person in the interaction you described at
the beginning of the survey).
1

2

3

4

Never

Rarely

Occasionally

Frequently

5
Very
frequently

Physical abuse
1.
Threw something at me
2.
Pushed or grabbed me
3.
Pulled my hair
4.
Choked me
5.
Pinned me to the wall, floor, or bed
6.
Hit, kicked, or punched me
7.
Hit or tried to hit me with something
8.
Threatened me with a knife, gun or other weapon
9.
Spit at me
10.
Tried to block me from leaving
Sexual abuse
1.
Physically forced me to have sexual intercourse
2.
Pressured me to have sex when I said no
3.
Pressured or forced me to into other unwanted sexual acts (e.g., oral,
anal, etc.)
4.
Treated me like a sex object
5.
Inflicted pain on me during sex
6.
Pressured me to have sex after a fight
7.
Was insensitive to my sexual needs
8.
Made jokes about parts of my body
9.
Blames me because others found me attractive
Emotional abuse
1.
Insulted me in front of others
2.
Put down my sexual attractiveness
3.
Made out I was stupid
4.
Criticized my care of children or home
5.
Swore at me
6.
Told me I was crazy
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7.
8.
9.

Told me I was irrational
Blamed me for his problems
Made untrue accusations

Economic abuse
1.
Did not allow me equal access to the family money
2.
Told me or acted as if it were “their money, their house, their car,
etc.”
3.
Threatened to withhold money from me
4.
Made me ask for money for the basic necessities
5.
Used my fear of not having access to money to control my behaviour
6.
Made me account for the money I spent
7.
Tried to keep me dependent on him for money
Intimidation
1.
Moved toward me when he was angry
2.
Pounded his fists on the table
3.
Hit the wall
4.
Smashed or broke something
5.
Threw or kicked something
6.
Used angry facial gestures
7.
Drove angrily or recklessly
8.
Made threats to hit or kill me
9.
Made threats to turn others against me
10.
Made threats to take the children (if any) away
11.
Made threats to make sure I didn’t have money
12.
Made threats to show up unexpectedly or to always be watching me
13.
Made threats to come after me if I left
14.
Made threats to have me committed
Minimizing/denying
1.
Denied that he had abused me
2.
Told me I was lying about being abused
3.
Insisted that what he did was not so bad
4.
Told me to forget about what he did and leave it in the past
5.
Told me that abuse was a normal part of relationships
6.
Told me that he couldn’t remember hurting me
7.
Told me I hurt myself when I fell
Blaming
1.
Blamed me for his or her abusive behaviour saying:
2.
It was my fault
3.
I deserved it
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

He or she has to teach me a lesson
I provoked him or her
It “takes two to tango”
I hurt him first
I asked/dared him or her to hit me

Isolation
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Told me I couldn’t do something
Forbade me or stopped me from seeing someone
Monitored my time or made me account for where I was
Restricted my use of the car
Restricted my use of the telephone
Listened to my telephone conversations
Pressures me to stop contacting my family or friends
Made it difficult for me to get a job or pursue a vocation
Kept me from getting medical attention
Tried to turn people against me

(Male) privilege
1.
Demanded obedience
2.
Treated me like a servant
3.
Treated me like an inferior
4.
Expected me to meet their sexual needs regardless of my needs
5.
Treated me like I was helpless or incapable
6.
Told me I couldn’t get along without him them
7.
Had or demanded the final say in decisions
8.
Did not allow me to do the things that he thought he had a right to do
because he was a man
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Appendix D11
Modified Interpersonal Relationship Scale (MIRS)
(Garthoeffner, Henry, & Robinson, 1993)
As you respond to the following statements, think about your relationship with the person
who challenged your memory (i.e., the person in the interaction you described at the
beginning of the survey).
Please answer the statements by giving as true a picture of your feelings and beliefs as
they were at the time of the challenge, not the way you think it should be or should have
been.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Disagree

Strongly
disagree

*items are reverse scored
Trust
1. There are times when my partner cannot be trusted.
2. My partner would tell a lie if s/he could gain by it.
3. In our relationship, I have to be alert or my partner is likely to take advantage of
me.
4. My partner is honest mainly because of a fear of being caught.
5. I’m better off if I don’t trust my partner too much.
6. Even though my partner provides me with many reports and stories, it is hard to
get an objective account of things.
7. There is no simple way to decide if my partner is telling the truth.
8. In our relationship, I am occasionally distrustful and expect to be exploited.
9. My partner can be counted on to do what s/he says s/he will do.*
10. I do not believe my partner would cheat on me even if s/he could get away with
it.*
11. My partner can be relied on to keep his or her promises.*
12. My partner treats me fairly and justly.*
13. The advice my partner gives cannot be regarded as being trustworthy.
14. I am afraid my partner will hurt my feelings.
15. My partner pretends to care more about me than s/he really does.
16. My partner is likely to say what s/he really believes rather than what s/he thinks I
want to hear.*
17. I wonder how much my partner really cares about me.
18. I believe most things my partner says. *
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Self-disclosure
19. I can express deep, strong feelings to my partner.*
20. I feel comfortable expressing almost anything to my partner.*
21. In our relationship, I feel I am able to expose my weaknesses.*
22. I do not show deep emotions to me partner.
23. I share and discuss my problems with my partner.*
24. I tell my partner some things of which I am very ashamed.*
25. It is hard for me to tell my partner about myself.
26. I talk with my partner about why certain people dislike me.*
27. We are very close to each other.*
28. In our relationship, I’m cautious and play it safe.
29. I discuss with my partner the things I worry about when I’m with a person of the
opposite sex.*
30. I’m afraid of making mistakes with my partner.
31. I touch my partner when I feel warmly towards him or her.*
32. It’s hard for me to act natural when I’m with my partner.
Genuineness
33. My partner really cares about what happens to me.*
34. It is safe to believe that my partner is interested in my welfare.*
35. My partner is truly sincere in his or her promises.*
36. My partner is sincere and practices what s/he preaches.*
Empathy
37. My way of doing things is apt to be misunderstood by my partner.
38. I feel my partner misinterprets what I say.
39. I sometimes stay away from my partner because I fear doing or saying something
I might regret afterwards.
40. My partner doesn’t really understand me.
41. I sometimes wonder what hidden reason my partner has for doing nice things for
me.
Comfort
42. I seek my partner’s attention when I am facing troubles.*
43. I would like my partner to be with me when I’m lonely.*
44. I feel comfortable when I am alone with my partner.*
45. I would like my partner to be with me when I receive bad news.*
46. I feel relaxed when we are together.*
47. I face life with my partner with confidence.*
Communication
48. I listen carefully to my partner and help him or her solve problems.*
49. I understand my partner and sympathize with his or her feelings.*
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Appendix D12
Demographic Questions for Study 1 Participants
Age:
Sex:
Ethnicity (please select):
__ Black/African/Caribbean
__ Chinese
__ Filipino
__ First Nations
__ Japanese
__ Latin American
__ Mixed
__ South Asian (e.g., East Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, etc.)
__ Southeast Asian (e.g., Vietnamese, Cambodian, Malaysian, etc.)
__ White
__ Other: ______________________________________________
Highest level of education completed. If currently enrolled, please select the highest
degree you have received:
__ No formal education
__ Elementary school
__ High school or equivalent (GED)
__ Community college
__ Bachelor’s degree
__ Master’s degree
__ Professional degree
__ Doctorate degree
Where applicable: Please enter your Mechanical Turk ID in order to be compensated.
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Appendix D13
Supportive Resource Information Sheet – University of Windsor
and Surrounding Area
Student Counselling Centre
Room 293 (2nd Floor), CAW Student Centre
University of Windsor
Phone: 519-253-3000 ext. 4616
Hours: Monday to Friday, 8:30am to 12:00pm
and 1:00pm to 4:30pm
Email: scc@uwindsor.ca

Community Crisis Centre of
Windsor-Essex County
Walk-in service:
Jeanne Mance Building
1986 Ouellette Ave, 1st Floor
Windsor, ON
Hours: Monday to Friday, 9:00am to 5:00pm

Community Crisis Line of Windsor-Essex
County
24-hr crisis phone line: 519-973-4435

Distress Centre of Windsor-Essex County
Phone: 519-256-5000
Hours: Daily, 12:00pm to 12:00am

Sexual Assault Crisis Centre of Essex County
(24 hours)
1770 Langlois Avenue
Windsor, ON
Phone: 519-253-3100
Email: sacc@wincom.net

Sexual Assault & Domestic Violence
Treatment Centre
Windsor Regional Hospital,
Metropolitan Campus
1995 Lens Avenue
Windsor, ON
Phone: 519-255-2234

Hiatus House
(for individuals and families
experiencing domestic violence)
250 Louis Avenue
Windsor, ON
Phone: 519-252-7781

The Welcome Centre Shelter for Women
263 Bridge Avenue
Windsor, ON

Phone: 519-971-7595
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Appendix D14
Supportive Resource Information Sheet – International
Canada

United States

Crisis Service Canada and Canada Suicide
Prevention Service (CSPS)
Phone: 1-833-456-4566 (24-hour crisis services)
Text: 45645 (5pm to 1am EST)
Chat: crisisservicescanada.ca (5pm to 1am EST)

US National Suicide Prevention LifeLine
Phone: 1-800-273-TALK

KidsHelpPhone (age 20 and under)
Phone: 1-800-668-6868

CrisisChat
Online service
(Daily, 2pm to 2am EST)
Common Ground
Online chat service
(Monday to Friday, 4pm to 10pm)

Youth Space (age 30 and under)
Professional counsellors available to talk
Chat: Youthspace.ca (Daily, 6pm – 12pm PST)
Email: youthtalk2@pcfsa.org
First Nations and Inuit Hope for Wellness 24/7
Help Line
(24-hour help line)
Phone: 1-855-242-3310
Trans LifeLine
Phone: 1-877-330-6366

Trans LifeLine USA
Phone: 1-877-565-8860

Lifeline Canada
Web: www.thelifelinecanada.ca
- Contact information for local crisis
centres across the country
- ECounselling resources
- Coping strategies
- Information on the LifeLine App

Military Veterans Canada and USA
Phone: 1-800-273-8255 (press 2 for
Spanish)
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Appendix E
E1: Original Study 2 Advertisement for Online Participant Recruitment
(Recruitment Stage One)

Research participants wanted to complete online survey about experiences
in relationships with psychopaths!
Researchers at the University of Windsor are conducting a study investigating
experiences of remembering past events in interpersonal relationships with suspected
psychopaths.
As a participant, you will be asked about a specific time when someone you suspect to be
a psychopath made you question your memory for a past event. This may have been
because they told you that your memory was incorrect, that the events did not happen, or
that other people have doubts about your experiences. The researchers are hoping to learn
more about your experiences of remembering and communicating with suspected
psychopaths about things that happened in the past.
Your participation in this research is important for gaining new knowledge about how
individuals in relationships with psychopathic individuals remember past events. Please
note, participation in the study may involve thinking about potentially painful
relationship experiences.
Participation is completely voluntary and no identifying information will be connected
with your responses. Participants will receive a $5 Amazon e-gift card as compensation.
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Appendix E2
Original Study 2 Letter of Information - Recruitment Stage One

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH
Title of Study: Remembering past events in interpersonal relationships with suspected psychopaths
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Kendra Nespoli, MA, and Dr. Alan Scoboria
from the Psychology Department at the University of Windsor. This project is being conducted as part of Ms.
Nespoli’s doctoral dissertation.
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel to contact Kendra Nespoli at
nespoli@uwindsor.ca or Dr. Alan Scoboria at scoboria@uwindsor.ca.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study aims to explore people’s experiences with disagreements about remembering past events in
interpersonal relationships where one person is suspected to have psychopathic traits.

PROCEDURES
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to identify a time where you experienced social
challenge to a memory for a past event by another person who you suspect has psychopathic traits, and
answer questions about the social challenge. You will describe your memory and your experience of the
memory being challenged, and answer questions about the memory. You will then answer questionnaires
about personality, interpersonal style, relationship quality, and current functioning. The questionnaires will take
approximately 2 hours to complete and will be completed online.
Please complete the study on your own, and in a private location where you cannot be observed, and at a
time that you can devote your full attention without interruption.

POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
Because this study involves describing experiences in which there was disagreement about remembered
events, it is possible that you may choose to reflect on memories for relationship experiences (including past
experiences of emotional, physical, and/or sexual abuse) which may be upsetting to recall. You will be asked
to complete measures about such types of past experiences during the study. Please do not participate in this
study if you are uncomfortable thinking about or describing personal experiences with relationship aggression
that you may have experienced.
If you find that you are not comfortable continuing the study, you may terminate your participation. Contact
information for supportive resources are provided at the end of the survey and on the withdrawal page should
you wish to seek support. You may also access them at this link: SURVEY LINK HERE.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY
There are no known benefits of participation; however, potential benefits include gaining useful knowledge
about yourself and your interpersonal style by reflecting on past social interactions which may have impacted
your belief in memory for specific past events. This research may also contribute to a better understanding of
individuals who have been victimized by psychopaths in the context of interpersonal relationships, which may
benefit research knowledge as well as potentially provide information for advocacy work for survivors who
have been involved with these individuals.
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COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION
You will be compensated $5.00 (USD) for your participation in this research. You must complete at least 80%
of the survey to receive this compensation.

CONFIDENTIALITY
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain
confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission. You will provide your name and email address at
the end of the study so that we can provide you with compensation. Your name and email address will be kept
for one year at which point it will be deleted. No further identifying information will be collected about you, and
your identity cannot be linked to the responses that you provide.
As researchers, we are not in control of how information is transmitted over the internet, so to ensure
confidentiality, please do not include any personally identifying information about yourself or anybody else
when you describe your experiences during the study.
Data will be retained indefinitely and will be stored on an external hard drive in a locked filing cabinet as well
as on the secure storage devices of the investigators. The data is collected anonymously (is not linked to your
identity, which is used only to provide you with compensation). Only anonymized data will be shared with other
researchers. In any resulting publications or presentations, participants will be referred to in the aggregate (as
groups) so as to protect individual identity. If any of the written description that you provide is described in a
presentation or publication, the details will be altered or the event paraphrased, and any potentially identifying
information will be removed.

PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
You can withdraw your participation from this study at any time (prior to exiting the survey) by clicking on the
“Next” button until you come to the end of the survey. At the end of the survey, you will be asked if you would
like to withdraw your data. If you would like to withdraw your data, select ‘Yes” and the researchers will
manually remove any information recorded. Please note: Only completed surveys (>80%) will receive
compensation. If you choose to withdraw you must also return to Turk and withdraw yourself from the HIT.
The investigator may also withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant doing so. This
will not affect your compensation. Once you submit the completed survey and close the browser, you will no
longer be able to withdraw your data.

FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE PARTICIPANTS
A summary of the research findings will be available to you upon completion of the project.
Web address: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/research-result-summaries/
Date when results are available: on or before June 30, 2019

SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA
These data may be used in subsequent studies, in publications and in presentations.

RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, contact: Research Ethics Coordinator,
University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4; Telephone: 519-253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail:

ethics@uwindsor.ca
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR
These are the terms under which I will conduct research.
/s/ Kendra Nespoli
June 15, 2018
/s/ Alan Scoboria
June 15, 2018

SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT/LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
I understand the information provided for the study “Remembering past events in interpersonal relationships
with suspected psychopaths” as described herein. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and
I agree to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.
By commencing the study, it indicates your consent to participate.
Please print or save a copy of this information letter for your records.
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Appendix E3
Revised Study 2 Advertisement for Online Participant Recruitment
(Recruitment Stage Two)

Research participants wanted to complete online survey about experiences
in relationships with psychopaths!
We are currently recruiting participants for a study investigating experiences of
remembering past events in interpersonal relationships with suspected psychopaths.
We are interested in hearing about a time when a person you suspect could have
psychopathic traits gave you feedback that led you to question your memory for
a specific past event.
If you have had such an experience, follow the link below to complete the screening for
the study, and follow the instructions carefully.
If you meet the eligibility criteria for the study, we will send you an invitation to
complete the remainder of the study within about one week. Upon completion of the
study, you will receive the full compensation of a $5 Amazon gift card.
If you complete the screening (whether or not we invite you to continue), you will be
entered into a draw for one of three $100 gift cards in appreciation for your time to
complete the screening.
Your participation in this research is important for gaining new knowledge about how
individuals in relationships with psychopathic individuals remember past events. Please
note, participation in the study may involve thinking about potentially painful
relationship experiences.
Participation is completely voluntary and no identifying information will be connected
with your responses.
Link to study screener: QUALTRICS
Any questions about the study and eligibility requirements can be directed to
rememberingpastevents@gmail.com
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Appendix E4
Revised Study 2 Letter of Information for Screening
(Recruitment Stage Two)

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH SCREENING
Title of Study: Screening for Psychology Research Study: Remembering past events in interpersonal
relationships with suspected psychopaths
You are asked to participate in the screening for a research study conducted by Kendra Nespoli, MA, and Dr.
Alan Scoboria from the Psychology Department at the University of Windsor. This project is being conducted
as part of Ms. Nespoli’s doctoral dissertation.
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel to contact Kendra Nespoli at
nespoli@uwindsor.ca or Dr. Alan Scoboria at scoboria@uwindsor.ca.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study aims to explore people’s experiences with disagreements about remembering specific past events
in interpersonal relationships where one person is suspected to have psychopathic traits.

PROCEDURES
If you volunteer to participate in the screening for this study, you will first be asked to identify and describe a
time in which another person whom you suspect has psychopathic traits challenged your memory for a past
event. You may only complete the study screener one time. If your event description meets the eligibility
criteria for the study, we will send an email invitation to participate in the rest of the study following which you
may be eligible to receive compensation. In the rest of the study, you will be asked to answer further questions
about your experience of the memory being challenged and answer other questions about the memory. You
will also answer questionnaires about personality, interpersonal style, relationship quality, and current
functioning. The questionnaires will take approximately 2 hours to complete and will be completed online.
Please complete the study on your own, and in a private location where you cannot be observed, and at a
time that you can devote your full attention without interruption.

POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
Because this study involves describing experiences in which there was disagreement about remembered
events, it is possible that you may choose to reflect on memories for relationship experiences (including past
experiences of emotional, physical, and/or sexual abuse) which may be upsetting to recall. You will be asked
to complete measures about such types of past experiences during the study. Please do not participate in this
study if you are uncomfortable thinking about or describing personal experiences with relationship aggression
that you may have experienced.
If you find that you are not comfortable continuing the study, you may terminate your participation. Contact
information for supportive resources are provided at the end of the survey and on the withdrawal page should
you wish to seek support. You may also access them at this link: SURVEY LINK HERE.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY
There are no known benefits of participation; however, potential benefits might include gaining useful
knowledge about yourself and your interpersonal style by reflecting on past social interactions which may have
impacted your belief in memory for specific past events. This research may also contribute to a better
understanding of individuals who have been victimized by psychopaths in the context of interpersonal
relationships, which may benefit research knowledge as well as potentially provide information for advocacy
work for survivors who have been involved with such individuals.
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COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION
If you complete this screener, you will be entered into a draw to win one of three $100 Amazon gift cards,
whether or not you are eligible to continue in the study. If you are deemed eligible to participate in the full study
based on the study screener, we will send you an email invitation, and if you complete the survey will be
compensated $5.00 (USD; Amazon.com gift card) for your participation (in addition to the chance to win the
draw). To receive compensation, you must complete at least 80% of the survey (including correctly following
the instructions for all study procedures, providing written text responses when requested, and by responding
consistently to ratings scales). Eligibility to receive compensation will be determined by the research team
based on completeness and validity of responses. For example, answers that do not make sense, or which
are not relevant to the questions being asked cannot be accepted. Participants are encouraged to respond
thoughtfully and consistently when completing the screener and the study.

CONFIDENTIALITY
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain
confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission. For this screener, you will provide your name and
email address so that we can contact you with the invitation code should you be eligible to participate in the
full study. If invited to complete the study, you will be asked to provide your name and email address again at
the end of the study so that we can validate your identity and conduct the draw. Your name and email address
will be kept for one year at which point it will be deleted. No further identifying information will be collected
about you and your identity will be separated from your responses as soon as compensation is provided.
As researchers, we are not in control of how information is transmitted over the internet, so to ensure
confidentiality, please do not include any additional identifying information about yourself or anybody else
when you describe your experiences during the study.
Data will be retained indefinitely and will be stored on an external hard drive in a locked filing cabinet as well
as on the secure storage devices of the investigators. Your data will remain confidential, and your responses
will be de-identified as soon as compensation is provided). Only de-identified data will be shared with other
researchers. In any resulting publications or presentations, participants will be referred to in the aggregate (as
groups) so as to protect individual identity. If any of the written description that you provide is described in a
presentation or publication, the details will be altered or the event paraphrased, and any potentially identifying
information will be removed.

PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
You can withdraw your participation from this study at any time (prior to exiting the survey) by clicking on the
“Next” button until you come to the end of the survey. At the end of the survey, you will be asked if you would
like to withdraw your data. Please note: Only completed surveys (>80% completion of text answers and rating
scales) will receive compensation. If you would like to withdraw your data, select ‘Yes” and the researchers
will manually remove any information recorded. The investigator may also withdraw you from this research if
circumstances arise which warrant doing so. Once you submit the completed survey and close the browser,
you will no longer be able to withdraw your data.

FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE PARTICIPANTS
A summary of the research findings will be available to you upon completion of the project.
Web address: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/research-result-summaries/
Date when results are available: on or before June 30, 2019

SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA
These data may be used in subsequent studies, in publications and in presentations.

RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, contact: Research Ethics Coordinator,
University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4; Telephone: 519-253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail:

ethics@uwindsor.ca
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR
These are the terms under which I will conduct research.
/s/ Kendra Nespoli
June 15, 2018
/s/ Alan Scoboria
June 15, 2018
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SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT/LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
I understand the information provided for the study “Screening for remembering past events in interpersonal
relationships with suspected psychopaths” as described herein. My questions have been answered to my
satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.
By commencing the study, it indicates your consent to participate.
Please print or save a copy of this information letter for your records.

290

Appendix E5
Study 2 Screening Protocol
(Recruitment Stage Two)
Part I: Screening
Have you ever been in an interpersonal relationship with another person you suspect
could be a psychopath? (Yes/No).
- If Yes, the participant will be asked a second screening question.
- If No, the following message will be presented: “Thank you for your interest in
participating. The study has a number of eligibility criteria, and unfortunately you
do not meet all of the criteria and are not eligible to complete the study.”
During this relationship, did the person whom you suspect is a psychopath ever provide
you with feedback that made you question your memory for a specific past event?
(Yes/No).
- If Yes, the participant is eligible to participate in the study and will continue with
the protocol.
If No, the following message will be presented: “Thank you for your interest in
participating. The study has a number of eligibility criteria, and unfortunately you
do not meet all of the criteria and you are not eligible to complete the study.”
If ‘yes’ to both questions:
For this study, we are interested in instances in which the suspected psychopath gave you
feedback that led you to question your memory for a specific past event. For example,
this could include a time where they told you that something did not actually happen to
you, that you are misremembering something, or when they behaved in a way that made
you feel as if they did not believe your memory for a past event.
If you have had such an experience with some you suspect has psychopathic traits, please
describe the interaction you had with them in as much detail as possible in the space
below. If you can think of multiple instances in which this occurred with the same
individual, please choose ONE instance to focus on for the purpose of this study. Please
do not include any identifying information (e.g., names, addresses, etc.) about yourself or
anyone else, including the person you suspect is a psychopath.
[Open response field]
Thank you for your interest in the study! Please save a copy of your event description to
refer back to, should you be invited to participate in the study.
If you meet the eligibility criteria for the study, you will receive an invitation to complete
the remainder of the study by email within about one week. Upon successful completion
of the study, you will receive a $5 USD Amazon gift card as compensation for your time.
Requirements for receiving compensation are described on the consent form.
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Please enter your name and a valid email address below. This email address will be used
to contact you if you are eligible to participate in the study.
Name: [open response field]
Email address: [open response field]
How did you hear about this study? [open response field]
Would you like to be entered into the draw for one of three $100 Amazon gift cards as a
thank you for completing this screener?
- Yes
- No
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Appendix E6
Study 2 Email Invitation for Eligible Participants
(Recruitment Stage Two)
Thank you for your interest in participating in the study “Remembering Past Events in
Interpersonal Relationships with Suspected Psychopaths!”
Based on the screener that you completed, you are now invited to complete the remainder
of the study.
Please note, we are only able to compensate research participants who are invited to
complete the remainder of the study, and who make an effort to follow the
instructions, participate meaningfully, and complete at least 80% of the study questions.
If you are uncomfortable with any part of the study, or do not wish to answer some of the
questions, you are not obligated to respond. If you do not wish to complete a section,
please indicate this and let us know why if you are willing (as this helps us to understand
what it is like to take part in the study, which may improve the experience for future
participants).
Below is a unique survey code that can only be used ONCE to access the survey. To
begin the survey now, click the link provided. If you cannot commit the full 2 hours at
this time, please do not begin the survey now. This invitation is valid for one week.
If you have any questions about the study, please contact the study administrators at
rememberingpastevents@gmail.com
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Appendix E7
Revised Study 2 Letter of Information for Main Study
(Recruitment Stage Two)

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH
Title of Study: Remembering past events in interpersonal relationships with suspected psychopaths
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Kendra Nespoli, MA, and Dr. Alan Scoboria
from the Psychology Department at the University of Windsor. This project is being conducted as part of Ms.
Nespoli’s doctoral dissertation.
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel to contact Kendra Nespoli at
nespoli@uwindsor.ca or Dr. Alan Scoboria at scoboria@uwindsor.ca.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study aims to explore people’s experiences with disagreements about remembering specific past events
in interpersonal relationships where one person is suspected to have psychopathic traits.

PROCEDURES
If you volunteer to participate in the screening for this study, you will first be asked to identify and describe a
time in which another person whom you suspect has psychopathic traits challenged your memory for a past
event. If your event description meets the eligibility criteria for the study, we will send an email invitation to
participate in the rest of the study following which you may be eligible to receive compensation. In the rest of
the study, you will be asked to answer further questions about your experience of the memory being
challenged and answer other questions about the memory. You will also answer questionnaires about
personality, interpersonal style, relationship quality, and current functioning. The questionnaires will take
approximately 2 hours to complete and will be completed online. You may only complete the study one time.
Please complete the study on your own, and in a private location where you cannot be observed, and at a
time that you can devote your full attention without interruption.

POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
Because this study involves describing experiences in which there was disagreement about remembered
events, it is possible that you may choose to reflect on memories for relationship experiences (including past
experiences of emotional, physical, and/or sexual abuse) which may be upsetting to recall. You will be asked
to complete measures about such types of past experiences during the study. Please do not participate in this
study if you are uncomfortable thinking about or describing personal experiences with relationship aggression
that you may have experienced.
If you find that you are not comfortable continuing the study, you may terminate your participation. Contact
information for supportive resources are provided at the end of the survey and on the withdrawal page should
you wish to seek support. You may also access them at this link: SURVEY LINK HERE.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY
There are no known benefits of participation; however, potential benefits might include gaining useful
knowledge about yourself and your interpersonal style by reflecting on past social interactions which may have
impacted your belief in memory for specific past events. This research may also contribute to a better
understanding of individuals who have been victimized by psychopaths in the context of interpersonal
relationships, which may benefit research knowledge as well as potentially provide information for advocacy
work for survivors who have been involved with such individuals.
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COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION
If you complete this screener, you will be entered into a draw to win one of three $100 Amazon gift cards,
whether or not you are eligible to continue in the study. If you are deemed eligible to participate in the full study
based on the study screener, we will send you an email invitation, and if you complete the survey will be
compensated $5.00 (USD; Amazon.com gift card) for your participation (in addition to the chance to win the
draw). To receive compensation, you must complete at least 80% of the survey (including correctly following
the instructions for all study procedures, providing written text responses when requested, and by responding
consistently to ratings scales). Eligibility to receive compensation will be determined by the research team
based on completeness and validity of responses. For example, answers that do not make sense, or which
are not relevant to the questions being asked cannot be accepted. Participants are encouraged to respond
thoughtfully and consistently when completing the screener and the study.

CONFIDENTIALITY
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain
confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission. For this screener, you will provide your name and
email address so that we can contact you with the invitation code should you be eligible to participate in the
full study. If invited to complete the study, you will be asked to provide your name and email address again at
the end of the study so that we can validate your identity and conduct the draw. Your name and email address
will be kept for one year at which point it will be deleted. No further identifying information will be collected
about you and your identity will be separated from your responses as soon as compensation is provided.
As researchers, we are not in control of how information is transmitted over the internet, so to ensure
confidentiality, please do not include any additional identifying information about yourself or anybody else
when you describe your experiences during the study.
Data will be retained indefinitely and will be stored on an external hard drive in a locked filing cabinet as well
as on the secure storage devices of the investigators. Your data will remain confidential, and your responses
will be de-identified as soon as compensation is provided). Only de-identified data will be shared with other
researchers. In any resulting publications or presentations, participants will be referred to in the aggregate (as
groups) to protect individual identity. If any of the written description that you provide is described in a
presentation or publication, the details will be altered or the event paraphrased, and any potentially identifying
information will be removed.

PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
You can withdraw your participation from this study at any time (prior to exiting the survey) by clicking on the
“Next” button until you come to the end of the survey. At the end of the survey, you will be asked if you would
like to withdraw your data. Please note: Only completed surveys (>80% completion of text answers and rating
scales) will receive compensation. If you would like to withdraw your data, select ‘Yes” and the researchers
will manually remove any information recorded. The investigator may also withdraw you from this research if
circumstances arise which warrant doing so. Once you submit the completed survey and close the browser,
you will no longer be able to withdraw your data.

FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE PARTICIPANTS
A summary of the research findings will be available to you upon completion of the project.
Web address: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/research-result-summaries/
Date when results are available: on or before June 30, 2019

SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA
These data may be used in subsequent studies, in publications and in presentations.

RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, contact: Research Ethics Coordinator,
University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4; Telephone: 519-253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail:

ethics@uwindsor.ca
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR
These are the terms under which I will conduct research.
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/s/ Kendra Nespoli

June 15, 2018

/s/ Alan Scoboria

June 15, 2018

SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT/LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
I understand the information provided for the study “Screening for remembering past events in interpersonal
relationships with suspected psychopaths” as described herein. My questions have been answered to my
satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.
By commencing the study, it indicates your consent to participate.
Please print or save a copy of this information letter for your records.
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Appendix E8
Revised Study 2 Letter of Information for Main Study
(Recruitment Stage Two)
Change of Advisor

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH SCREENING
Title of Study: Remembering past events in interpersonal relationships with suspected psychopaths
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Kendra Nespoli, MA, and Dr. Josee Jarry from
the Psychology Department at the University of Windsor. This project is being conducted as part of Ms.
Nespoli’s doctoral dissertation.
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel to contact Kendra Nespoli at
nespoli@uwindsor.ca or Dr. Josee Jarry at jjarry@uwindsor.ca.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study aims to explore people’s experiences with disagreements about remembering specific past events
in interpersonal relationships where one person is suspected to have psychopathic traits.

PROCEDURES
If you volunteer to participate in the screening for this study, you will first be asked to identify and describe a
time in which another person whom you suspect has psychopathic traits challenged your memory for a past
event. If your event description meets the eligibility criteria for the study, we will send an email invitation to
participate in the rest of the study following which you may be eligible to receive compensation. In the rest of
the study, you will be asked to answer further questions about your experience of the memory being
challenged and answer other questions about the memory. You will also answer questionnaires about
personality, interpersonal style, relationship quality, and current functioning. The questionnaires will take
approximately 2 hours to complete and will be completed online. You may only complete the study one time.
Please complete the study on your own, and in a private location where you cannot be observed, and at a
time that you can devote your full attention without interruption.

POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
Because this study involves describing experiences in which there was disagreement about remembered
events, it is possible that you may choose to reflect on memories for relationship experiences (including past
experiences of emotional, physical, and/or sexual abuse) which may be upsetting to recall. You will be asked
to complete measures about such types of past experiences during the study. Please do not participate in this
study if you are uncomfortable thinking about or describing personal experiences with relationship aggression
that you may have experienced.
If you find that you are not comfortable continuing the study, you may terminate your participation. Contact
information for supportive resources are provided at the end of the survey and on the withdrawal page should
you wish to seek support. You may also access them at this link: SURVEY LINK HERE.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY
There are no known benefits of participation; however, potential benefits might include gaining useful
knowledge about yourself and your interpersonal style by reflecting on past social interactions which may have
impacted your belief in memory for specific past events. This research may also contribute to a better
understanding of individuals who have been victimized by psychopaths in the context of interpersonal
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relationships, which may benefit research knowledge as well as potentially provide information for advocacy
work for survivors who have been involved with such individuals.

COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION
If you complete this screener, you will be entered into a draw to win one of three $100 Amazon gift cards,
whether or not you are eligible to continue in the study. If you are deemed eligible to participate in the full study
based on the study screener, we will send you an email invitation, and if you complete the survey will be
compensated $5.00 (USD; Amazon.com gift card) for your participation (in addition to the chance to win the
draw). To receive compensation, you must complete at least 80% of the survey (including correctly following
the instructions for all study procedures, providing written text responses when requested, and by responding
consistently to ratings scales). Eligibility to receive compensation will be determined by the research team
based on completeness and validity of responses. For example, answers that do not make sense, or which
are not relevant to the questions being asked cannot be accepted. Participants are encouraged to respond
thoughtfully and consistently when completing the screener and the study.

CONFIDENTIALITY
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain
confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission. For this screener, you will provide your name and
email address so that we can contact you with the invitation code should you be eligible to participate in the
full study. If invited to complete the study, you will be asked to provide your name and email address again at
the end of the study so that we can validate your identity and conduct the draw. Your name and email address
will be kept for one year at which point it will be deleted. No further identifying information will be collected
about you and your identity will be separated from your responses as soon as compensation is provided.
As researchers, we are not in control of how information is transmitted over the internet, so to ensure
confidentiality, please do not include any additional identifying information about yourself or anybody else
when you describe your experiences during the study.
Data will be retained indefinitely and will be stored on an external hard drive in a locked filing cabinet as well
as on the secure storage devices of the investigators. Your data will remain confidential, and your responses
will be de-identified as soon as compensation is provided). Only de-identified data will be shared with other
researchers. In any resulting publications or presentations, participants will be referred to in the aggregate (as
groups) to protect individual identity. If any of the written description that you provide is described in a
presentation or publication, the details will be altered or the event paraphrased, and any potentially identifying
information will be removed.

PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
You can withdraw your participation from this study at any time (prior to exiting the survey) by clicking on the
“Next” button until you come to the end of the survey. At the end of the survey, you will be asked if you would
like to withdraw your data. Please note: Only completed surveys (>80% completion of text answers and rating
scales) will receive compensation. If you would like to withdraw your data, select ‘Yes” and the researchers
will manually remove any information recorded. The investigator may also withdraw you from this research if
circumstances arise which warrant doing so. Once you submit the completed survey and close the browser,
you will no longer be able to withdraw your data.

FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE PARTICIPANTS
A summary of the research findings will be available to you upon completion of the project.
Web address: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/research-result-summaries/
Date when results are available: on or before June 30, 2020

SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA
These data may be used in subsequent studies, in publications and in presentations.

RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, contact: Research Ethics Coordinator,
University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4; Telephone: 519-253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail:

ethics@uwindsor.ca
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SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR
These are the terms under which I will conduct research.
/s/ Kendra Nespoli

June 15, 2019

/s/ Josee Jarry

June 15, 2019

SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT/LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
I understand the information provided for the study “Screening for remembering past events in interpersonal
relationships with suspected psychopaths” as described herein. My questions have been answered to my
satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.
By commencing the study, it indicates your consent to participate.
Please print or save a copy of this information letter for your records.
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Appendix E9
Study 2 Main Protocol
Part II: Event Description
Please refer back to the event description you provided for the study screening and
answer the following questions in reference to the event you described in which someone
you suspect could be a psychopath made you question your memory for a specific past
event.
Please describe your memory for the original event (i.e., for the event itself).
[Open response field]
Approximately how old were you (in years) when the original event took place?
[Open response field]
Please describe how the suspected psychopath challenged your memory for the event. For
example, what did s/he say or do that made you question your memory?
[Open response field]
Approximately how old were you (in years) when this challenge took place?
[Open response field]
What happened after your memory was challenged?
[Open response field]
What did you decide about your memory?
[Open response field]
Do you think the challenge affected your confidence in your memory? Elaborate if
possible.
[Open response field]
Why do you think the suspected psychopath challenged your memory for the event?
[Open response field]
Here is a list of potential outcomes of a challenge to a memory for a past event. Please
check the one that applies, or check "other" if none apply:
a) I defended my memory and told the other person that they were incorrect and
maintained my belief that the event occurred as I remembered it.
b) I defended my memory and told the other person that they were incorrect but felt as
if my belief that the event occurred as I remembered it was lower than it was before
the challenge.
c) I complied with the other person by saying that they were correct but maintained my
belief that the event occurred as I remembered it.
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d) I complied with the other person by saying that they were correct and felt as if my
belief that the event occurred as I remembered it was lower than it was before the
challenge.
e) I did not say anything to the other person as to whether they were correct or incorrect
but maintained my belief that the event occurred as I remembered it.
f) I did not say anything to the other person as to whether they were correct or
incorrect, and felt as if my belief that the event occurred as I remembered it was
lower than it was before the challenge.
e) Other: None of these really capture what took place.
Please elaborate on the outcome that you just endorsed in the question above. We would
like more information about what took place that lead to this outcome, particularly if you
selected "Other".
[Open response field]
Please describe the nature of your relationship with the person you suspect is a
psychopath (e.g., friend, parent, sibling, significant other, acquaintance, etc.).
[Open response field]
Do you consider this an ongoing relationship at the present time? (Yes/No)
If Yes, approximately how long (in years) have you been in this relationship? (numerical
value).
If No, approximately how long (in years) has it been since the end of this relationship?
(numerical value)
Approximately how long (in years) had you known the suspected psychopath at the time
the interaction about this memory took place? (numerical value)
Was/is this type of exchange about a memory a type of interaction that you typically have
with the person you suspect is a psychopath? (Yes/No)
How frequently did/do you have interactions with the person you suspect is a psychopath
about the quality of your memory for past events? (E.g., once a week, once a month, etc.)
[Open response field]
What impact, if any, has this experience (i.e., memory challenge by the suspected
psychopath) had on you?
[Open response field]
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Part III: Memory Characteristics
Please answer the following questions regarding how you currently view the memory that
you described at the beginning of the survey (the memory that was challenged by the
person you suspect is a psychopath).
Belief in Occurrence (Scoboria et al., 2019)
1. How likely is it that you personally did in fact experience this event?

(1 = definitely did not happen; 7 = definitely happened)
2. It is true that this event occurred to me.
(1 = not at all true; 7 = extremely true)
3. How strong is your belief that this event actually occurred?
(1 = no belief; 3 = weak belief; 5 = moderate belief; 7 = strong belief)
4. While remembering this event, I feel that it actually occurred.
(1 = not at all; 7 = very strongly)
5. I feel that this event really happened to me.
(1 = no feeling; 7 = strong feeling)
6. Whether or not I can visualize this event clearly, I believe the event actually
happened to me.
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
7. I believe this event really occurred.
(1 = definitely did not occur; 7 = definitely occurred)
8. I believe that this event actually occurred to me, even if the details that I remember
are not completely accurate.
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
Belief in Accuracy (Scoboria, Talarico, et al., 2015)
1. How confident are you that your memory for this event is accurate?
(1 = not at all confident; 7 = completely confident)
2. What proportion of your memory for this event is accurate?
(1 = not at all accurate; 7 = 100% accurate)
3. Do you have any doubt about the accuracy of your memory for this event?
(1 = a great deal of doubt; 7 = no doubt whatsoever)
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Recollection (Scoboria et al., 2014)
1. Do you actually remember experiencing the event?
(1 = no memory at all; 7 = clear and complete memory)
2. How strong is your memory for this event?
(1 = no memory; 3 = weak memory; 5 = moderate memory; 7 = strong memory)
3. As you think about this event, can you actually remember it rather than just knowing
that it occurred?
(1 = not at all; 3 = vaguely; 5 = distinctly; 7 = more than any event)
Recollective Phenomenology, Personal Plausibility and Importance (Scoboria et al.,
2019)
1. How plausible is it that you personally could have experienced this event?
(1 = not at all plausible, 7 = extremely plausible)
2. When I think about this event it involves visual details.
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
3. My representation of this event contains sensory details (I can see, hear or perceive
what happened)
(1 = not a lot; 7 = a lot)
4. My memory for this event does not involve a lot of sensory information (sounds,
smells, tastes, etc.) (Reverse scored)
(1 = not a lot; 7 = a lot)
5. As I think about the event, I can visualize the setting where it occurred.
(1 = vague; 7 = clear/distinct)
6. When I think about this event, the location where the event takes place is.
(1 = vague; 7 = clear/distinct)
7. As I think about this event, I can see the location/setting where it took place.
(1 = not at all; 7 = extremely clear)
8. When I think about this event, the relative spatial arrangement of objects and people
are.
(1 = vague; 7 = clear/distinct)
9. As I think about the event, I feel that I travel back to the time when it happened, that I
am a subject in it, rather than an outside observer tied to the present.
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
303

10. While thinking about this event, I feel that I travel back in time and that I am right at
the moment when this event happened.
(1 = not at all; 7 = absolutely)
11. As I think about the event, I feel as though I am re-living the event.
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
12. While thinking about this event, I feel that I am re-experiencing the situation, as if I
was there.
(1 = not at all; 7 = very strongly)
13. This event is important to me (in relation to my goals, my values, and so on).
(1 = not at all important; 7 = very important)
14. I have thought or talked about this event before.
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
Memory Experiences Questionnaire-Short Form (MEQ-SF; Luchetti & Sutin, 2015)
EMOTIONAL INTENSITY
1. My emotions are very intense concerning this event.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
2. The memory of this event evokes powerful emotions.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
3. This memory does not evoke strong emotions in me.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
SHARING
4. Since it happened, I have talked about this event many times.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
5.

I frequently think about or talk about this event with others.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)

6. I rarely tell others about this memory.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
DISTANCING
7. I feel like the person in this memory is a different person than who I am today.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
8. When I recall this memory, I think, “that’s not me anymore.”
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
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9. I feel like I am the same person in the memory as I am today.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
VALENCE
10. The overall tone of the memory is positive.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
11. The overall tone of the memory is negative.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
Centrality of Event Scale (CES, 7-item; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006)
1. I feel that this event has become part of my identity.
(1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree)
2. This event has become a reference point for the way I understand myself and the
world. (1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree)
3. I feel that this event has become a central part of my life story.
(1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree)
4. This event has colored the way I think and feel about other experiences.
(1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree)
5. This event permanently changed my life.
(1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree)
6. I often think about the effects this event will have on my future.
(1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree)
7. This event was a turning point in my life.
(1 = totally disagree; 5 = totally agree)
Social Challenge Items (Wysman, 2016)
*bolded items created for the present study
Please think back to the time when you experienced the memory challenge you discussed
above and consider these questions.
1. At the time of the memory challenge, how much did it bother you that your memory
disagreed with what the other person said or did?
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
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2. Currently, how much does it bother you that your memory disagreed with what the
other person said or did?
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
3. At the time, how easy was it for you to disagree with the person who challenged your
memory?
(1 = very hard; 7 = very easy)
4. How much did your past experiences with the person who challenged your memory

influence your behaviour (i.e., what you said or did) in reaction to the challenge?
(1 = past experiences did not influence me at all; 7 = past experiences influenced me)
5. How forceful was the challenge the person made?
(1 = not at all forceful, 7 = very forceful)
6. At the time of the challenge, how important was it for you to avoid disagreeing with
the other person?
(1 = not at all important; 7 = very important)
7. At the time of the challenge, how important was your relationship with the person
who challenged your memory?
(1 = not at all important; 7 = very important)
8. How important is your relationship with the person(s) who challenged your
memory now?
(1 = not at all important; 7 = very important)
9. How credible was the information that the person provided when challenging your
memory?
(1 = not at all credible; 7 = highly credible)
10. At the time of the challenge, how credible was the person who challenged your
memory?
(1 = not at all credible; 7 = highly credible)
11. At the time of the challenge, how much did you trust him/her?
(1 = I did not trust them at all; 7 = I trusted them completely)
12. How much do you trust him/her now?
(1 = I do not trust him/her/them at all; 7 = I trust him/her/them completely)
13. At the time of the challenge, how much did you generally trust other people?
(1 = I did not trust others at all; 7 = I trusted others completely)
14. How much do you generally trust other people now?
(1 = I do not trust others at all; 7 = I trust others completely)
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15. At the time of the challenge, how much did you generally trust your own memory for
past events?
(1 = I mistrusted my memory completely; 7 = I trusted my memory completely)
16. How much do you trust your own memory for past events in general now?
(1 = I mistrust my memory completely; 7 = I trust my memory completely)
17. At the time of the challenge, to what extent did you wonder if your memory might
have come from some source other than personal experience? Some examples of
other sources include having been told about it by someone else, from your
imagination, a dream, or from a TV show.
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
18. After the challenge occurred, how much did you seek out information from anyone
else (other than the person who challenged your memory)?
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much)
19. After the challenge occurred, how much did you discuss the event with others (not
including the person who challenged your memory)?
(1 = lack of discussion with others, 7 = long and/or emotionally intense discussion
with others)
20. At the time of the challenge, to what extent did you feel like the person who
challenged your memory was attempting to threaten you?
(1 = I was not threatened; 4 = I felt that threat was implied; 7 = there was an explicit
threat)
21. How important was this memory to you before it was challenged?
(1 = not at all important; 7 = very important)
Part IV: Other Measures (IAS, DUTCH, MSRP, GCS, CCB, MIRS)
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Appendix E10
Interpersonal Adjective Scale - Self
(IAS-R; Wiggins et al., 1988)
Please rate how accurately each word describes you, using the following scale.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

extremely

very

quite

slightly

slightly

quite

very

extremely

accurate

accurate

accurate

accurate

inaccurate

inaccurate inaccurate inaccurate

For example, consider the word “Introverted”. How accurately does that word describe
you as a person? If you think this is a quite accurate description of you, you would select
the number “6” in the space next to the word “Introverted”. If you think this word is
slightly inaccurate as a description of you, you would select the number “4”. If it is very
inaccurate you would select “2”, and so on…
It is very important that you do not skip any. If you are uncertain about the meaning of a
word, please consult the definitions provided in the brackets.

Introverted (feels more comfortable by oneself; is less interested
in other people)
Assertive (tends to be aggressive and outspoken with others)
Timid (tends to be fearful or uncomfortable around others)
This measure is protected by copyright. Samples items are presented in accordance with
PAR Inc. license agreement.
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Appendix E11
Interpersonal Adjective Scale - Other
(IAS-R; Wiggins et al., 1988)
Please rate how accurately each word describes the person you suspect is a psychopath,
using the following scale.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

extremely

very

quite

slightly

slightly

quite

very

extremely

inaccurate

inaccurate

inaccurate

inaccurate

accurate

accurate

accurate

accurate

For example, consider the word “Introverted”. How accurately does that word describe
you as a person? If you think this is a quite accurate description of you, you would select
the number “6” in the space next to the word “Introverted”. If you think this word is
slightly inaccurate as a description of you, you would select the number “4”. If it is very
inaccurate you would select “2”, and so on…
It is very important that you do not skip any. If you are uncertain about the meaning of a
word, please consult the definitions provided in the brackets.

Introverted (feels more comfortable by oneself; is less interested
in other people)
Assertive (tends to be aggressive and outspoken with others)
Timid (tends to be fearful or uncomfortable around others)
This measure is protected by copyright. Samples items are presented in accordance with
PAR Inc. license agreement.
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Appendix E12
Dutch Test of Conflict Handling (DUTCH) – Self
(Euwema & Van de Vliert, 1990)
Please rate the degree to which you agree with the following statements about yourself.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Yielding
gives in to the wishes of the other party.
concurs with the other party.
tries to accommodate the other party.
adapts to the other parties' goals and interests.
Compromising
tries to realize a middle-of-the-road solution.
emphasizes that we have to find a compromise solution.
insists we both give in a little.
strives whenever possible towards a fifty-fifty compromise.
Forcing
pushes own point of view.
searches for gains.
fights for a good outcome self.
does everything to win.
Problem solving
examines issues until finding a solution that really satisfies
both parties.
stands for own and other's goals and interests.
examines ideas from both sides to find a mutually optimal
solution.
works out a solution that serves own and other's interests as
much as possible.
Avoiding
avoids a confrontation about our differences.
avoids differences of opinion as much as possible.
tries to make differences look less severe.
tries to avoid a confrontation with the other.
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5
Strongly
Agree

Appendix E13
Dutch Test of Conflict Handling (DUTCH) – Other
(Euwema & Van de Vliert, 1990)
Please rate the degree to which you agree with the following statements about the person
you suspect is a psychopath.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Yielding
gives in to the wishes of the other party.
concurs with the other party.
tries to accommodate the other party.
adapts to the other parties' goals and interests.
Compromising
tries to realize a middle-of-the-road solution.
emphasizes that we have to find a compromise solution.
insists we both give in a little.
strives whenever possible towards a fifty-fifty compromise.
Forcing
pushes own point of view.
searches for gains.
fights for a good outcome self.
does everything to win.
Problem solving
examines issues until finding a solution that really satisfies
both parties.
stands for own and other's goals and interests.
examines ideas from both sides to find a mutually optimal
solution.
works out a solution that serves own and other's interests as
much as possible.
Avoiding
avoids a confrontation about our differences.
avoids differences of opinion as much as possible.
tries to make differences look less severe.
tries to avoid a confrontation with the other.

311

5
Strongly
Agree

Appendix E14
Modified Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Short Form
(SRP-SF; Paulhus et al., 2016)
Please rate the degree to which the following statements describe the person you suspect
is a psychopath.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

The person I suspect to be a psychopath…
1.
2.
3.

Rarely follows the rules.
Has often done something dangerous just for the thrill of it.
Never feels guilty over hurting others.

This measure is protected by copyright. Samples items are presented in accordance with
Multi Health Systems license agreement.
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Appendix E15
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS)
(Gudjonsson, 1989)
How false or true is each statement in describing you?
Note: You may skip any questions you do not wish to answer.
1

2

3

4

False

Mostly
False

Mostly
True

True

1. I give in easily to people when I am pressured.
2. I find it very difficult to tell people when I disagree with them.
3. People in authority make me feel uncomfortable and uneasy.
4. I tend to give in to people who insist they are right.
5. I tend to become easily alarmed and frightened when I am in the company of
people in authority.
6. I try very hard not to offend people in authority.
7. I would describe myself as a very obedient person.
8. I tend to go along with what people tell me even when I know they are wrong.
9. I believe in avoiding rather than facing demanding and frightening situations.
10. I try to please others.
11. Disagreeing with people often takes more time than it is worth.
12. I generally believe in doing as I am told.
13. When I am uncertain about things, I tend to accept what people tell me.
14. I generally try to avoid confrontation.
15. As a child I always did what my parents told me.
16. I try hard to do what is expected of me.
17. I am not too concerned about what people think of me.
18. I strongly resist being pressured to do things I don’t want to do.
19. I would never go along with what people tell me in order to please them.
20. When I was a child, I sometimes took the blame for things I had not done.
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Appendix E16
Checklist of Controlling Behaviors (CCB)
(Lehmann et al., 2012)
Below is a list of behaviours people may experience in relationships. For each of the
statements below, please select the response that best describes your relationship with the
person you suspect is a psychopath (i.e., the person in the interaction you described at the
beginning of the survey).
1

2

3

4

5

Never

Rarely

Occasionally

Frequently

Very frequently

Physical abuse
1.
Threw something at me
2.
Pushed or grabbed me
3.
Pulled my hair
4.
Choked me
5.
Pinned me to the wall, floor, or bed
6.
Hit, kicked, or punched me
7.
Hit or tried to hit me with something
8.
Threatened me with a knife, gun or other weapon
9.
Spit at me
10.
Tried to block me from leaving
Sexual abuse
1.
Physically forced me to have sexual intercourse
2.
Pressured me to have sex when I said no
3.
Pressured or forced me to into other unwanted sexual acts (e.g., oral, anal, etc.)
4.
Treated me like a sex object
5.
Inflicted pain on me during sex
6.
Pressured me to have sex after a fight
7.
Was insensitive to my sexual needs
8.
Made jokes about parts of my body
9.
Blames me because others found me attractive
Emotional abuse
1.
Insulted me in front of others
2.
Put down my sexual attractiveness
3.
Made out I was stupid
4.
Criticized my care of children or home
5.
Swore at me
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6.
7.
8.
9.

Told me I was crazy
Told me I was irrational
Blamed me for his problems
Made untrue accusations

Economic abuse
1.
Did not allow me equal access to the family money
2.
Told me or acted as if it were “their money, their house, their car, etc.”
3.
Threatened to withhold money from me
4.
Made me ask for money for the basic necessities
5.
Used my fear of not having access to money to control my behaviour
6.
Made me account for the money I spent
7.
Tried to keep me dependent on him for money
Intimidation
1.
Moved toward me when he was angry
2.
Pounded his fists on the table
3.
Hit the wall
4.
Smashed or broke something
5.
Threw or kicked something
6.
Used angry facial gestures
7.
Drove angrily or recklessly
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Made threats to:
Hit or kill me
Turn others against me
Take the children (if any) away
Make sure I didn’t have money
Show up unexpectedly or to always be watching me
Come after me if I left
Have me committed

Minimizing/denying
1.
Denied that he had abused me
2.
Told me I was lying about being abused
3.
Insisted that what he did was not so bad
4.
Told me to forget about what he did and leave it in the past
5.
Told me that abuse was a normal part of relationships
6.
Told me that he couldn’t remember hurting me
7.
Told me I hurt myself when I fell
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Blaming
1.
Blamed me for his or her abusive behaviour saying:
2.
It was my fault
3.
I deserved it
4.
He or she has to teach me a lesson
5.
I provoked him or her
6.
It “takes two to tango”
7.
I hurt him first
8.
I asked/dared him or her to hit me
Isolation
1.
Told me I couldn’t do something
2.
Forbade me or stopped me from seeing someone
3.
Monitored my time or made me account for where I was
4.
Restricted my use of the car
5.
Restricted my use of the telephone
6.
Listened to my telephone conversations
7.
Pressures me to stop contacting my family or friends
8.
Made it difficult for me to get a job or pursue a vocation
9.
Kept me from getting medical attention
10.
Tried to turn people against me
(Male) privilege
1.
Demanded obedience
2.
Treated me like a servant
3.
Treated me like an inferior
4.
Expected me to meet their sexual needs regardless of my needs
5.
Treated me like I was helpless or incapable
6.
Told me I couldn’t get along without him them
7.
Had or demanded the final say in decisions
Did not allow me to do the things that he thought he had a right to do because
8.
he was a man
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Appendix E17
Modified Interpersonal Relationship Scale (MIRS)
(Garthoeffner, Henry, & Robinson, 1993)
As you respond to the following statements, think about your relationship with the person
you suspect is a psychopath (from the description you provided at the beginning of the
survey).
Please answer the statements by giving as true a picture of your feelings and beliefs as
they were at the time of the memory challenge, not the way you think it should be or
should have been.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither agree nor
disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

*items are reverse scored
Trust
1. There are times when my partner cannot be trusted.
2. My partner would tell a lie if s/he could gain by it.
3. In our relationship, I have to be alert or my partner is likely to take advantage of
me.
4. My partner is honest mainly because of a fear of being caught.
5. I’m better off if I don’t trust my partner too much.
6. Even though my partner provides me with many reports and stories, it is hard to
get an objective account of things.
7. There is no simple way to decide if my partner is telling the truth.
8. In our relationship, I am occasionally distrustful and expect to be exploited.
9. My partner can be counted on to do what s/he says s/he will do.*
10. I do not believe my partner would cheat on me even if s/he could get away with
it.*
11. My partner can be relied on to keep his or her promises.*
12. My partner treats me fairly and justly.*
13. The advice my partner gives cannot be regarded as being trustworthy.
14. I am afraid my partner will hurt my feelings.
15. My partner pretends to care more about me than s/he really does.
16. My partner is likely to say what s/he really believes rather than what s/he thinks I
want to hear.*
17. I wonder how much my partner really cares about me.
18. I believe most things my partner says. *
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Self-disclosure
19. I can express deep, strong feelings to my partner.*
20. I feel comfortable expressing almost anything to my partner.*
21. In our relationship, I feel I am able to expose my weaknesses.*
22. I do not show deep emotions to me partner.
23. I share and discuss my problems with my partner.*
24. I tell my partner some things of which I am very ashamed.*
25. It is hard for me to tell my partner about myself.
26. I talk with my partner about why certain people dislike me.*
27. We are very close to each other.*
28. In our relationship, I’m cautious and play it safe.
29. I discuss with my partner the things I worry about when I’m with a person of the
opposite sex.*
30. I’m afraid of making mistakes with my partner.
31. I touch my partner when I feel warmly towards him or her.*
32. It’s hard for me to act natural when I’m with my partner.
Genuineness
33. My partner really cares about what happens to me.*
34. It is safe to believe that my partner is interested in my welfare.*
35. My partner is truly sincere in his or her promises.*
36. My partner is sincere and practices what s/he preaches.*
Empathy
37. My way of doing things is apt to be misunderstood by my partner.
38. I feel my partner misinterprets what I say.
39. I sometimes stay away from my partner because I fear doing or saying something
I might regret afterwards.
40. My partner doesn’t really understand me.
41. I sometimes wonder what hidden reason my partner has for doing nice things for
me.
Comfort
42. I seek my partner’s attention when I am facing troubles.*
43. I would like my partner to be with me when I’m lonely.*
44. I feel comfortable when I am alone with my partner.*
45. I would like my partner to be with me when I receive bad news.*
46. I feel relaxed when we are together.*
47. I face life with my partner with confidence.*
Communication
48. I listen carefully to my partner and help him or her solve problems.*
49. I understand my partner and sympathize with his or her feelings.*
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Appendix E18
Demographic Questions for Study 2 Participants
Age:
Sex:
Ethnicity (please select):
__ Black/African/Caribbean
__ Chinese
__ Filipino
__ First Nations
__ Japanese
__ Latin American
__ Mixed
__ South Asian (e.g., East Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, etc.)
__ Southeast Asian (e.g., Vietnamese, Cambodian, Malaysian, etc.)
__ White
__ Other: ______________________________________________
Highest level of education completed. If currently enrolled, please select the highest
degree you have received:
__ No formal education
__ Elementary school
__ High school or equivalent (GED)
__ Community college
__ Bachelor’s degree
__ Master’s degree
__ Professional degree
__ Doctorate degree
How did you hear about this study? [open response field]
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Appendix E19
Compensation Information for Study 2
Please enter your name _____________ and email address ________________ in order
to receive compensation.
If you would like to donate the compensation you will receive for participating in this
study, please select which organization(s) you would like us send your donation to:
__ Aftermath
__ Love Fraud
__ Hare.org
__ Love.Life.Om.
__ Psychopaths&Love
Thank you for your participation!
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Appendix E20
Supportive Resource Information Sheet – International
Canada

United States

Crisis Service Canada and Canada Suicide
Prevention Service (CSPS)
Phone: 1-833-456-4566 (24-hour crisis services)
Text: 45645 (5pm to 1am EST)
Chat: crisisservicescanada.ca (5pm to 1am EST)

US National Suicide Prevention LifeLine
Phone: 1-800-273-TALK

KidsHelpPhone (age 20 and under)
Phone: 1-800-668-6868

CrisisChat
Online service
(Daily, 2pm to 2am EST)
Common Ground
Online chat service
(Monday to Friday, 4pm to 10pm)

Youth Space (age 30 and under)
Professional counsellors available to talk
Chat: Youthspace.ca (Daily, 6pm – 12pm PST)
Email: youthtalk2@pcfsa.org
First Nations and Inuit Hope for Wellness 24/7
Help Line
(24-hour help line)
Phone: 1-855-242-3310
Trans LifeLine
Phone: 1-877-330-6366

Trans LifeLine USA
Phone: 1-877-565-8860

Lifeline Canada
Web: www.thelifelinecanada.ca
- Contact information for local crisis
centres across the country
- ECounselling resources
- Coping strategies
- Information on the LifeLine App

Military Veterans Canada and USA
Phone: 1-800-273-8255 (press 2 for
Spanish)
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